SAFE FILE: Harry Hopkins

JR
This telegram must be

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated January 14, 1941

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

REGRADED

138, January 14, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM MR. HOPKINS:

"Weekend with Cherchill. Leaving for tour naval bases with him today. Saw King yesterday. Well and confident. He sends warm regards to you. Your message received well here. Am urging Government here not to create or accentuate differences between us pending passage of Bill. What is your best judgment as to when Bill will pass? Hope there will be no major amendments. Can we be informed relative to the Bill from time to time? Going here pretty (BEGIN UNDERLINING) rough (END UNDERLINING). Am seeing everything from bombs to President's cousins. Letter by messenger. All well."


JOHNSON

TFV

932401

SECONDARY THEATERS

AFRICA



-27:05

IN THE PACIFIC AREA

1	Hawaii and when will those planes be there?
<u></u>	b. How many planes to reinforce Panama and when will they be there?
V	c. How many would be required in the whole of the Far Eastern area to afford support sufficient to prevent that area falling into the hands of the enemy?
1	d. Can the British provide any of these planes and if so how many, of what type and when?
1	e. what planes could we supply, by what route and when?
V	f. If we have not adequate ammunition for these combat planes can the British supplement that by loaning us ammunition for a few months?
-	g. More specifically what steps can be taken for the defense of Singapore and the Philappines?
-	h. Are we going to make an effort to get an air unit into China in addition to the planes already there?
<u></u>	i. Are we going to order the American fliers there into the Army and are they going to be reinforced by planes, what type, when and how?
	j. what would be the plan of operations in event of the fall of Singapore?
r	k. Would the Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand be defensible and is there a plan for action in the event of that contingency?

· Safa: Hopkins

February 16, 1942

PRIORITY OF OBJECTIVES TO JULY 1

LIST OF PRIORITIES - A

- 1. United States to take primary responsibility for reinforcing the Netherlands Last Indies, Australia and New Zealand. The men, materiel and munitions to leave the United States prior to March 31. Supporting supplies of men and material to compensate for attrition rate to follow regularly. The force to include the men and material that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary.
- 2. In addition to convoy, the Navy to strike with every means available in that area the supply lines or concentration points of the Japs. The Navy to provide in Australia such naval base material as is required.
- 3. Every effort made to hold Java as well as defending with all means available all further advances of the Japs. Hold the island of Timor.
 - 4. The British to make such supplementary assistance as they

have available in this area in ships and man power.

- 5. The British to take the primary responsibility for reinforcing Eurma immediately and defending Rangoon. The United
 States to provide such supplementary aid as is available.
- 6. The United States to continue to take the primary responsibility for military assistance to China in terms of materiel, but confining that materiel for the present to the urgent munitions of war such as aircraft, ammunition, high octane gasoline and such other weapons of war as can be utilized when they reach the Chinese Army. The volunteer air force now in Rangoon to be considered part of American support of Chiang Kai-shek.
- 7. Intensification of the campaign against submarines in the Atlantic, including the great extension of the use of smaller ships.
- 8. The Russian Protocol, the supplies to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the United Kingdom and to selected South American countries.

- 9. The reinforcement of Hawaii. The increase in our attacking force on the Atlantic Seaboard to 100,000 men and the preparation of shipping for their purposes. The British to increase their special forces from 55,000 to 100,000 men.
 - 1. Carry out the proposed plans for bomber squadrons in England.
 - 11. The strengthening of the Atlantic Ferry Service.
- 13 Put up in the very top production priorities for the machine tools, the equipment and facilities required for the production of high-octane gasoline plants, of all combat aircraft of the Army and the Navy and merchant ships.

LIST OF PRIORITIES - B

- The complete occupation by American forces in Iceland and the reaching of our objective in the North of Ireland.
- A complete plan for striking force in Alaska and the Aleutian
 Islands and pushing that plan as far as possible prior to July 1.
- 3. The induction and enlistment of ____ hundred thousand men for the Army and the Navy and the provision of training and equipment

for these men.

201 - 11

But

SECRET

March 2, 1942.

Memorandum for Mr. Harry Hopkins.

Airplane production for February, according to preliminary figures, was 3,148 planes. This is above the January figure, despite the fact that February was a short month.

134 heavy bombers were delivered - 75 B-17s and 59 B-24s. This is 24 above estimates.

I do not have the breakdown between tactical planes and training planes.

Robert P. Patterson Under Secretary of War.

RPT 107

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Date- 4-3-59

Signature- Carl J. Specer

PD
This telegram must be closely paraphresed before being communicated to anyone. (NO)

Lenden

Dated April 14, 1942 Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Logic: in min

Secretary of State.

Washington.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date_FED_ 4 1972

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1820, April 14, noon.

HOPKINS.

Serious nevel problem developing Indian Ocean. Chiefs of Staff here considering message which former nevel person will send to you later today. I have appointment with him six o'clock tonight when he will show me draft. I am Sure that nevel situation Indian Ocean requires your most urgent attention. The enemy have apparently moved very powerful forces in that direction and the implications of this will readily occur to you.

Final meeting Chiefs of Staff and Defense Council with us will be held late tonight. Very confident of outcome. Marshall has made splendid impression hare. He has presented our case with great force but moderately. The result will, I believe, be not only an agreement in principle but a real meeting of minds. I cannot

emphasize

-2- #1820, April 14, noon from London

emphasize too strongly the favorable impression Marshall has made here. Everyone regrets that admiral King could not have been present. Everyone here asks about you. I am feeling extremely well but anxious to get ham to tell you what cannot be said by cable.

MATTHEWS

KLP

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Boy

April 15, 1942.

HOPKINS LONDON

YOUR SUGGESTION BEING STUDIED BUT CONCENSUS OF OPINION IS THAT ODOR STILL TOO STRONG FOR FAMILY OF NATIONS.

ROOSEVELT

032m01

JW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated April 15, 1942

Rec'd 5:48 a.m.,

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1851, April 15, 12 a.m.

SECRET AND FERSONAL FOR THE FRESIDENT FROM

HOPKINS.

How about nailing that wood pussy Laval to your bern door?

MATTHEWS

KLP

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

-27 .. 02

Safe : Hopkins

April 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LOVETTE

You remember some time ago the Army took 25 planes from the airlines. As I recall you put those directly into the Army service and sent to the African Ferry Service 25 planes belonging to the Army in their stead.

Today I have a memorandum dated April 22 stating that the total number of planes in the transport service in the African-Asiatic Ferry routes are 37, of which 10 are in China, 17 in India, 2 en route and 4 scheduled to leave.

I don't quite understand these figures because I assumed you had a substantial number of transports in Africa itself going back and forth between Cairo and Takoradi.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

22.01

WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

April 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

With reference to your memorandum of April 24 on the subject of the number of planes in the African-Asiatic ferry routes, our records here indicate a considerably larger figure than the 37 mentioned by you. Since our records show shipment and initial allocation, we are not absolutely sure of the present position of all of these planes, but we are wiring out to the locality to get more accurate information and I shall communicate this to you as soon as it is received.

At the present time, excluding 37 transport type aircraft delivered to the British in Africa under Lend-Lease, there are 53 planes carried on our records as being in Africa and India on <u>fer-fying services</u>.

China National Airways is charged with 8, of which 6 are known to be in India East of Karachi and with 2 C-53's somewhere around Basra en route to them.

For the 10th Air Force in India, four planes have been turned over to them East of Karachi. For the Burma Road replacement operation 13 of the 25 planes are on the way and were last reported somewhere in the Natal Division with 12 at West Palm Beach, 9 of which are ready to go as of April 25 with 3 held up with difficulties in the extra-range tanks.

On the trans-Africa British-PAA operation between Bathhurst and Cairo, there are 14 transports.

On the Lagos-Karachi run, the Ferrying Command-PAA, there are 14 planes. I am informed that some of these have been shot through to India and China on a special secret mission, after the completion of which they will return to their regular Division run.


General Stilwell's headquarters have recently advised us that the condition of the fields is such that 25 planes on the Burma Road operation is the present maximum which he can effectively handle. Operations in that district appear to be seriously interfered with by the Japanese advance in Burms and air attacks on all fields in that general district. A report just received indicates that a

DOD DAM 5200.9 (9/27/58)

10-25-66

F. ...

SECRET



China National Airways plane landed at Lashb to find the field deserted and at once took off for Kunming. However, General George reports that he intends to bring the number of aircraft destined for the Burma Road operation up to 35 within the next few weeks by sending additional C-53's and C-47's out of Army production (these have stiffened bellies and wide doors to permit cargo carrying).

In addition to the aircraft shown above there are, of course, the Boeing 307's (4-engined stratoliners) used in the through express service. These are generally used for emergency requirements and are, therefore, not charged especially to this operation.

ROBERT A. LOVETT


Assistant Secretary of War for Air

ett Libeary

500.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10- 25-66

Signature-Carl L. Spicer



77 -- ~ 7

THE WHITE HOUSE Hophins Marshall and King Lundon Your two manager of July 22. do not whally Take mer lay ourprise And I agree that mere acquisting on part of and finals is not on ficient. therefore repret The directive That some ather affereion be worked ant for hencricum pround forces m 1942. In 1942. Inch me affancier anght not to at such a Mostance as to require

PSF (Lufe): Hopki

very lung sea Trip. Therefore I not study of following in The order of what I regard so bust shauce of success combined with political and miletary usefulures and anubined with Pprad. a. a new form of attack on Algress and in Morocco &. The old gymnast tent Confined in Engineering to American Traspo unty C. Northern Norway al igypt. E. Persia to Cancasus. I have just account movings

fram Kurrison in Beren of which following paraf have Quali Unguste. have speed in a Mecicion. Musevelo

Sate File: Hopkins For Hofokins Sin Wineston my Can med The Tell him not sown he that stats That wedding , woodolph touched with her med he is in fine from and the back continues To infrom. All will will see you at White Hunke Litry

Russel

July 15, 1942.

KENORANDUN FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL ADMIRAL KING NOW. HARRY L. HOPKINS

BURJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR BONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.

1. O.K.

- go great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joing operational plans between the British and curselves along two linest
 - (A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.
 - (B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3.

- (A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be sompromise on this point.
- (B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.
- (C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is computal.
- (D) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably mad.
- (E) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

- 4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.
- 5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investinge the possibility of executing SLEDGEHARMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHARMER is of such grave importance that grave reasons are to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russianeshingses collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, SLEDGEHARMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHARMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.
- 6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.
- 7. If SLEDGEHARMER is finally and definitely out of these picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

- (a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, RCUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.
- (b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, MCUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.
- 8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:
 - (1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
 - (2) Loss of Syria.
 - (3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.
 - (4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

- (5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.
- (6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.
- (7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.
- (8) You will the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely:
 - (a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.
 - (b) A new operation in Korocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of Krench Colonial troops is still in doubt.
- (9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and African beginning in 1942. It is of the utmast importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the ether hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1948 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.
- (10) Please remember three cardinal principles -speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined
 with defense but not defense alone.
- (11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER_IN_CHIEF

MISS THILY:

I DAY HAVE CENT, YOU A COPY OF THIS YESTERDAY. I CAN'T HEMEMBER BUT IT IS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES.

L. BERNEY

Bot

FIRMULE 23, 1942

TO: MEDICAN TABASSY

THE TANK THE THROUGH FOR THE PRINT MINISTER FR M FOR THE STATE OF YOUR TELEVISION PRESCRIED B.A.D. 510 FEBRUARY 21 FOR THE COLDERY, PARAGRAPH (11):

THE FLIGHT OF HEAVY DOMEIRO ACROSS AFRICA TO THE FAR HANT MAN CONTINUED LITHOUT ARATEMENT. THE ONLY CHECK TO COVETENT DECURRED BETWEEN INDIA AND MEL AND EVIDENTLY WAS IN ORDER MORE TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM ARRACOM BUT EVEN SO OUR REPORTS INTECATE TO THESE FLY. FROM CEYLON TO JAVA FEBRUARY TARMTY.

MARINY HOPKINS -

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

SAFE FILE: Iceland

Directions for Adding JPEG tags into An HTML Document to Create Originals

- 1. Place disk into hard drive and open up notepad.
- 2. Go into the A drive and switch from "text documents" to "all files."
- 3. Open up TXTEMP.
- 4. Using the list provided, change "PLACE TITLE HERE" to the title of the first jpeg on your list, in quotation marks.
- 5. Moving down the notepad, change "PLACE TEXT HERE" to
 - "> In between the quotation marks you will place the tag of the jpeg that you are working on followed by a period and jpeg.

Ex. <img src="a01a01.jpg"

- 6. Moving down the notepad, change "PLACE GRAPHIC HTML HERE" to
- "t .htm" In between the t and .htm, place the tag of the jpeg you are working on.
- 6. To the right of that, you will find "VIEW TEXT." Change that to read "VIEW ORIGINAL."
- 7. Change "PLACE NEXT PAGE HERE" to the jpeg tage of the next document with a .htm after it. If you are working on the last document in a folder, cut this entire line with the cut tool found in edit, for you will need it for the first document in the next folder you do (All you will have to do then is paste that line back into the notepad.) Ex. "a01a02.htm"
- 8. When working with the first jpeg of a folder, delete the **entire** line containing "PLACE PREVIOUS PAGE HERE." Use the cut tool found in edit. When working on the second document and the rest from then on, paste the entire line back. You must then change "PLACE PREVIOUS DOCUMENT HERE" to the jpeg tag of the previous document followed by .htm.
 - Ex. If you are working on file a01a02, you will write "a01a01.htm"
- 9. In front of "Index" you will place an a and the folder number you are working on. After "INDEX" you will place a .htm.
 - Ex. "a01Index.htm"
- 10. You are now finished inserting into notepad. Press Save As, and name the document the jpeg tag followed by a .htm.

Ex. "a01a01.htm"

- 11. Save this document into desktop, and start on the next jpeg tag in notepad.
- 12. Once you save close to fifty or sixty documents, go into INTERNET and enter FTP.
- 13. Where it says PROFILE NAME, type in Marist.
- 14. Where it says HOST NAME, type in www.academic.marist.edu
- 15. Where it says USER ID, type in Jay.
- 16. Where it says Password, type in the password that Jay Gagnon gives you.
- 17. On the right hand column, double click on the green arrow.
- 18. Double click on fdr.
- 19. Double click on web.
- 20. Double click on fdrsafe.
- 21. Double click on documents.
- 22. Double click on the box that your folder is in. If you do not know what box your document is in, just randomly check the boxes until you find your number.

ZSECRET

(c) A new plan, entitled Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 3, which would involve an "all-out" defense of Western Atlantic waters, plus the defense of Iceland, Under this plan, we would protect all except Axis shipping west of longitude 260West, and would attack Axis raiders and submarines wherever found in these waters. This would involve escorting of all convoys bound between North America and the United Kingdom, as well as patrolling and covering operations for the protection of shipping in the Western Atlantic, including the convoys between Freetown and the United Kingdom which now move approximately along the meridian of 30°West. This latter plan has been in preparation for the past ten days, and should be ready for issue to the Fleet the latter part of this week. We have discussed this plan with the British Joint Staff Mission here in Washington, and have telegraphed it to London so that the British Chiefs of Staff could advise us on it. The British have expressed full agreement with it, except in minor details, and, naturally, desire to see it placed in effect. It is the plan which Ambassador Winant referred to in his yesterday's dispatch. In sending this plan to Ghormley, I advised him as follows:

"You are to state categorically to the Chiefs of Staff that there is no present intention of the United States Government to execute this measure, but the Chief of Naval Operations has directed the preparation of the plan so that the Navy will be ready for effective action under all eventualities. The plan would be considered a preparatory measure for ABC-1 and would be in general accord with that agreement."

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DECL Service (9/27/58)

milir E. Rossevelt Libra.

JUD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFFDate- 4-6-59
WASHINGTON

Signature- Carl & Spicer

August 29, 1941

Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

Dear Betty:

I am of the opinion that the United States forces in Iceland should be under one commander, who should be given, to the extent legally possible, full authority and responsibility. The Commander's authority should not be restricted to that contemplated in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" for the exercise of "unity of command."

In order to give the Commander of United States Forces in Iceland the authority legally possible over the combined forces, I propose that Marine forces in Iceland be detached for service with the Army. There is attached hereto a joint letter transmitting to the President a draft of an Executive Order which will accomplish the proposed detachment.

Since the Army contingent will sail on or about September 5, it is very desirable that this matter be expedited.

Faithfully yours,

Sichas signad HRS

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Bate- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

Washington, D. C.

August 29, 1941.

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

Troops of the United States Marine Corps are now serving in Iceland. A small Army force is at present there and a larger body of Army troops is expected soon to sail for that island. The military situation requires that the personnel of the several branches be under a single command; and it is most undesirable that there be two separate United States military forces in that island, each operating under a different department and different laws. Congress has provided a remedy for such a situation by the following statutes:

- a. ** * * The Marine Corps shall, at all times, be subject to the laws and regulations established for the government of the Navy, except when detached for service with the Army by order of the President; and when so detached they shall be subject to the rules and Articles of War prescribed for the government of the Army: * * ** (Revised Statutes, sec. 1621; 34 U.S.C. 715)
- b. *ART. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and
 shall be understood as included in the term 'any person
 subject to military law,' or 'persons subject to military
 law,' whenever used in these articles:
- (c) Officers and soldiers of the Marine Corps when detached for service with the armies of the United States by order of the President: * * ** (Article of War 2, 41 Stat. 787, 10 U.S.C. 1473)

It is therefore recommended that, pursuant to the statutes quoted, you sign the inclosed draft of an order, which will have the effect of making the Army and Marine forces in Iceland a single



22122



united force and will greatly increase their military efficiency. It is further recommended, for obvious reasons, that the order be kept secret until after the arrival of the Army troops mentioned in Iceland.

The action recommended follows the precedent set by President Wilson in issuing a similar order with respect to the marines serving in the American Expeditionary Forces in France.

Respectfully yours,

Henry L'Etimoon

Secretary of War.

Townstal

Secretary of Navy.

l Incl. Draft of order.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)



EXECUTIVE ORDER

Detachment of Marines in Iceland for Service with the Army.

Pursuant to Revised Statutes, section 1621 (34 U.S. Code 715), Article of War 2 (10 U.S. Code 1473); and the act of August 29, 1916 (34 U.S. Code 716); it is hereby ordered, effective September 13, 1941, that all personnel of the United States Marine Corps then or later serving in Iceland and of the Medical Department of the Navy serving with them be detached for service with the Armies of the United States, and remain so detached until their departure from Iceland.

The White House

August , 1941.

a 33624

But.

BF. Sof: Iceaux

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

COMPTENTIAL

September 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached despatch gives General

Marston's report of the rape case in Iceland

which Elliot spoke of the other day.

The full written report has not yet reached the Department.

Respectfully,

R. BEARDALL

: Lost Library

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DOD DIK. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

· Mariana Concession Constitution

22 21

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER			ADDRESSEES	<u> </u>	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE	
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

GCT

TEXT

HAVE SIGNED VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS OF 4 WARINES ACCUSED OF RAPE OF COUNTRY HOWAR AND MARINES ARE SEING TRIED BY GENERAL COURTS MARTIAL. 1 CONVENED TODAY, PUBLIC STATMENT BY THIS HEADQUARTERS DEPRECATING INCIDENT AND ASSURING IDELANDERS OF FULL MEASURE OF PUNISHMENT FOR ACCUSED MEM AND APPARENTLY ALLAYED PUBLIC FEELINGS, MAILED REPORT SEPT. 5Th. THE ABOVE IS IN REFERENCE TO YOUR \$62255.

DISTRIBUTION:

MARCORPS....ACTION

15/11 13 FILE _NAVIDE

*PHONED ADM NOYES/ GEN HOLCOME / 4095/9

*PHONED MARCORPS D.O. 1302

TIME

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN SEE ARTICLE 76 (4) NAV REGS.

77.- ~~

SAFE FILE: India

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON

March 10, 1942.



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RUDOLPH FORSTER:

The attached paper was prepared by Field Marshal Sir John Dill for the President's information. He has sent it with a note to General Marshall for transmission and as General Marshall is not here today I am forwarding it direct. Will you please see that the President gets it.

Incl. 5-page mimeo. with map, "Appreciation of the Japanese threat to India."

MAR 1 1 1942

OUT



OUT

DECLASSIFIED JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974





Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

10th March, 1942.

Dear Mushall

The President asked to be informed as to the scale of a Japanese attack against India in the event of the loss of Burma, and also as to the British forces available to meet it.

Attached hereto is a note along these lines.

Home & Dill

General George C. Marshall, Room 2030, War Department, Washington, D.C. BUY



COPY NO

APPRECIATION OF THE JAPANESE THREAT TO INDIA.

INVACION BY LAND.

- 1. The only line of invasion by land is from BURMA through ASSAM, such an invasion being combined with air and sea borne attack in the area of the GANGES DELTA.
- 2. Unless they over-run BURMA the Japanese cannot invade INDIA by land. Assuming, however, that they do over-run BURMA, the scale of attack is limited by the over-riding factor of communications, which will therefor be considered first.

Communications. (See Sketch map attached).

- The communications from French INDO-CHINA through YUNNAN to the Northern ASSAM rail-head at LEDO are so difficult that a threat from this direction can be disregarded. Similarly even if the Japanese over-run the MANDALAY Area, communications beyond MYITKYNIA are such that an advance beyond that point in any strength is most unlikely.
- 4. There are only two other lines of advance.
 - (a) From MANDALAY via KALEMA MANIPUR ROAD
 and BRAFMAPUTRA VALLEY; This is served by
 only one Road of which the Southern Section
 will be incomplete until April at the earliest

PRAHMAPUTRA DELTA; this consists chiefly of tracks or very poor reads all of which are subject to interruption in the summer rainy season, but it is also served by fairly good railway communications to INDIA. Communications from Southern BURMA to CHITTAGONG are extremely poor, but the Japanese could build up their forces there by the use of small coastal craft which could then be used for landings along the BENGAL Coast. Air cover can also be provided from landing grounds along the BURMA Coast.

Estimation of Japanese Scale of Attack by band.

- Japan would have no difficulty in making available the necessary land forces together with strong air forces. It is estimated that they could concentrate, deploy and maintain :-
 - (a) One or possibly two Divisions advancing from MANDALAY by the route to the BRAHMAPUTRA VALLEY.
 - (b) About two Divisions from the CHITTAGONG
 Area advancing by land and sea against
 the GANGES DELTA Area.

INVASION BY SEA.

against INDIA depends on the defeat or neutralisation of British naval forces based on CEYLON. The modern section of this fleet consists only of a striking force of one battleship and two aircraft carriers until April/May when it will be reinforced by a second battleship and a third carrier.

The four cld "R" class battleships now on or near the INDIAN OCEAN can only be considered as suitable for convoy escorts. For early warning of any large-scale expedition approaching INDIA, we shall depend upon our ability to maintain sufficient submarine and air patrols.

7. In view of the distance of their nearest repair base, such an operation by the Japanese would be risky and difficult, but the strategical advantage of early attack would be immense and this possibility, therefore, cannot be disregarded. If such an operation were attempted, it is very probable that the initial stroke would consist of a surprise bombing attack on TRINCOLALEE, the defences of which are still relatively weak, and if success were achieved it could be followed up by the immediate invasion of CEYLON with a probable secondary invasion in the MADRAS area.

Scale of Japanese attack by Sea.

the Japanese still have available sufficient forces and shipping for a seaborne expedition now by two divisions. The provision of garriso s for the Netherlands East Indies is unlikely to prove a heavy commitment and provided therefore that they do not at the same time undertake major operations against Australia, Japan can collect forces for operations against INDIA and CEYLON at a greater rate than we can reinforce those places.

ARMY AND AIR FORCES AVAILABLE TO MEET THESE THREATS.

9. Taking into consideration the need to provide adequate defence of the NORTHWEST FRONTIER, of internal security and the low state of training and equipment of field formations now in INDIA, it is estimated that the following ground forces could be made available to meet these threats.

(a) CEYLON.

The forces in CEYLON must be considered as fortress troops which cannot be used to reinforce INDIA should the attack develop against INDIA and not CEYLON. They consist of:-

Now.

Reinforcements due

34th Ind. Div. (less one Bde).		by Mid-March	by Abril/May 6th Australian Div. (lees one		
	One	British Bde. Gp.			
One CEYLON Territorial Bde.	One	East African Bde.	Bde. Gp) One Indian Armd		
Cne Fd. Arty Bty. Heavy A.A. 48 guns.			Car Regt.		
Light A.A. 52 guns					

Two Fleet Air Arm

Fighter Sqns.

Three Fighter Sqns. One Torpedo Bomber Sqn. One Light Bomber Sqn. One G.R. Sqn. One Flying Boat Sqn.

(b) INDIA.

The forces in INDIA must be disposed to meet both the threat by sea to the MADRAS area and the threat by land and sea to BENGAL. The whole strength of the forces in INDIA cannot therefore be concentrated against an attack against either of these places. consist of:-

Mid-March

Reinforcements due.

One Flying Boat

Sqn.

20	by April/May				by June/July	
Two Indian Inf. Divs. 70th British Div. less one Bde. Group Heavy A.A. guns 88	Heavy Light				100 m	British Div. Indian Armd Bdes.
Light A.A. guns 87	. 97 -	179			55	+

Four Fighter Sqns. Two Light Bomber Sqns. Five Miscellaneous Sons

Three Fighter Sons. Two Light Bomber Sqns. Two Medium Rombon Sane

CONCLUSIONS.

- 10. After the Japanese have occupied Burma, the two chief dangers in the INDIAN OCEAN, in our view, will be as follows:-
 - (a) Sea-borne expedition to occupy CEYLON.

 This would have a dual object first to deny to us
 the main British fleet base, and second to enable
 the Japanese directly to threaten sea communications
 with the MIDDLE EAST and with RUSSIA via the
 PERSIAN GULF.
 - (b) Occupation of the CALCUTTA Area by means of combined sea-borne and overland attacks. This operation would have as an important object the complete cutting off of CHINA from outside assistance except by air transport methods.
- 11. Defence against either of the above attacks will be primarily by sea and air forces, naval forces playing a predominant part round CEYLON, and air forces in the CALCUTTA Area.
- 12. The crux of the situation is the rate at which we can provide air reinforcements for INDIA and CEYLON. The British air strength in the MIDDLE EAST has already been seriously depleted by transference of air squadrons to INDIA, BURMA and the FAR EAST.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 10th March, 1942.

PSF Safe: cludia

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

.pril 7, 1940.

months of for

GILTERALL A.L. DIL

By Deguty Archivist of the U.S.

By T. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 B72

Those seem this -- nor do I cuite thou whether this calls for a reply on my part or not. That do you think?

F. D. R.

PSF-Safe: India

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

April 7, 1942

The attached is a complete copy of No. 155 from New Delhi.

The one previously sent at 10:35 this morning did not contain Section three.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) New Delhi

Dated April 6, 1942

Rec'd 9:03 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH .

155, April 6, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

OTHER DENTIFIED FOR THE PRESIDENT AND

ACTING SECRETARY:

Wavell supplements his personal appeal (See my 145, April 4, 8 p.m.) through me to the President by a secret letter as follows.

JOHNSON, President's Representative

AIC

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 B. DECLASSIFIED

By J. Schenble Date FEB 4 187/2


DM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi Dated April 6, 1942

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.,7th

Secretary of State,

Washington.



RUSH

155, April 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date

"PERSONAL CECRET

When we met on Saturday, you asked me my most immediate need and I replied 'aircraft.'

The Japanese attacks now in progress against
Colombo and our shipping and India generally emphasize
the vital urgency of this requirement. It is not
too much to say that our whole position in India
during the next few months depends on whether we
can receive an adequate supply of aircraft.

The figures I give you below do not in any way represent our ultimate requirements but are the numbers of aircraft for which I estimate that we can find crews if we can receive them during or before June, the earlier the better of course: Fighters:

120 P-40's; Bombers 120 B-25's; General Reconnaissance:

80 Hudsons; Bomber Transport: 40 DC-3's.

If you could do anything to obtain us these aircraft

-2- #155, April 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from New Delhi aircraft as an urgent and vital requirement I shall be most grateful. (Signed) A.P. Wavell."

JOHNSON President's Representative

EDA

TRB
This telegram must be closely paranhrase; before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi Dated April 6, 1942 Rec'd 8:59 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

155, April 6, 5 p.m., (SECTION THREE).

Wavell says holding India depends upon the approximate number above set forth over and above Royal and our own air force. He authorizes me to say to the President that if we can furnish these planes he will hold India. British gradual withdrawal in Burma adding to confusion so I hope I may be able to answer Wavell at earliest date.

(END OF MESSIGE) .

JOHNSON President's Representative

EDA

35 Safe: India

WAR DEPARTMENT **HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES** WASHINGTON

April 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Request for Additional Airplanes in India.

In connection with request made by General Wavell of Mr. Louis Johnson for additional airplanes in India, it is my opinion that we should handle this matter with care.

India is in the war theatre for which the British have full responsibility. When this same matter was brought up before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British members stated that it was a British responsibility and that they would handle it. Accordingly the document concerning additional airplanes to India is now being considered by the British Joint Chiefs of Staff in London.

In view of the above, I recommend that no further action be taken on this request.

Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,

Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Hamold

Incl: Conf. ltr: to Gen. Arnold frm. the President, 4/7/42, re attached complete copy of telegram #155 frm. New Delhi.

Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, volume 1, pp. 629-630.

MEV
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Lond

Dated April 9, 1942 , Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Pox Co

PSF; Lake - Shorica

Secretary of State, Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1721, April 9, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HOPKINS.

There is an unfortunate impression here that Louis Johnson is acting as your personal representative and under your instructions mediating between the British and the Indian Congress. Within the past few hours Cripps apparently in cooperation with Johnson has submitted a new proposal relative to the control of defenses in India. This proposal was made to the Indian Congress without consultation with the Governor General or with Wavell and with no knowledge of the British Government here. I have a feeling that Cripps very naturally is using Johnson who in turn uses your name very freely. I have told the Prime Minister and Eden that Johnson is not acting as a mediator on your behalf but what-Ever he is boing he is doing at the specific request of Crivos

MATTHEWS

EWI.

RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Lundon
Dated April 9, 1942
Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY. 1721, April 9, 5 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

The Governor General of India has the distinct feeling that all of Johnson's moves are being directed by you. I believe it important that Johnson's part in this be played down because of the danger of a proposal being made to the British Government which they might reject and which the public might think comes from you. I lunched with Eden today and he is not to encouraged about the outcome in India but it may break favorably before the day is over. I am seeing the Prime Hinister again at six o'clock and will cable you the latest news at once. I have found Eden and Lyttelton very sympathetic today to our main proposal.

(FMD OF MESSAGE.)

HISTHEWS.

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DEPARAMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

From: Turin)

Number: 170 Dated: 4/11/4

Caption:

This telegram has been distributed to:

Please advise the Division of Communications and Records if further distribution should be made.

This telegrom must be closely puraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi
Dated April 11, 1942
Rec'd 3:53 a.m.

Secretary of State,

RUSH

170, April 11, 9 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRET/RY

The Congress delivered its rejection of Cripps!

proposals at 7:00 o'clock Friday night, Nehru sending

me a copy. The rejection is a masterpiece and will

appeal to free men everywhere.

My substitute defense amendment was informally agreed to at conference between Cripps, Nehru, and Congress President Thursday night but then after they disagreed on giving any authority to new Nationalist Government proposed by Cripps, Cripps said my formula meant same thing as his original amendment which was quite untrue and denied his earlier press remarks that Nationalist Government, any more real self government now.

JOHNSON

HTM

State Dept. Letter, NI-72

FEB 4 1972

This telegram must be closely paraphrasid before being communicated to anyone. (SC) New Delhi Dated April 11, 1942. Rec'd 3:47 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

170, April 11, 9 a.m., (SECTION TWO)

Cripps is sincere, knows this matter should be solved. He and Nehru could solve it in five minutes if Cripps had any freedom or authority. To my amazement when satisfactory solution seemed certain, with unimportant concession, Cripps with embarrassment told me that he could not change original draft declaration without Churchill's approval and that Churchill has cabled him that he will give no approval unless Wavell and Viceroy separately send their own code cables unqualifiedly endorsing any change Cripps wants.

JOHMSON

CHD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi
Dated April 11, 1942
Rec'd 6:28 a.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

RUSH .

170, April 11, 9 c.m. (SECTION THREE)

I never lost confidence until then. London
wented a Congress refusal. Why? Cripps' original
offer contained little more than the unkept promise
of the First World War. Does England prefer to lose;
India to enemy retaining claim of title at peace
table rather than lose it by giving freedom now?
I have my own opinion about it.

The Indian Ocean is controlled by enemy; British shipping from India has been suspended; according to plan determined many days ago, British are retiring from Burma going north while fighting Chinese go south; wavell is worn out and defeated; the hour has arrived when we should consider a replotting of our policy in this section of the world. Association with British here is bound to adversely affect morale of our own officers. Only the best should be sent and those who have failed

-2- #170, April 11, 9 n.m. (SECTION THREE) from New Delhi

have failed elsewhere should not (repeat not) be dumped here as many have been in recent past. In so dumping here men like General Adler (whose failure in Egypt I know personally) we follow the policy which brought Wavell here and which has been utterly demoralizing to all British who really want to resist enemy.

JOHNSON

EMB

AS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi
Dated April 11, 1948
Rec'd 7:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

MOST IMEDIATE

RUSH

170, April 11, 9 a.m. (SECTION FOIR)

With me. The President would like him and on most things they agree. I have his personal promise to proceed to Calcutta immediately in effort to alkay fear, settle general motors and steel strikes, and keep industry operating there. I shall have his complete help; he is our hope here. I trust him.

of the 1,350,000 kilowatts of installed electric consector capacity in all India, 1,100,000 kilowatts is located east of the line Bombay-Cawnpore. In the area west of this line, the only area in which additional industrial capacity may be located with reasonable safety, electric power supply is limited to 250,000 industrial of which no surplus is available. Therefore landing or bombing in present industrial area will mean the end of India's ability to aid herself materially industrialwise.

JOHNSON,
PRESIDENT'S REPRESENTATIVE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) New Delhi
Dated April 11, 1942
Rec'd. 7:02 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

170, April 11, 9 a.m., (SECTION FIVE).

America's effort therefore must be toward direct aid.

There is little opportunity for India to aid herself-particularly since Cripps, through no fault of his
own, has failed.

Halifax's speech added the finishing touch to the sabateging of Cripps. It is believed here it was so intended and timed and I am told pleased Wavell and the Viceroy greatly. (END OF MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

RDS

Jalian .

 $(1)^{1/2}$

February 25, 1942. 11.40 P.M.

A: BASSADOR WINANT LONDON

As you may guess, I am somewhat concerned over the situation in India, especially in view of the possibility of the necessity of a slow retirement through Burma into India itself. From all I can gather the British defense will not have sufficiently enthusiastic support from the people of India themselves.

In the greatest confidence could you or Harriman or both let me have a slant on what the Prime Minister thinks about new relationships between Britain and India? I hesitate to send him a direct message because, in a strict sense, it is not our business. It is, however, of great interest to us from the point of view of the conduct of the war.

ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

FOR THE PRESIDENT

034901



KAI-SHEK TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE

May 31, 1942

RECENT RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM INDIA CHO...S INTERNAL SITUATION MORSENING. MAHATMA CANDRI LAUNCHING AROUND MIDDLE JUNE NON-VIOLENT NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT AIMING AT COMPLETE BREAKDOWN ALL COMMUNICATIONS RAILWAYS PUBLIC UTILITIES TO OUST BRITISH RULE. MOVEMENT WILL BE STRONGER THAN ALL PREVIOUS ONES AND MORE THAN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. IF INDIA GOV RUMENT PUT GANDRI UNDER ARREST THIS WILL AROUSE ANGER OF WHOLE COUNTRY. HE WILL NOT HESITATE TO GO INTO FAST UNTO DEATH CAMPAIGN TO ATTAIN OBJECTIVE. IF HE DIES WHOLE INDIA WHICH WORSHIPS HIM AS GOD WILL PROBABLY RISE IN REVOLT. AT HIS WORD ALL VILLAGES ESPECIALLY CENTRAL INDIA WILL BE IN POSITION FRUSTRATE EXISTING WAR PLANS ACTIVITIES AND THUS AFFECT ENTIRE CAUSE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS PART ASIA.

RECENT LETTERS FROM NEHRU SHOW THAT DESPITE ALL HE CAN DO
INTERNAL REVOLUTION EREWING AS ANTI-BRITISH FEELING GAINING MOMENTUM.
HE THINKS ONLY WAY GAIN INDIAN PUBLIC SUPPORT OF WAR IS DECLARATION
BY UNITED NATIONS OF INDIA INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION.
HE WRITES "TIME IS PAST NOW WHEN SOME CLEVER FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO
ERITISH AND INDIA CAN BE DEVISED. POPULAR AS I AM WITH MY PEOPLE
THERE IS SO MUCH ANTI-BRITISH FRELING NOW THAT I CANNOT POSSIBLY GET
ANYTHING DONE WHICH IGNORES INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE SELF-DETERMINATION.

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

Ry J. Schauble Date_____FEB

4 1975




"ERITISH HAVE MADE LOT OF JINNAH AND HIS SEPARATIST TENDENCIES. IF
THIS ATTITUDE CONTINUES SOLUTION IMPOSSIBLE. AT SAME TIME NO ONE WANTS
BRITISH GOVERNMENT THROW JINNAH COMPLETELY OVERBOARD. LET THEM SAY
THEY RECOGNIZE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE SELF-DETERMINATION AND LEAVE IT TO
US SETTLE WITH EACH OTHER WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM THEM. REAL PROFILEM
IS HOW TO MAKE OUR PROPLE ENTHUSIASTIC FOR CAUGE. NO VAGUE PROMISES
ASSURANCE POLITICAL OR DIPLOMATIC PHRASIOLOGY IS GOOD ENOUGH BUT SOME—
THING THAT STRIKES AT ROOT OF PROFILEM."

PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM NEHRU DATED MAY 26 CONFIRMS THAT MAHATMA
GANDHI INCREASINGLY BITTER AND DEMANDS BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM INDIA.
CONGRESS ATTITUDE TOWARD GANDHI UNCERTAIN BUT MAHATMA GANDHI HIMSELF
CAN POWERFULLY INFLUENCE MASS OPINION AND ANY STEP HE TAKES WILL HAVE
FAR MEACHING CONSEQUENCES. MAHATMA GANDHI'S ACTION MAY ADVINGELY
AFFECT INTERNAL AND WAR SITUATION BUT MAHATMA GANDHI SEEMS RESOLVED.
NEHRU SEEING MAHATMA GANDHI TO CLARIFY SITUATION.

By J. Schauble Date_____





SAFE FILE: IRELAND

PSF Safe File: IRELAND
PARAPHRASE

Telegram No. 932

From: Embassy, London

Sent: March 11, 1941, 3 p.m.

Rec'd: 10:20 a.m.

REGRADED

From Colonel Donovan for the Secretary of the Navy. I went to Ireland as you suggested in your communication. Factors are many and there is no better narrative than in the communication dated February 7, 1941 to the Under Secretary of State from our Minister, David Gray. The pressure of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland is my idea the core of the situation at present. Through the medium of the Cardinal Primate of Armagh pressure is imposed on de Valera. MaCrory is a determined, eloquent Nationalist and vigorous man of 80 who relentlessly and openly repeats the litany of injuries and wrongs which the Northern Irish Government he claims is causing the Catholic minority to suffer. In this estimate I am sure I am right because I found that de Valera with me did not spend his time explaining the history of the relations between England and Ireland as he did with others, I have been told. On the contrary he and I came at once to the danger of invasion by Germany. De Valera seemed worried and disturbed and yet anxious that I understand that in this cause he and his government were friendly to England. He also stated that he was opposed and had been to the elimination by force of the partition issue as he felt that only by evolution could they have unity. He could resist invasion successfully and save England a diversion of troops if Ireland were properly armed.

The resistance of the people to any situation making available bases was referred to by him again and again, to their distrust of the intentions of Britain which even so far extended as to allow troops to land to resist known Nazi attack until actually the troops of Germany had come in, and the determination of the Irish people to remain neutral even over America's request.

In order that I should understand this he said he had requested the Cardinal to come from the North and discuss matters with me. There is no need for me to state what I said to both of them but I do believe that there are dangerous elements which may have consequences of a very serious nature to Britain's defense if not dealt with. It is my opinion that they can be least with if we and the British act rapidly.

Mr. Churchill telephoned me when I returned and invited me to Checquers. Menzies, who is the Prime Minister of Australia, was there. I expressed my belief to them that the center of trouble lay in the North and that this trouble was emphasized by de Velera's failure to permit the Irish people to be enlightened of what was taking place in the cutside world, but I felt throughout that he would wish to be in on Britain's side if he were free. I was asked to express my views as to the remedy. I told them this was not a job of fighting but rather one of statesmanship: that the fear of the Irish that the proper arming would not be permitted by the British as they intended

U-L: SMKA: LMF 3/12/41 • Copy to Navy 740.0011 European War 1939/8944

to seize the ports; that if force were used, it would be necessary in order to hold the bases for the occupation of Ireland; that this would be worse than non-use of the bases as it would play into the German hands, and it would mean diversion of British troops needed badly at home. In addition the situation in the United States would be endangered. Menzies agreed with all of this and said Irish Origin of his people are 23 percent and force would effect the opinion of the Australians.

I stated with emphasis (a) that some kind of contact should be established by England with de Valera, that there appeared to be a curtain of asbestos hanging between England and Ireland, that unless an appeal was made by means of a liaison between de Valera and Churchill to their amour propre the willing support of the Irish could not be gained, and that de Valera constantly referred to the absence of this liaison; (b) that the Prime Minister should look into the veracity of the complaints against the Northern Irish and that irritation whenever possible should be removed; (c) that opinions and speeches should receive publicity such as those of the 2nd in command of Cosgroves, Dillon, who is urging Ireland as an obligation to civilization and Christianity to join England and declare war; (d) that it should be seen to by us that Aiken, Minister of War of Ireland, be seen. Moreover we should see to it that American defense measures impress him, that you and other Cabinet members who have experienced war service talk to him, and that, as I made clear to de Valera, it should be emphasized to him that the United States was only furnishing with arms those countries of whose intention to help the democracies there was no doubt. (Aiken is possibly in America for other reasons. He is of the extreme left); (e) that if practicable General Scanlon's suggestion of several weeks ago be adopted to bring Ireland into our sphere, to carry our naval, military and governmental representatives to Foynes from Boston by air. It is necessary for us to get rid of the veil of unreality under which Ireland is living if we really intend to influence her. (f) In view of the fact that if anything is to be accomplished we must bring Ireland into our sphere and it might be a good plan, not an inconceivable one, to issue an invitation to de Valera to come to America.

I was told by the Prime Minister that he would investigate the complaints and would deal with anything wrong. Mr. Churchill also said although he was for a united Ireland he would not compel it. He stated that he would have to back up Northern Ireland and give support to this position should de Valera not come in. However, the situation would change should de Valera come in with Great Britain, in which case he would attempt to solve the matter using all this influence to do so. Churchill said that to arrive at a solution he would be willing to grant sufficient defense protection before a base was set up, and that likewise he would as a preliminary step towards a final arrangement establish an all-Ireland defense commission.

Following this Menzies and Churchill agreed that the former should go to Ireland this week and discuss the matter with de Valera. Everybody in England realizes how urgently these bases in Ireland are needed. I am sure that our help in securing the Irish bases is greatly hoped for.

a 35 a 02

This was forming in. On Thursday last, the 3rd April, I flew to Belfast, where I had a series of conversations with Mr. Andrews, the Prin Minister, and with other leading citizens. On Friday norming I proceeded to Dublin, where on Friday and Saturday I had lengthy discussions with Mr. De Valera and with several of his senior colleagues. In each place my attitude was one of enquiry, because I felt that to achieve any useful result I must aim at getting a real understanding of the various points It would be impossible for me to give any detailed account of conversations which covered a total of many hours, and most of which in any event were of a confidential character, and I therefore propose to set out in this memorandum certain conclusions at which I arrived as a result of my talks. emphasise that these conclusions are based upon inference rather than upon explicity statements, but I believe that they are accu rate.

1. ULSTER

There is a very strong, and indeed bitter, feeling in Ulster about Eire. Though the whole of my own instinctive bias is in favour of Ulster, I was occasionally a little disturbed to find myself wondering whether the Ulster attitude is entirely a reasoned one. Just as there are some Protestants whose Protestantism is an expression of hostility rather than of faith, so there are undoubtedly Ulstermen whose loyalty to Great Britain seems chiefly founded upon a dislike of the South. These remarks do not, of course, apply to the majority of those who determine Ulster's policy, but at the same time the fact must be recorded that recruiting in Ulster is indifferent and that some comment is beginning to arise from the fact that the existing recruiting is greatly stimulated by a stream which flows from Eire into Ulster, a stream which has now got up to a volume of something like 650 men per month. There is among responsible leaders a strong feeling that conscription should have been extended to Ulster and that the refusal so to extend it was dictated by a tenderness for the feelings of the Roman Catholic minority in Ulster which they felt was unwarranted. This view, widely held, has no doubt affected recruiting. Another thing which is having its effect is the abnormally high unemployment, the figure being put at something like 45,000. Unemployment can easily have a depressing effect upon recruiting if the view becomes current that the man who enlists will after the war find his occupation gone. The Ulster uncaployment is no doubt primarily due to the slackening of business at the linen mills, but there is a feeling that it could be substantial taken up if more use were made by the British Covernment of the munitions manufacturing potential of Ulster. Another related factor which I thought had something to do with the recruiting position is the fear that the recruit's civil job will be taken by somebody coming into Ulster from the South. It is not my business to discuss the policy of the British Government on these matters, but it can be argued that many of these factors

> Ey Authority of State Dept Ligram 1-12-72 FEB 8 1972

could be dealt with if conscription were applied to Northern Ireland side by side with a law protecting the conscript in relation to his civil employment, and if at the same time the Ministry of Supply could with a certain measure of publicity investigate the industrial resources of Ulster. There are no doubt weighty arguments to the contrary, and my opinion may therefore be quite wrong, but I feel no doubt that the present position irritates Ulster and provokes avoidable comment in Eire.

I was informed quite unanimously that the unification of Ireland would be forcibly resisted by Ulster for three principal reasons:-

Ulster will not forgo its allegiance to the Throne (a)

It refuses to be voted into neutrality by the Roman (b) Catholic majority in the South

(c) Ulstermen fear that their industrial establishments would be dissipated or weakened by the economic or fiscal policies of a united IrishParliament.

2. EIRE

24 na

 $c_{O_{D_i}}$

C:7Ph

than ate.

> The people of this "distressful country", or at any rate those who govern it, are in a state of exaggerated selfconsciousness. They are not very realistic in their approach to the problems of the war. They are ready to take offence. They resented the fact that Colonel Donovan's visit was only for a couple of hours. They feel, and I think with some justification, that their point of view has been either not examined or impatiently examined. These comments are specially true of De Valera himself. He interested me very much. is at first sight a somewhat saturnine figure, particularly when he sallies abroad in a long dark frieze overcoat and a broad-brimned black hat. Personal contact with him, however, indicates that he is educated, I think sincere, and with a mind in which acute intelligence is found to contain many blind spot occasioned by prejudice, bitter personal experience, and a marked slavery to past history. It was clear to me that, whatever the position may be in the provinces (as to which I know nothing), he has a large and fanatical following in Dublin He is the "chief". The very clerks in the offices stand promptly to attention as he strides past. His Ministers speak with freedom in his absence, but are restrained and obedient Some of these Ministers are possessed of in his presence. more flexible minds than his, and I found them merry fellows, but in the last resort I am quite sure that his view will prevail. On the whole, with all my prejudices, I liked him and occasionally succeeded in evoking from him a sort of wintry humour, which was not without charm. His mind must be studied promptly but patiently if the Irish problem is to be settled. He professes to attach little importance to personal contacts, and is accustomed to deal with things from behind a barrier of maps, charts and records; but my own experience with him

> > 1 - Authority of State Dept DECLASSIFIED

indicates that, in fact, he responds to the personal touch and is not incapable of being affected by the right kind of approach. I will attempt to state his views, not as he precisely formulated them, because he is not given to precision in relation to modern events, but as I inferred them I think accurately, from hours of discussion, discussion which was confidential and as to the terms of which I would, therefore, desire not to be quoted:-

(1) He is of the opinion that Britain's cause in this war is a just one and that the war was forced upon her.

(2) He would like Britain to win and feels that 80 per cent. at least of the people of Eire, though they are by instinct distrustful of the British, would like the same thing.

(3) He has no grievance against Great Britain, except that Ireland is still a divided country. He is, however, convinced that the present British Coverment is

hostile and unsympathetic.

(4) He tells a story of injustices to the Roman Catholic minority in Ulster, which after all is, in two of the six counties, a Roman Catholic majority. injustices, to use his own phrase, "make his blood boil." Yet on examination they appear somewhat shadowy. There is the old controversy about a separate capital grant to Roman Catholic schools. which are, in fact, more liberally treated in Ulster There is the suggestion than they are in Australia. that Roman Catholics are prejudiced in caployment. There is the statement that the Morthern electorates have been so gerrymandered that inadequate minority representation in the Ulster Parliament results. This last seems of small moment, since the Ulster Parliament has a law that no elected member may sit without taking the Oath of Allegiance, and consequentl this minority demand is for the right to elect members who will after election not sit in Parliament! complaint is therefore a strange intellectual phenomenon, which could perhaps be found in no country other than Ireland.

5) This minority agitation in Ulster is, I think, largely femented by Cardinal MacRory, and De Valera is prepare upon pressure to admit that the anti-partition feeling is much stronger among the Roman Catholics of Ulster

than it is in Eire itself.

(6) When brought face to face with the fact, he recognises that Great Britain could not possibly throw Ulster into Eire if that meant that Ulster was also to become neutral and that Great Britain was to be deprived of even those bases which she now has. He infers from this, and admits reluctantly, that the unity scheme cannot very well be pressed during the war so long as Eire remains neutral.

(7) He affirms, however, that there is a passionate desire in the Irish heart to be neutral in the war; a strang

State Dept telegram 1-12-72 FEB 8 1972

passion to invade the average Irish heart but, nevertheless, one the existence of which he vigorously I questioned him repeatedly as to the maintains. reason for this and as a rule he slipped easily and skilfully into a discussion of past history; but with some regularity I found him coming back to another reason which struck me as much more comprehensible and much more capable of being dealt with. reason was that "Ircland is defenceless." that "Dubli has practically no anti-aircraft gans," that "there is practically no air force," and that "the army is without modern equipment." In other words, I am quite sure that De Valera's neutrality policy is founded not only upon a traditional distrust of Great Britain, but also and perhaps principally upon fear of German attack, particularly from the air.

He recognises that the British people are not likely to be willing to provide arms which may conceivably be used against them. He asserts that no possibility of such use will arise unless Eire is invaded by the This line of argument is, of course, well British. known, but I was left, after many repetitions, with a very definite feeling that, as this fear of attack is the principal obsession, the possibility of re moving it by some material assistance on the munitions and aircraft side should be promptly explored. may be improbable, but it is certainly not impossible that a country which wishes us to win should be willing to give us some assistance, provided we can reduce the risks involved in the giving of that assistance; and the right way to reduce those risks is to give the Irish weapons, not unconditionally, but as the price of co-operation.

De Valera does not appreciate the immediate war problem. He stands in front of the map and cannot understand why naval bases in Ireland should be of the slightest importance to Great Britain. I found it necessary to explain to him the importance of air bases as a platform for fighting aircraft. He did not appear to have appreciated the immense significance of even a hundred miles in the zone of operations of fighters. I think he would understand these things much better if he had some of his own. He told me with great earnestness that with arms Hire could protect herself and therefore protect Britain's flank. But when I pointed out that the British flank was on the western and north-western approaches and that these could not be protected by a neutral, but only by belligerent ships and aircraft, I had the impression that this platitude came to him almost as a new idea.

(10) He firmly believes that the United States is coming into the war, but has not yet faced, though I asked him to do so, the effect which this would have on Irish American opinion.

Leligian 1:12-72

(11) He feels that Eire could supply more food-stuffs to Great Britain, but that Great Britain is prepared to go a little hungry in order to injure Eire.

The paragraphs I have written above contain, as I They may convey the realise, much exasperating information. impression that De Valera is an entirely impossible person. This is not altogether the case. He has in my opinion some . fine qualities. His fixed ideas, like those of his people, cannot be removed by alcofness or by force. They can be removed only by a genuine attempt to get at their foundations by enquiry and, wherever possible, by understanding. outsider, like myself, and particularly to one who travelled seventeen thousand miles to confer with his colleagues of the British Government, it is fantastic to be told that De Valera and Andrews have never met, and that I have had more conversations with Do Valora than any British Minister has had since the war began. I therefore suggest very strongly that the whole question of the defence of Eire should be looked at, that the Secretary of State for the Dominions should pay an early visit to Belfast and Dublin, and that if he receives the slightest encouragement he should invite De Valera and a couple of his colleagues to come to London for discussions with the Prime Minister and other members of the British Cabinet. I know that such a meeting would be welcomed by some numbers of the Irish Cabinet who are beginning to realise that neutrality has its defeats no less renowned than war; and I would be by no means pessimistic about the outcome. even if such discussions failed, they would give a very different colour to any subsequent policy which it was found necessary to adopt in relation to Ireland and would be of great value in regard to world opinion.

R.G.M.

Dept telegram 1-12-73

Julian.

We have learn't from a most secret but entirely reliable cource, which must on no account be compromised, that the Italian minister in Dublin has reported a conversation with the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs in which the latter said that although no immediate danger of a British invasion existed for the moment, it was difficult to foresee what complications there might be in the future. The Secretary added that a decisive attack by the Axis on the British islands should not be too long delayed and not later than the beginning of next Spring, because the main concern in governing circles in Fire lay in the possibility, which was considered to be more and more certain, that America would intervene in the war, which would render the position of Eire even more critical than at present. This conversation indicates, even under the most favourable interpretation, a tendency on the part of Mr. Walshe towards re-insurance with the Axis. The Italian Minister is extremely unreliable, but as it confirms the impression gained from previous reports you ma; care to show this message to the President for his strictly personal information as showing the unsatisfactory attitude of some at any rate of the Irish authorities in regard to this country.

DECLASSIFIED

Fy Authority of State

Dept telegram 1-12-72

By J Date FEB 8 1972

SAFE FILE: Italy

A

PSF & fe: Staly

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

Rome

Dated February 27, 1940 Rec'd 9:21 a.m.

Secretary of State, Washington. REGRADED UNCL. E.F.E.

127, February 27, 11 a. m.

STRICTLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM WELLES.

I was received yesterday morning by the Minister for Foreign Affairs with great cordiality and had a conversation with him for about one hour and a half.

Mussolini received me in a very friendly manner yesterday afternoon in the company of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and I talked with him for about an hour. The Ambassador was present at both conversations.

I emphasized in both conversations that any views or suggestions that were communicated to me would be regarded as strictly confidential and were solely for the information of the President and the Secretary of State. I further emphasized that the mission entrusted to me by the President was solely for the purpose of reporting to him about the present situation in Europe

in

hsm -2- No. 127, February 27, 11 a. m., from Rome (Section 1)

in order that he might determine whether there existed any possibility for a permanent and lasting peace and I made it clear that the Government of the United States was not interested in a precarious or temporary peace. I further emphasized that I was authorized to offer no proposals.

(END SECTION ONE OF SEVEN).

PHILLIPS

CSB

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

In my two conversations I touched first upon the fact that Italy and the United States were today the two most powerful neutrals and that it seemed desirable that cordial and friendly relations should exist between them in the event that at some time in the future the moral influence of the countries could be exerted towards the establishment of that kind of a peace foundation which would tend to insure the maintenance of stable and peaceful international relations. I expressed the hope in this connection that it might be found possible to find a meeting as to policies and principles which might result in the development of greater commercial interchange between both countries on mutually beneficial bases. I found the atmosphere in this regard on the part of the Chief of the Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs cordial and understanding and they both expressed great satisfaction by reason of the personal interest of the President in American participation in the 1942 exposition.

KLP

PHILLIPS

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated February 27, 1940 Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a. m. (SECTION THREE).

In my conversation with Mussolini I spoke at some length of the purposes of the Government of the United States in suggesting an exchange of views between the neutral powers with a view to ascertaining whether an agreement might be found upon desirable principles of international economic relationship and for the reduction and limitation of armaments. I reminded Mussolini of the address which he had made to the Chamber of Deputies on May 26, 1934, in which he had stressed the fact that no country can be self-contained and that barriers to trade, control of exchanges and other artificial barriers must be abolished in the interest of sane international economic relations.

I said that in response to the request of the Italian

Government for an indication of the views of the United

States regarding this subject I was glad to hand him a

brief

hsm -2- No. 127, February 27, 11 a.m. (Section 3) from Rome brief memorandum which set forth the views of the United States in that regard and I gave him a copy of the document covering international economic relations approved by the Secretary of State shortly before my departure from Washington, omitting the first sentence of numbered paragraph two.

PHILLIPS

HPD

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

I said that he would find that the views so set forth coincide very completely with the views which he himself had expounded in his speech of 1934. Mussolini read the paper very attentively and stated that he was completely in concord with the exposition contained therein. He said that he wished to remind me that Italy had been the last country to adopt a system of autarchy and that Italy had only done so after the Ottawa agreement had been enacted, after France had set up many economic barriers particularly the French quota system, and he did not (repeat not) omit a reference to the high tariff policies pursued by the United States prior to the Roosevelt Administration. He said that a poor country like Italy had been forced in self-defense to adopt an autarchic system; that he had always believed and continued to believe that the views set forth in his speech of 1934 represented the only international economic system which could provide for a healthy international relationship.

Hε

-2- #127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR) from Rome.

He stated, however, that while the Government of Italy shared the views of the Government of the United States with regard to economic policy he did not consider it practical or possible to make any concerted effort to turn to such a system until a just political peace had been found for Europe.

PHILLIPS

KLP

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 2:46 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)

HE said further that if and when a just political peace was arrived at, no sound economic system could be agreed upon unless there was simultaneously found a means of obtaining an international agreement upon the limitation of armaments. I naturally stated at this juncture that my Government emphatically concurred in this belief.

I gathered the impression that Mussolini believed that the initiative taken by the United States in suggesting an exchange of views between the neutral states with regard to economic policies and with regard to limitation of armament implied some form of neutral coalition, and therefore emphasized the fact that the sole purpose of the United States in this regard was to try and find an agreement upon principle so that the neutral powers, when the time arrived for the reestablishment of peace, might work together towards the effective accomplishment of a practical plan for the

-2- #127, Feb. 27, 11 a.m., (SEC FIVE) from Rome

limitation of armaments coincident with the creation of a sound international economic system. Mussolini concurred heartily in the opinion I expressed to him in that connection that unless such bases became operative there could be no satisfactory improvement in national standards of living and no hope of obtaining that increase of purchasing power in each country which made for prosperity and stability.

PHILLIPS

NPL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940 Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION SIX)

With regard to the detailed and confidential views which were expressed to me by Mussolini and by Ciano as to whether there was any possibility at this time for the establishment of a constructive and permanent peace, I believe it wiser for me not to telegraph the more secret of the views expressed. Mussolini stated emphatically that he believed that such a possibility existed. He stated equally emphatically that if a "real war" as he phrased it broke out such a possibility would vanish at least for some time to come. He stated with the utmost conviction that in his belief no people now at war desired war and that in that sense there existed a very great difference between the situation in 1914 and the present hostilities.

Mussolini attributed great significance to the speech made by Hitler in Munich two days ago. Upon my asking for his suggestions as to any conversations which I might hold in Berlin he told me that he believed that what I would there be told would be very similar to the opinions which he had expressed to me.

PHILLI PS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940 Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

He twice reiterated his belief that it had been a great tragedy that the nations of the world had not been willing in 1934 to agree upon a practical system for the limitation of armaments at a time when Germany had been willing to agree upon a reasonable plan for the limitation of armaments and that the expenditures in money and in services since that period for the construction of armaments and the fantastic number of individuals in all nations now engaged solely in the manufacture of armaments made the problem of a future limitation of armaments and a future return to economic national sanity infinitely more difficult.

Attache outset of my interview with Mussolini I gave him the President's autograph letter which evidently greatly gratified him and which he asked me to say he would answer personally. He read aloud the concluding sentence of the President's letter in which the President expressed the hope of seeing him personally soon and smilingly remarked that he himself had hoped for this personal interview for many

years

-2- #127, Feb. 27, 11 a.m. (SEC SEVEN) from Rome

years but that it seemed that there were too many miles of ocean between the President and himself to permit of the realization of his hope.

(END SECTION SEVEN)

PHILLI PS

JRL:NPL

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940 Rec'd 3:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

I said that of course there was always a half way point.

He then looked at me very interestedly and added with particular emphasis "as well as ships to take us there".

At the conclusion of my interview he said that he and the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be glad to receive me again when I passed through Italy on my return to Washington since he believed that he would receive information which might be of value to the President after my visits to Berlin, Paris, and London, and which he would be glad to communicate to me for the information of the President.

I shall leave Rome at midnight tonight, proceeding through Switzerland so as to arrive in Berlin on the morning of March 1.

(END OF MESSAGE)

PHILLIPS

NK:NPL

-- Myn toylor

sinfe: Italy

hsm
This telegram must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to anyone. (D).

Rome

Dated February 28, 1940
-- Rec'd 1:14 p. m.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIES

Secretary of State, Washington.

130, February 28, 2 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM

MR. TAYLOR.

"Presentation ceremonials concluded yesterday with highest spiritual dignity and human understanding following which I was accorded an entirely private audience with His Holiness lasting upwards of three-quarters of an hour. The principal points in the order of their discussion in the conversation briefly stated are as follows:

One. That the French and British require continuing security not possible with the present German regime in whose good faith they have no confidence.

Two. That the German people are in fact dissatisfied but so controlled by Gestapo and SS and political groups that being unarmed, unorganized, and under constant surveillance, are for the moment powerless.

Three.

hsm -2- No. 130, February 28, 2 p. m., from Rome

Three. That the army officers in general in Germany do not favor war but are not now prepared to oppose the political head of the state. If ordered to march would at the moment obey.

Four. That Germany has not sufficient resources to carry on a long war but can do so for a year or more.

Five. That His Holiness is not in contact with Mussolini but his information is that Ciano is opposed to war as are the Italian people of all classes and that Mussolini is wavering and undecided. (My own opinion is that Mussolini's attitude is at least in part that of a trader depending on events to land ultimately on the right side with the greatest concessions to and benefits for his country. There is no doubt that his demands will be substantial in any event.)

PHILLI PS

CSB

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D).

Rome
Dated February 28, 1940
Rec'd 1:27 p. m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

131, February 28, 3 p. m. Continuing my 130.

"Six. The British and French will demand reconstruction of Poland and Czechoslovakia on a probable compromise basis and that a plebiscite in Austria permitting the public to determine its future would not be opposed by Great Britain and France.

Seven. That an open offer to act as mediator by any great power at the present moment is in His Holiness' opinion untimely.

Eight. Closest collaboration with the President through me and daily access to the Holy Father whenever desired day or night was freely and voluntarily offered to me. I shall remain in Rome until the end of March and have arranged with Under Secretary Welles to meet him on his return before his departure for America.

While in the interim I shall communicate by cable any useful

hsm -2- No. 131, February 28, 3 p. m., from Rome useful information received I will undertake to have prepared a complete confidential summary with if possible the collaboration and concurrence of the Pope for delivery to the President by Welles on his return.

Meantime I am also carrying out as the President's representative the necessary formalities prescribed by Vatican protocol.

Tittmann has arrived and is rendering satisfactory assistance. Miss Viterbo is also with me."

PHILLI PS

CSB

PSF Lafe: Ita JT ROME This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-Dated February 28, 1940 fore being communicated to anyone. (SC) Rec'd 3:52 p.m. Secretary of State, Washington. 132. February 28, 5 p.m. Welles! brief visit to Rome has been exceedingly helpful. As the Department is aware the Chief of Government has refused to receive any Americans since February 1938 and this was the first opportunity therefore since that date in which our views on various matters could be presented to him personally as a responsible American. I have always been in doubt whether my opinions given from time to time to Ciano have reached the Duce, nor in my frequent contacts with the Foreign Minister has the latter ever attempted to explain the views of his chief on international trends or events. This total absence of contact with the Chief of Goveernment as well as the continued uncertainty of his opinions make it very difficult to report with any degree of certainty the Italian Government's position on matters of interest and concern to us. Welles' visit and the autograph letter from the President have afforded a needed occasion to sound Mussolini on various matters. (END OF SECTION ONE) PHILLIPS EMB a36 c01

JRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 28, 1940 Rec'd 6:50 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

132, February 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

But in addition to the information which Welles obtained his friendly approach to the subjects touched upon during both conversations seemed to strike a responsive chord which Hitler too has been lacking especially on the part of Mussolini.

It is probable that Mussolini and Ciano will interpret the cordial sentiments expressed as an indication of our desire to let "bygones be bygones" and for a closer collaboration hereafter between the two countries.

I would welcome such an interpretation and at the same time I venture to express the hope that we on our part will not let occasions pass when we could properly convert friendly sentiments into mutual beneficial actions.

While it is clear that the Italian Government has gone out of its way to extend to Mr. Welles all courtesies including elaborate floral decorations at the stations in Naples and Rome, private car from Naples to Rome and then to the Swiss frontier and official automobiles during

JRL -2- 132, February 28, 5 p.m. (Section Two) from Rome.

during his stay in Rome, the Italian press has been reserved in discussing the visit. Such articles as have appeared have come from Italian correspondents in other European capitals.

(END OF MESSAGE)

PHILLIPS

JRL

Die PSF Lafe: Sta

EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

ROME

Dated March 2, 1940

Received noon

Secretary of State

Washington

NACLASSIFIED REGRADED

144, March 2, 1 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MYRON

T.YLOR .

"March 1. Preceding my audience with the Pope on
Tuesday I had on Monday a long interview with the Papal
Secretary of State Cardinal Naglione. I have already
reported upon my interview with His Holiness. This
morning, Friday, I had separate interviews with Monsignor
Tardini and Monsignor Montini first and second assistant
Secretaries of State for the Vatican both of whom appear
to be very able and well-informed. The interview with
the former was a lengthy one leaving me with the following
impressions:

(One) That the European situation is extremely delicate and dangerous and growing more so especially for this country.

(Two) That it is rendered so by the uncertain character of the two heads of state the one here equally with the one to the north.

(Three)

EDA - 2 - #144, March 2, 1 p.m. from Rome

(Three) That the one here who was the earliest apostle of preparedness and war has latterly been assuming the dual and difficult attire of axis partner and peaceseeker.

(Four) That he has no love for England and little for Emerica.

(Five) That he seeks the greater glory of influencing the peace of Europe by force or persuasion with the utmost advantage to himself.

(Six) That contrary to our general belief the King is weak in comparison and has lost much of his control of the nation's affairs.

(Seven) That while the public are anti-war and anti-German they are not in a position to control the greater internal decisions.

PHILLIPS

PEG

EKUM PITTON Safe: Staly This telegrem must be closely paraphrased be-Rome fore being communicated Dated March 2, 1940 to anyone. Rec'd 1:22 p.r. Secretary of State,

Washington.

JR

145. March 2, 2 p.m. Continuing my 144.

"(Eight) That there exists with the leader here a ceruain fear of the strenght of the German army and the possibility of Germany's organizing Russia in a progressive way to fortify her own weaknesses and ultimately to expand her influence.

(Nine) My general impression was one of depression on the outlook as it appears today with a lively understanding on the part of those interviewed of a probable economic collapse following either war or a sudden and radical disarmement and demobilization creating troublesome unemployment.

(Ten) The Cardinal Secretary of State made a return call upon me on Wednesday and Thursday I received the return call of Cardinal Belmonte, Dean of the College of Cardinals, while this evening I made the prescribed call on the Dean of the Diplomatic Corpse, Mr. Von Bergen, the German Ambassador to the Holy See. He is a diplomat of the

old

-2- #145, March 2, 2 p.m., from Rome.

old pre-war school with whom I had an agreeable conversation.

He was Counselor under Ambassador von Ketler who was

killed in the Boxer Rebellion and whose widow Baroness

von Ketler is the niece of our mutual friend, Lewis

Cass Ledyard, Sr.

(Eleven) Tomorrow morning, Saturday, I am to have another private audience with His Holiness during which Mrs. Taylor is to be presented.

(Twelve) Saturday I am to make a courtesy call upon the French Ambassador to the Holy See, Mr. Charles Roux. He is represented to be the ablest of the Vatican diplomats. I hope to obtain further impressions."

PHILLIPS

EMB

JAMES D. MOONEY 1775 BROADWAY NEW YORK

Rome, March 15th, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith copies of the five messages sent to you through the courtesy of the Navy Department.

Before making any more contacts I shall await your further wishes.

Respectfully yours,

James D.Mooney

The Honorable Franklin D.Roosevelt President of the United States The White House Washington D.C.

THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ

AB-2/A14-4/(64)

15 March, 1940.

From:

Naval Attache, American Embassy, Rome, Italy.

To :

Director of Naval Intelligence.

Subject:

Forwarding reports from Mr. James D. Mooney to the President

of the United States.

Enclosure:

(A) Five reports and covering letter from Mr. James D. Mooney.

1. The enclosures are forwarded herewith for transmission to the President.

T.C. KINKAID.

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UUD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Dato- 6/3/69

Signature- X12

The Honorable Franklin D.Roosevelt, President of the United States, The White House, Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President,

I arrived in Europe via Rome on February 11, and in accordance with the conversations I had had with you at the White House during December and January I have absorbed myself in exploring the war and peace situation in Europe particularly in relation to the points of interest that you emphasized to me from your own point of view during my conversations with you.

I made a statement to you just before Christmas, immediately following my return from having travelled extensively throughout Europe and particularly the belligerent countries England, France and Germany during the opening four months of the war, to the effect that, during the scores of contacts I had had with all classes of people from aristocrats to workingmen I had not found one individual from brass hat to taxidriver who considered the war anything but a catastrophe for Europe. Among the common people it was considered a prime piece of insanity and they were appalled at the thought of sacrificing themselves to suicide on the Western front. Further, they were horrified at the prospect of starvation, which is now already under way in Europe, and which will increase in intensity as the struggle goes on.

This situation is still true. No emotional background for war exists among the people who have to bear the brunt of it. There is such a strong undercurrent of antagonism against war among the peoples of Europe just as there is in the United States among our own people, that any political leader who does not recognize this powerful undercurrent is likely in time to find himself in the position of a flag-pole sitter. As a matter of fact, any political leader in any one of these countries who is not now planning how to bring about a peace consistent with the prestige and honor of his country is a flag-pole sitter even now. While this political leader, whichever country he is in, is making belligerent speeches, the crowd is showing evidence not only of not listening to the flag-pole sitter but of actually walking away from the flag-pole.

The disillusionment of world war number one still dominates the feelings of everyone in Europe. The time since that war is so short that poignant memories are still fresh from griefs induced by the loss of millions of husbands or sons, from four years of starvation and economic misery, and from the long years of painful reconstruction that had to be suffered during the post-war period. These memories naturally are powerful in stimulating every man's imagination in Europe for the consequences of the present war.

If the war gets under way with really aggressive military action on both sides the consequences of the pending war will be far more disastrous than the other war for two reasons:

First, the techniques of slaughtering and maiming great masses of people have been multiplied during the past twenty years in horror and effectiveness.

Second, Europe began the war of 1914 - 18 with some economic fat on its bones. Europe begins this war with scarcely economic skin on its bones.

Europe is poverty-striken now, as you know, Mr.President, from the ordinary economic indices. This poverty has come under my own personal observation scores of times during these past years, particularly in the belligerent countries, where I am necessarily brought face to face with the standards of living among wage earners and salaried employes.

England, France and Germany are broke at the beginning of the war. Even if the war were to end right now every one of these three countries is confronted with huge social problems that arise out of bad economic conditions. Every one of these countries will confront the same kind of serious social and economic difficulties that confronted you when you took office as President for your first term in 1933.

The people of Europe are pathetically eager to see you, Mr. President, take some kind of a hand in the whole situation, for two reasons: First, they have a warm confidence in you because of your humane qualities and compassion. Further, you have shown constantly in your speeches and public attitudes that how ever a system of government is constructed or operated in any country it should have as its inspiration the freeing of men from the haunting fears of oppression and starvation.

The second point is a very practical point. The political leaders in the belligerent countries are very conscious of the political, economic and military power of the United States. Therefore they are extremely eager to avoid offending you or American public opinion in any way. They will respect what you say or any position you take because you have a lot of chips on the table. The other neutrals are not powerful enough to be listened to very attentively.

I have had a ringside seat at this European show for the past twenty-two years, beginning with my experience as a doughboy in the American Expeditionary Forces in France and continuing on through the many political and economic crises of the following years. The whole thing has been a fiasco of bad politics and dumb-bell economics. The poker playing of the past two years, particularly between Germany on one side and England and France on the other, that has culminated in hanging another world war around the necks of the people in Europe provides an ironic, futile and tragic last chapter.

Certainly your taking a quiet hand in the situation is infinitely justified. Your courage and tact and experienced understanding of European problems certainly could produce a better result than this.

After spending a few days in Rome and discussing the situation here with people who brought me reasonably up to date on the Italian, French and British viewpoints, I mean not only official viewpoints but the actual feelings of the people in these respective countries, I proceeded to Germany where I have spent the past three and a half weeks.

During my visit to Germany I rechecked the observations I had made to you after my last several months stay there ending just before I left for New York in December. I had several interesting discussions over the peace and war problem with the government officials including Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Fieldmarshal Goering, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop as well as several other of the leading officials of the German government.

I presented to these gentlemen unofficially and informally certain of your attitudes of mind about the whole war and peace problem and in turn received from them for your information certain of their unofficial, informal attitudes of mind to be presented to you. These personal messages I am working up from my notes now and shall cable them to you in series during the next few days.

Meantime I wish to inform you that generally the attitude of the German government as expressed particularly by the officials I have mentioned was one of warm response to your personal, informal, unofficial interest in the whole problem. They seem eager to work with you to resolve the present difficulties in the direction of a more orderly political and economic world. They seem eager also to do whatever can be done to improve the relations between our two countries.

The outline of my discussion with Chancellor Hitler, revolving around the points that you had emphasised during your discussions with me in December and January, will be forwarded in a day or so just as quickly as I can get it prepared and coded.

Yours respectfully

James D. Mooney

4

Rome, March 12th, 1940

The Honorable Franklin D.Roosevelt, President of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

This message will outline the discussion with Chancellor Adolf Hitler in Berlin on March 4th, 1940.

The arrangements for the discussion with Chancellor Hitler had been made by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop with whom I had visited on February 29.

Before pitching into the outline of the discussion with Chancellor Hitler I should like to present to you a few details about my reception by the Chancellor because these will provide you with a bit of background as to the basis on which I presented myself to the German Government and in turn the response that was made.

Shortly after my arrival in Berlin I sent the following letter to the Chancellor:

"I need hardly inform you, Mr. Chancellor, that the human and economic consequences of the present war are terribly disturbing to the people of the entire world.

"The people in my own country feel that the war can end only in disaster for Europe and that the war will eventually have very serious consequences in America.

"I know that the welfare of the people and their inner feelings have always lain close to your heart, and I believe that it would serve a useful purpose if I were given the opportunity to discuss this problem generally with you.

"I know also that you, Mr. Chancellor, belong to the group of men in Europe and the United States who believe that the present war is a poor and disastrous way to dispose of the many international political and economic mistakes that have been made since 1914, and it is on this common ground that I should like to discuss the entire problem with you."

My letter was routed through the Foreign Office and a few days later I was received by the Foreign Minister, Mr.von Ribbentrop. During this discussion with the Foreign Minister the unofficial, informal character of my entire visit was made clear to him. The arrangements later for the visit with the Chancellor were established on this ground.

When I was received by the Chancellor, the Guard of Honor was turned out and generally I was treated most courteously. I need hardly tell you that this was not because of myself personally. Obviously the courtesies were intended as marks of respect to you and to the United States, or in any event to me as an American citizen carrying word from you.

The Chancellor was warm and friendly and the discussion during our visit took place between himself and myself alone. There were present only two other persons, one a uniformed official, acting really as his body guard, and another who took notes of the conversation and occasionally interpreted the more involved English into German for the benefit of the Chancellor.

I started out the discussion by presenting to the Chancellor your personal respects and greetings, to which he responded warmly.

I then told the Chancellor that the President had felt that by keeping the discussion on an informal basis, the heads of the governments could better understand each other and what they really wanted to get at. The Fresident wanted to be informed as to what the leaders in the various countries in Europe really and actually had in their minds. In this way preliminaries could be developed for the formalities that must be arranged as an introduction to an orderly political and economic world.

I discussed the President's attitude towards Germany as he had disclosed it to me during the personal discussions I had had with him on my recent visits with him in Washington. The President had said to me: "I wish that you would remind the Germans that I went to school in Germany, and that I became very familiar with their country in my younger days. I have many German personal friends. In my business days I had numerous clients with interests in Germany, and through them, and in other ways, I have kept in close touch with Germany over a period of many years."

The President had disclosed to me that he was not interested in saying to the German people what they should do about their leaders or their Government. That was their own affair. He felt that every people was entitled to have the form of Government and the individual leaders as they desire and choose for themselves.

The President felt that the United States, in common with all other countries had a vital interest in the present war and that our country ran the risk of suffering serious consequences from the war. He was interested in a broad world solution of the many political and economic problems which confront the world today, and he was convinced that in the solution the United States must necessarily play an important part. He was interested in a fair and equitable solution of the immediate difficulties between individual countries primarily because these difficulties bear on the broad world problem.

In this connection he had said, "I am not interested in any scheme for world domination on the part of the British or the French any more than I am on the part of the Germans."

The President had said that perhaps we could agree on a framework for an orderly political and economic world to which the leaders of the various European countries could subscribe in principle. It was the President's attitude that to reinforce such a frame-work the United States could make a substantial contribution of its surplus commodities such as cotton, wheat, lerd and copper, as well as gold.

The President felt that all countries, and especially Germany, should have broader and freer access to raw materials. As an exemple he mentioned copper as a material that could be made available in a broader way for Europe and the countries that particularly want copper. He would like to do something about this entire problem.

The President was in favor of freeing trade rather than in Freetrade as a world policy. With regard to reducing the obstructions to world commerce, he said: "I do not believe that some of the schemes that are being discussed for doing away with tariffs entirely in Europe are practicable. Governments will continue to need tariffs for revenue purposes. In the matter of opening up a broader distribution of goods and raw materials, it would be better to move in this direction gradually than to make a great many radical changes. There must be a gradual and orderly transition between war-time and peace-time economy throughout the world."

The President believes in promoting the acceptance of the mostfavored-nation principle as a foundation for reconstructing international trade. He recognizes, however, that certain practical political and economic considerations will require intermediate deviations from this principle.

In connection with the absorption of unemployed and armament workers the President said: "However, tariff barriers must be reduced and trade relations remarkably improved in Europe, because in any discussion of reconstructing an orderly world it is necessary to provide some means for furnishing employment for the people who are now being used for armament programs. During recent years,

and particularly during the last year or two, employment has been used for armaments because industry and trade have been so badly hit by the many restrictions on the flow of international trade."

I pointed out to the Chancellor that the President had no detailed ready-made peace formula or statement of peace terms which he intended to present at this time to the belligerent powers. The President had expressed no interest, on the various occasions when he discussed the situation with me, in interposing himself between the belligerents to urge them to peace. He was not offering himself as a peacemaker in the present situation. Further, he was not offering himself as an arbitrator, either now or in the future.

However, if the belligerents wished to call upon the President's services in the capacity of a moderator, he would be very happy to serve as such. He had said to me: "I would much prefer to respond to such a request by serving as a possible moderator in the situation, rather than be asked to serve as an arbitrator."

I then explained to the Chancellor that the President had chosen a typically American office to illustrate the position and functions which he had in mind. The designation "Moderator" is used in connection with an old-established American institution, the "Town-meeting", and appears also in the organization of the Presbyterian and some other Protestant churches.

I presented at this point a written definition of the distinctive features of the position and functions of a moderator, which had been translated into German for the Chancellor. The Chancellor was extremely interested in this definition and read it most carefully.

The definition of a moderator which I presented to the Chancellor read as follows: "The moderator is chosen by the common agreement of those whom he serves. The moderator has no special power or supremacy over his associates, but is honored and his word carries weight as primus inter pares - first among equals. Those whom the moderator serves have no jurisdiction over the moderator. It is the duty of the moderator to see that the business of the meeting or conference over which he presides is transacted in accordance with a previously defined and accepted set of principles. The moderator's method of executing his function is not by making final decisions, as an arbitrator, nor by casting a decisive vote in the event of balanced opposing views. These powers are not inherent in the moderator's office. Instead, it is the function of the moderator to establish the magnitude and character of the areas of difference between opposing views, and to attempt by all means at his disposal to reduce and reconcile such differences for the greatest overall good of the group as a whole."

This concluded my presentation of the President's informal, unofficial attitudes.

In response the Chancellor, first of all, expressed satisfaction that President Roosevelt had considered it useful to exchange views in an unofficial, informal manner through Mr. Mooney. The Chancellor was glad to become acquainted with President Roosevelt's personal viewpoint and attitude towards these important questions.

The Chancellor listened to my presentation of the President's personal feelings and attitude as expressed in the foregoing outline without interruption to make comment relating peculiarly to any one of the points in itself. He seemed to prefer to wait and then discourse on the various points from his own general standpoint.

After my presentation of the outline of the foregoing points and after the Chancellor had had the opportunity to examine critically and attentively the definitions, translated into German, of the President's term "Moderator", he then responded generally as follows below.

His remarks were taken down in shorthand by the attendant present who later summarized them and submitted the summary to the Chancellor for approval. This approved summary, which coincided with my recollection and notes of the meeting, was translated into English and I was given the opportunity to copy this translation verbatim. I also had the opportunity of verifying the notes which had been made of my own presentation of the President's point of view.

The Chancellor began his remarks by stating that he had always been of the opinion that the circumstances under which President Roosevent took office had confronted him with very great and difficult tasks, the solution of which the President had undertaken in a broad and constructive manner.

The Chancellor felt that from time to time unfortunate rumors and pieces of propaganda had disturbed badly the relations between our two countries. The Chancellor particularly deeply regretted that a false rumor had been circulated after a conversation he had had a few years ago with an American of German descent. This rumor he cited as typical of the rumors, propaganda, and lies which create unfortunate misunderstandings. The rumor was supposed to have been based on the conversation with the German-American referred to above. The rumor, it seems, was to the effect that on the occasion of President Roosevelt's second election the Chancellor was said to have expressed the opinion that he personally considered the reelection of the President to have been a mistake. The rumor was a lie on two grounds; first, the Chancellor had said no such thing, and second, the Chancellor has his own important problems to solve in Germany which absorb so much of

his time that ordinarily the problems of America are too far away from his own mind for him to make comment on them.

The Chancellor had been furious when he heard of this lie because he had never said that the reelection of President Roosevelt was a mistake. On the contrary, he had always been of the opinion that nobody else but President Roosevelt would be able to complete the important tasks which the President had begun during his first term.

Referring to the war, the Chancellor said that the present war was a curious one, in that Germany has declared war on nobody, but that England and France had declared war on Germany. Germany has no war aims, other than to oppose the war aims of her own destruction as proclaimed by England and France. These countries, the Chancellor said, want to dismember Germany, to interfere with her own internal system of government and to make her subject to a France-British hegemony.

These are the war aims, the Chancellor continued, which have been given wide publicity in the western countries, but England and France lack the necessary power to realize these war eims. They have forgotten that there is a tremendous difference between 1914-18 and today. In the last war, Germany had to fight alone against the whole world. At that time Japan, Russia and Italy were on the other side, while today they are sympathetic with Germany.

As far as man-power is concerned, Germany is today as strong as England and France together. From a military point of view, Germany has war on only one front, while her rear is secure and free. Germany is well prepared for the fight, and is fully determined not to rest until her security is fully safeguarded, not only for the present, but also for the future. Germany does not want to have to take up arms every twenty years.

The Chancellor said that the whole German people is inspired by the same determination. It is futile for her enemies to hope for dissensions within the German nation. The German Reich of today has its roots deep in the national structure, whereas the German monarchy in the last war had no such roots in the masses of the people. In spite of this lack of a broad popular foundation, Germany fought against overwhelming odds for four years. She can now look with all the more confidence to the future, in view of the many changes which have occurred in the situation, all to her advantage.

The Chancellor then turned to economic questions. He said that Germany regarded it as inadmissible that two countries like England and France should endeavor to rule the whole world, by means of their Empires, and to reserve to their exclusive use the whole of the economic resources of the world. He said further that for Germany's economic security, with respect to the importation of necessary foodstuffs and raw materials, it is imperative that she get out of the position where England, by one means or another, can take steps every ten years or so, to throttle or impede this flow of essential foodstuffs and necessary materials and goods.

Referring in this connection to the question of colonies, the Chancellor said that the German colonies had been stolen from them by the English and French in contradiction to assurances given to Germany by President Wilson. These colonies were of no vital importance to France and England, but they constitute a vital necessity for Germany. For these reasons the colonies must be returned to Germany.

Regarding the comparative density of population in Germany and the United States, the Chancellor said that Germany must necessarily produce ten times as much per square kilometer of ground as the United States, because there are ten times as many inhabitants per square kilometer in Germany as in the United States.

Furthermore, Germany cannot buy her necessary imports in her own currency. In order to receive her essential imports, Germany must export. For example, for every pound of coffee imported there must be a corresponding quantity of goods exported.

A country which is forced to live under such conditions must necessarily feel that the dictatorship which countries like England and France exercise over the seven seas is unendurable. The effects of such dictatorship have only recently been given further expression through the action taken by Great Britain in stopping maritime transport of German coal to Italy.

With regard to the military situation, the Chancellor said that in the World War there were 130 German divisions on the East Front and 117 on the West Front, while at present there are 200 divisions on the West Front alone. Speaking as a soldier in the great war, he said that he had learned how to evaluate his opponents, and he knows they are not superior to the Germans.

Germany has no war aims. Only aggressors have war aims, and in the present war the aggressors are those who declared war, namely England and France. Should it be said that Germany had attacked Poland, one must remember that action was taken by Germany against Poland in order to put an end to Polish terrorism against the German minorities in that country. There would never have been a German-Polish war if England had not interfered in the Polish affair, which was none of England's business:

The Chancellor said that the present war can only be brought to an end if England and France will abandon their war aims. He would be very glad to leave it to President Roosevelt himself to find out whether they were ready to do so. Germany will not make peace unless and until she receives adequate assurances of security for the future, because in the past three hundred years France has too often declared war on Germany.

If England and France, but particularly England, fully realized today that they could not hope for assistance from other countries, as for instance the United States, they would make peace tomorrow. England considers the war a kind of sport in which the others must do the fighting. She had first asked the Russians to help her, and was now busy trying to get assistance from Norway and Sweden.

In concluding and summarizing his attitude on this present problem of war or peace the Chancellor expressed his belief that he would be able to reach an agreement with President Roosevelt in ten minutes on the following basis: First, Germany is ready to respect England as a great world power. In like manner she is ready to respect France as a great world power. But Germany demands in return that she also be respected as a world power. Second, if these world powers respect one another, they can make peace. Third, once peace is established, armaments can be remarkably reduced and the labor thus released can be employed for more productive purposes. Further, by means of a better organization of international trade in harmony with the suggestions made by President Roosevelt this labor can be readily absorbed by the resulting improvement in overall economic conditions.

Meantime, unfortunately for the interests of peace, England refuses to admit that Germany herself is also a reality as a world power.

This concludes the outline of the discussion with Chancellor Hitler.

Yours respectfully,

James D. Mooney

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, The White House, Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

On March 7th I visited with Fieldmarshal Goering at his home near Berlin and am preparing to transmit to you as quickly as possible a general report of the conversation with the Fieldmarshal.

However, during the conversation the Finnish problem came under discussion and it has occurred to me that you might find this part of the discussion particularly interesting. Accordingly, I am sending you this message immediately.

After presenting to the Fieldmarshal informally and unofficially your attitudes of mind in the same manner as I presented them to Chancellor Hitler, and after receiving his general responses to your points, I went into a discussion with the Fieldmarshal of American public opinion in relation to certain of the current political factors in Europe.

I pointed out to the Fieldmarshal that American public opinion held that it lay well within Germany's grasp to provide an early solution to the situation which existed between Russia and Finland. Germany's position in the matter, beyond doubt, entitled her to certain powers of mediation.

Sentiment in the United States with regard to Russia had been developing unfavorably for the past year or more and had received a still further setback through the attack on Finland. Further westward movement of Russian influence in Europe was regarded in America as undesirable.

No feature of the present war had attained greater prominence in the American mind, which traditionally favored the under-dog, than the brave struggle which Finland had been making against heavy odds for her right to exist. The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, The White House, Washington D.C.

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No feature of the present war had attained greater prominence in the American mind, which traditionally favored the under-dog, than the brave struggle which Finland had been making against heavy odds for her right to exist. This feeling had been so marked that it was difficult to conceive of any possible move which would do more to raise German prestige and good-will in America than a timely, humane and equitable settlement of the Finnish problem under German initiative and leadership.

Fieldmarshal Goering responded to the point that Germany might take the initiative in bringing about an early solution of the Finnish problem by referring to several German expressions that had already been made to Russia urging Russia to a moderate course and reasonable demands with respect to Finland. Further, Germany had encouraged Finland to consider carefully and, if possible, accept some of the Russian points of view. But Finland had refused to make any concessions.

The Fieldmarshal continued that everything possible in the situation was being done and that there were hopes that the destroyed city of Viborg might provide the nucleus for a solution of the problem on a realistic basis. He added further that this city, which has been one of the principal Russian demands and which is outside the Finnish lines of defense, will have to be almost completely rebuilt. It was hoped that Finland would agree to leave the present site to the Russians and rebuild it at a nearby site within their natural lines of defense.

In summarizing the Finnish situation the Fieldmarshal wanted me to give assurances to the President that Germany was most interested in an early and equitable solution of the whole problem. He concluded by saying that in the Finnish situation everything possible had been done and that everything that could possibly be done would be done to this end.

Very respectfully,

James D.Mooney

The Honorable Franklin D.Roosevelt, President of the United States, The White House, Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

This message will outline the discussion with Fieldmarshal Goering at his home, Karinhall, in the country near Berlin, on March 7th, 1940. Only one other person was present during the discussion, Dr. Wohlthat, who has represented the Fieldmarshal and Germany during the past couple of years as an Ambassador-at-large, specializing particularly on trade treaties. The arrangements for the discussion with Fieldmarshal Goering had been made by Dr. Wohlthat.

I presented the President's personal respects and greetings to the Fieldmarshal and he responded warmly in kind.

I then presented to the Fieldmarshal the unofficial and informal personal attitude of the President on certain of the current political and economic problems just as I had done previously in the discussion with Chancellor Hitler, and really covered the identical ground.

Fieldmarshal Goering stated that he was pleased to get the information on the President's personal views because he had never heard these views expressed publicly and was glad to have the reassurances of the President's neutral and open mind.

In expressing himself as to the viewpoints of President Roosevelt, the attitude of the Fieldmarshal was most friendly and sympathetic. He intended to continue to explore every avenue leading towards improved relations between Germany and the United States, and was particularly responsive to the President's ideas relating to the present situation in Europe.

With respect to German-American relations, the Fieldmarshal felt that Germany had not taken a single step nor established a single policy which was contrary to American interests. Germany had not meddled in American constitutional affairs nor done anything damaging to American affairs generally.

He referred to the number of people of German descent in America, and was of the opinion that their influence politically was considerably less now than in the early Colonial days, when German failed by only one vote in the Assembly of becoming the official language in the newly founded state. The Fieldmarshal's own staff-adjutant, a General in the army has a brother and sister who are American citizens living in Kentucky.

Turning to the question of American neutrality, the Fieldmarshal regarded the cancellation of the arms embargo as representing, in effect, an advantage to England and France, through placing the entire industrial potentiality of the country at the disposition of the Allied nations. Meanwhile the realities of the situation prevented Germany from drawing upon America as a source. This effect he found in harmony with public opinion in America, which he realizes is broadly in favor of England and France. In this connection he was interested in the conservative attitude of American industry generally toward war orders.

With regard to new and drastic methods of warfare, the Fieldmarshal believed that his own feelings and those of the German people and their leaders were in sympathy with the American
feeling of horror toward their use. However, in fighting for
her national existence, Germany was forced to meet any military
necessities which confronted her with every means at her disposal. England was surely using every weapon, military and
economic, including the blockade, against combatants and civilian population alike, and was pressing forward to equal
Germany in the very weapons whose use England now decried and
against which American opinion was so definitely negative.

As to the British Empire, the Fieldmarshal considered that it has performed and can continue to perform a most useful service to the entire civilized world. He agreed with the American view that any serious weakening of the Empire would be a severe loss to the white race in all parts of the world. Germany had no quarrel with the British Empire as such, but with the English policy of interference in European affairs outside the

British Empire. Further, Germany resented the strangle hold on the world's economic resources and trade routes which England endeavored to maintain by means of the Empire, and to use against Germany as well as other countries, including neutrals.

The Fieldmarshal illustrated this point by raising the question of what America's attitude would be if Germany tried to stir up trouble in Mexico against the United States, as England had been doing in Eastern Europe against Germany. Or if Germany detained American ships and seized American mails to neutral countries as England is doing.

I went into a discussion with the Fieldmarshal of American public opinion in relation to certain of the current political factors in Europe. I pointed out to the Fieldmarshal that American public opinion held that it lay well within Germany's grasp to provide an early solution to the situation which existed between Russia and Finland. Germany's position in the matter, beyond doubt, entitled her to certain powers of mediation.

Sentiment in the United States with regard to Russia had been developing unfavorably for the past year or more and had received a still further setback through the attack on Finland. Further westward movement of Russian influence in Europe was regarded in America as undesirable.

No feature of the present war had attained greater prominence in the American mind, which traditionally favored the underdog, than the brave struggle which Finland had been making against heavy odds for her right to exist. This feeling had been so marked that it was difficult to conceive of any possible move which would do more to raise German prestige and good-will in America than a timely, humane and equitable settlement of the Finnish problem under German initiative and leadership.

Fieldmarshal Goering responded to the point that Germany might take the initiative in bringing about an early solution of the Finnish problem by referring to several German expressions that had already been made to Russia urging Russia to a moderate course and reasonable demands with respect to Finland. Further, Germany had encouraged Finland to consider carefully and, if possible, accept some of the Russian points of view. But Finland had refused to make any concessions.

The Fieldmarshal continued that everything possible in the situation was being done and that there were hopes that the destroyed city of Viborg might provide the nucleus for a solution of the problem on a realistic basis. He added further that this city, which has been one of the principal Russian demands and which is outside the Finnish lines of defense, will have to be almost completely rebuilt. It was hoped that Finland would agree to leave the present site to the Russians and rebuild it at a nearby site within their natural lines of defense.

In summarizing the Finnish situation the Fieldmarshal wanted me to give assurances to the President that Germany was most interested in an early and equitable solution of the whole problem. He concluded by saying that in the Finnish situation everything possible had been done and that everything that could possibly be done would be done to this end.

As to the government regime in Germany, in which England has professed lack of confidence, the Fieldmarshal was convinced that the German scheme of Government was so firmly rooted in the nation that it could not be displaced until Germany, and with her, most of middle Europe was brought to military, economic and social collapse. It was doubtful whether England could have greater confidence in the succeeding revolutionary regime which would spring up from the ruins of Europe.

Germany was fighting first of all against her own destruction by England and France, and for escape from starvation. Germany wanted a German sphere of influence in middle-Europe which could be likened to a German "Monroe-Doctrine". Germany wanted access to the world's raw materials and trade through restoration of her colonies and through removal of the strangle-hold which England and France imposed on natural resources and trade routes by force of their Empires.

Political, cultural and religious autonomy for the smaller states in the German orbit were included in this concept, and, since they were not strong enough in military or economic terms to maintain the independence of their international position in these respects, political interference from outside would be excluded from this German sphere of influence. These conditions already prevailed in Slovakia, were being developed as rapidly as possible in Bohemia and Moravia and would be introduced into Poland.

Turning to economic questions, the Fieldmarshal discussed the most-favored-nation principle, which was Germany's basic guiding principle in all the commercial treaties she was making. The only difference between the German and American views of this principle lay in the respective theories on this matter. In actual practice Germany was required by the necessities of the situation in various countries with which she negotiated trade agreements to establish some qualifications and deviations from the theoretical principle, just as America in certain cases made exceptions and special provisions. The qualifications thus established by Germany could also be compared with the exceptions and deviations observable in the Ottawa agreements.

There had been no change in Germany's views on the most-favorednation principle since before 1914, but the altered circumstences throughout the world with respect to the gold-standard, severe exchange fluctuations and blocked currencies had rendered these deviations from the theoretical principle necessary if trade were to be maintained at all.

For example, the countries in Southeastern Europe, which Germany regarded as falling within the German sphere of influence, and with whom various trade agreements and arrangements had been effected, all had exchange controls of one kind or another. Germany was the best market by far for their products, these countries were ready and willing to accept German goods in payment, and to accept the capital assistance which Germany offered to build up their industries and to develop their natural resources.

These countries, however, could not compete with some of the large world producers of certain of the commodities such as wheat and barley which represented the greater part of their "trading assets", so that in establishing the arrangements between herself and those countries to their mutual advantage, Germany had found it necessary, if these arrangements were to function at all, to agree upon a margin over world prices for these products in much the same manner as the United States government had rendered assistance to the American farmer.

In this connection it was important to note that although the present Germany represented a far larger potential market for American goods than ever before, the American tariff position and generally impaired relations between the two countries prevented this potentiality, to a large extent, from being realized. The Fieldmarshal indicated a strong desire for improved economic and commercial relations and cooperation between Germany and the United States, and felt that much ground would be gained for both sides by a more liberal attitude in America towards accepting imports from Germany to pay for American exports.

Germany regarded middle-Europe as her sphere of influence, but granted in principle that each nation had a right to political, cultural and religious autonomy and its own form of government. Germany realized the need and the advantages to herself, to the countries in the German sphere of influence and to the rest of the world, of maintaining an open door and the freest possible trade relations with the countries of Western Europe and the rest of the world.

The relation of population to subsistence in this German sphere is such that the standard of living in this area could not be maintained and improved without a vigorous flow of trade in both directions with countries outside the German sphere. The modern industrial development of the world was far ahead of the political and social capacities to capitalize constructively upon this development for a broadly improved standard of living. Statesmen everywhere carry the responsibility to bring about the necessary equalization of these fundamental factors.

On the general subject of war and peace, the Fieldmarshal felt that this rested with England. Germany was ready to end the war and turn to more constructive purposes, provided England would abandon her war aim of Germany's destruction. Britain knew what she was fighting against - against a stronger Germany - but did not seem to know what she was fighting for.

The Fieldmarshal was particularly interested in the discussion of the position and functions of a "moderator", with which term he had not been familiar in such connection. He drew a comparison between this concept of a moderator and the part played by President Wilson in the armistice and peace negotiations following the world war, which, in his opinion, had not been productive of the best results. However, he recognized the distinction that in 1918-19 the situation involved victorious and defeated nations, which is not the case in the present situation. Furthermore, he realized that public opinion in the United States twenty years ago had not been in favor of some of the features of President Wilson's plans, whereas now American public opinion seemed to be definitely in favor of ending the war.

The Fieldmarshal continued that he would like very much to see something done to bring about an early end to the hostilities, but was inclined to doubt whether America could effectively assume the role of moderator now, in view of the English viewpoint and state of mind. He felt definitely that the principal difficulty at present in the way of an approach to the problem by way of a moderator lay in London.

If something were to be initiated from the American side in this general direction, the Fieldmarshal was of the opinion that it should be done very soon, because certain very important present advantages to Germany would be impaired by long continued dalay. This was too great a responsibility for the leaders of Germany to assume, to incur such penalties by a policy of indeterminate waiting. If Germany could be sure that something constructive was in process of development, including the necessary changes in the English and French standpoints, she would not force the decision aggressively. But there were grave doubts as to the possibility of such circumstances materializing.

Dealing with the military situation, the Fieldmarshal felt that since England had decided to make this war, a heavy responsibility rested upon those who directed Germany's effort if they failed to capitalize upon the present military advantages. These are felt to be a stronger air force, slmost twice as many divisions on the Western front as in 1914-1918, superior artillery and more effective techniques in mine and submarine warfare.

The Fieldmarshal believed that England would not be convinced, without putting it to the test, that Germany was able, if necessary, to fight successfully against England and France. In consequence, England was continuing to develop every means in her power to destroy Germany. The Fieldmarshal further felt that if England were convinced of Germany's ability to defend herself successfully, England would be ready to discuss a basis for ending the war. Under such circumstances she would find Germany equally ready to take part in such discussions.

This concludes the outline of the discussion with Fieldmarshal Goering.

Yours respectfully,

James D.Mooney

Rome, March 15, 1940

The Honorable Franklin D.Roosevelt, President of the United States, The White House, Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

During the past several days cables have been sent to you covering the exploration work that I have been able to do so far in the war and peace situation in Europe.

In this concluding message of the series I should like to make a few suggestions to you in relation to the current problem. I have been rather saturated with the problem, particularly during the past several months and am presenting these suggestions with the hope that they might be slightly helpful in developing your own views and plans.

The peoples of Europe are united in the belief that the present war could have been averted. There is today a deeper self-interest appeal for all the belligerent peoples in making peace than in continuing the war. Nobody can doubt the wish of every belligerent country for the ending of this war.

The world faces many problems today just as serious as war and far more worthy of sacrifices. None of these problems is going to be solved by this war.

There are times when a man or a nation must fight. There are things worth more than life itself. The death of martyrs sometimes enables others to live on in a better world. But nobody in Europe seems to believe that a better world will come out of this war. In other words, the war in Europe today is not regarded as martyrdom; but as suicide for winners and losers alike.

Is there a way out? There is still in Europe a universal hope that a way out might be found. There is still a strong undercurrent of feeling that a peace should be attempted

at the beginning instead of at the end of the war. Level-headed people everywhere in Europe are still hoping that there may be peace before millions of lives have been lost, before Europe has been made a shambles and before bitterness has been branded in the hearts of men here for another generation. Peace at the beginning of the war might provide some hope for the solution of European problems.

Europe can count only on the President of the United States to take an effective hand in the mediation that is necessary in the present situation. I know from my recent extended contacts back home in December and January that the American people believe too that it is an insane war and that the United States shares some responsibility for the deep causes of the present war. It seems therefore that the American people would support a discreet position as a moderator on the part of the President. However, I do not want to be so presumptious as to extend the discussion of this phase of the whole problem.

I should like on the other hand however to make some suggestions to you for the practical points that will have to be considered in building up the approach for a peace. I feel reasonably sure of my ground in making these suggestions because of my intimate contacts in Europe with the problem over the past several years and particularly during the past six months of the war.

The problem of calling off the war is essentially one of prectical politics. The political groups in the three belligerent countries have thrown so many dead cats over the other fellow's garden wall during the past two or three years and particularly during the last six months, that it is now very difficult for them to have any discussions with one another. These political factors not only distrust each other in a personal way but they have been telling the world violently and frequently that they hate and distrust each other.

One cannot help raising the question here, when it is said on either side that they cannot deal with the other crowd, as to how much the situation will be improved in this respect if the war goes on for two or three years. Certainly at the end of that time not a shred of trust or respect would be left on either side.

The situation needs the hand of a man skilled in practical politics. There are conflicting ideologies, and important problems of economics and political boundaries. But no political leader in Europe when in a frank mood will contend for killing off several million men and making a shambles of Europe as the means for settling these problems.

The root of the trouble at present seems to lie in the problems of personal prestige. In generating the peace pattern one must include a large element of face saving. I say this without the slightest implication of criticism of the various political leaders personally because the events of the past two or three years have been appallingly difficult.

The next important point is national prestige and honor. A practical approach toward mediation will have to include elements to reconstitute these less material but very important factors for both sides.

The third and last general point so far as the political leaders are concerned is security for their own countries and peoples.

As to the peoples themselves in the belligerent countries, two things are closest to their hearts: first, immunity from physical danger, in other words, a peaceful life. Second, the right to earn a living.

I have sent you a complete outline of the discussions with Chancellor Hitler and Fieldmarshal Goering on the subject of war and peace and in presenting these outlines I have tried carefully to avoid interpolating any of my own points of view about Germany's attitude into my report of their conversations. I considered it most important to report the conversations to you as faithfully as possible and to give you the opportunity to make your own deductions from them.

However, I should like now to present my own sense of the German attitude built up from an intensive exploration of their standpoint and outlook.

In the first place, my own opinion is that Germany is eager to make peace. I believe that this eagerness is not induced by any great fears on the part of Germany that they cannot withstand attack from England and France and take care of themselves rather well. They do not like the idea of taking up the war aggressively but they are just as grim and determined about seeing the war through as England and France.

Boiled down in essence, Germany is willing to make such concessions for Poland and Czechoslovakia as could please world opinion in relation to the religious, cultural and political autonomy of these nations. On the other hand, Germany seems thoroughly determined to prevent any recurrence of the nuisance value generated

by England and France through their making political and military pacts with countries contiguous to Germany.

The main other thing that Germany seems determined about is the return of the former German colonies. But it seems that they would want these returned primarily for their trading value. After the colonies were technically turned tack to her, Germany would be willing to give way on actually taking over some of these territories. This is because Germany realizes that certain political embarrassments would ensue to England and France if the colonies as defined by their present boundaries were actually taken over by Germany. Germany might for instance be willing to trade the whole lot of her former colonies in Africa for a new block of territory in Central tropical Africa which she could open up and colonize. In other words, she is willing in spirit to have the colonial problem handled in a mutually constructive way.

Some of the points which you emphasized to me during our discussions at the White House in December and January, as for instance religious freedom and Germany's coming into the family of nations for international trade along the lines endorsed by you and Secretary Hull, are generally quite acceptable to Germany in principle. Furthermore, the many discussions I had with officials of the German government made me believe that they would meet you more than half way in supporting your broad general program for resolving the immediate political difficulties in Europe in the direction of an orderly political and economic world program.

One of the most important points in dealing with Germany at the present time, if not the most important point, is again a very practical human point. German officials have often said to me, and I have heard it a great deal during the past few years in Germany generally, that the Germans are tired of being treated like bad school-boys. They are tired of being talked down to and of being scolded all the time as though they had a special monopoly among the nations on all the failings of human nature.

During my recent visit with the government officials in Germany the friendly expressions that you had made toward Germany in your remarks to me had a tonic effect in soothing the irritation that could have arisen ordinarily in my discussing with them frankly and bluntly as I did, some of the elements of American public opinion in relation to Germany's present policies on certain matters.

In general, what this situation in Europe needs at the moment, Mr. President, is the healing influence of some of your tolerant, friendly, patient type of dealing.

I am not going to discuss what the French want or the English want, because you are just as familiar with this as I am, except I should like to touch on one or two points from the standpoint of either country, just as a means of introducing a few suggestions for the practical approach to peace.

The French want security. Further, they want a reconstitution of their national prestige and honor, which they feel suffered through their not saving Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Maginot line is a great part of the answer to French security.

In discussions for peace France could champion the rights of Poland and Czechoslovakia for certain national, religious, political and cultural autonomies. Undoubtedly France could get such rights from the Germans if such rights did not interfere with Germany's security on her eastern and southeastern borders.

England too wants security and a reconstruction of her national prestige and honor.

Let us address ourselves for the moment to the problem of prestige and honor for England and particularly to the problem of facesaving for the political group in England under whose leadership and inheritance of previous bad politics England became involved in the present situation.

Nobody could possibly take exception to England's having declared war on Germany at the time Germany declared her intention of invading Poland. England had said that she would declare war if this invasion took place and she was bound to keep her word. This does not mean that the present war is not still wrong because, although the declaration of war by England was logical on September 3, the preceding causes over a series of years, and particularly the poker playing of 1938 and 1939, provided a very illogical basis in the whole sequence of events.

The thing I want to suggest to you, Mr.President, is that England has found herself during the past six months since the outbreak of world war number two in the position of a school boy or young fellow who has got himself into a bad fight against a tough adversary. As is the way of a school boy or young fellow, he carries a chip on his shoulder and picks up challenges for a fight quite lightly.

After the fight is well under way and he has been accumulating a black eye, he is inclined to wonder why he had not been a bit more polite in the situation. Finally, if the fight is going badly or the opponent seems to be much tougher than he had anticipated, he is quite happy if a policeman happens to come along or perhaps some older man to stop the fight.

Honor is still intact because he did not fail to accept the challenge and he did not quit. But on the other hand, also, his nose is still reasonably intact and this is comforting. In other words, he retires from the fight with honor and not too badly bruised up. This is the perfect situation for a fellow who likes to maintain his reputation in the neighborhood for being a scrappy fellow.

Stopping a fight is very often a most thankless job and this fight in Europe looks particularly difficult.

But you are the only one who can stop it, Mr.President. Perhaps, some way or another could be found whereby you could project yourself into the situation in harmony with American public opinion and in harmony with saving face for the political leaders in the belligerent countries and in harmony with their national honor and prestige. God knows the peoples of these belligerent countries would be very happy for peace and I am quite sure this includes the political leaders themselves.

The final suggestion I have to make, Mr.President, is that instead of starting in by trying to settle some of the heated and irritating issues between England and Germany, that you set forth before the belligerents an attractive frame-work for an orderly political and economic world, which you would invite the belligerents to join. Such a frame-work would set forth certain broad principles to which the belligerents could subscribe.

This frame-work would have to recognize certain practical factors in the European situation. For example, England has declared again and again that Germany is a constant factor for unrest in Europe and that the world cannot settle down to orderly progress until Germany ceases to press its nuisance-value and stops grabbing more territory.

Some assurance must therefore be given to the British people that once Germany's legitimate demands are fulfilled Germany too will settle down to business and cease pulling some new stunt every few months.

As evidence of Germany's willigness to respond to this viewpoint and set of principles, Chancellor Hitler gave me emphatic assurance for transmission to you that with the recognition of Germany as a first class power, entitled to have some hegemony in her part of the world, and with the satisfaction of Germany's colonial claim, a long period of peace can come so far as Germany is concerned.

The President of the United States could elicit a solemn pledge from both sides that after the two parties had stopped fighting and had agreed upon an equitable peace between them, a peace formulated under the guidance of the President as moderator, they agree to let the other fellow alone and cease pin-pricking him by stirring up trouble in the other fellow's back yard.

It should be remembered that the United States would not guarantee either side. The American public opinion is dead set against any such commitment or involvement. The Allies did their best to make us guarantee their side after the last war, and failed. America, of course, will not fall for that this time either.

But the President of the United States could become the trustee for both sides by locking up in his safe, figuratively speaking, a solemn document from both sides whereby both sides agree that the peace treaty which they have signed shall be a lasting one. With his skill for dramatic presentation Mr. Roosevelt could give world-wide publicity to these pledges and also let the world know that a violation of them would raise up the entire moral force of the United States against the violator. Such a Magna Charta of world peace would assure the British nation that it had not declared war in vain. England would have achieved what it could not attain after the last war. Then, it was clearly a dictated peace and of course the loser could do nothing but accept it without really intending to do anything but throw off the shackles at the first opportunity. In contrast, a peace among equals would be something to the lasting observance of which both sides could pledge themselves.

If a truce could be declared during which these principles could be discussed, only a few months of relief would be needed from the danger and fear of imminent military aggressiveness to explore the practical possibilities of applying these principles.

If at the end of such a period of truce it should be found that the principles contained no ground for a more orderly political and economic world, then it would be time enough to say: let the war go on and let the world go to hell.

This is my last message of the present series and before making any more contacts I shall await your further wishes.

Respectfully yours,


James D.Mooney

PSF Lage: J HSM Rome This telegram must be Dated March 16, 1940 closely paraphrased

before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State, Washington.



190, March 16, noon.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WELLES.

I was received by the King this morning and had with him a conversation lasting just under an hour. In the conversation which was in general terms the King expressed his highest admiration and regard for yourself and for all that you have done in the causa of peace.

I have just concluded a conversation of an Lour and a half with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister emphasized even more than he had done in cu. conversation two weeks ago the determination of Italy to do everything within its power to further the reestablishment of peace, to adhere strictly to its present line of policy and to take no steps which would further trouble the world situation. (END SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PHILLIPS

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 16, 1940 Rec'd 11:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

190, March 16, noon. (SECTION TWO)

In my conversation with him I was given full opportunity to evaluate the recent Ribbentrop conversations here in connection with the course of my present mission. Twenty (repeat twenty).

I am being received by Mussolini this afternoon.

Count Ciano requested me to postpone my departure from Rome which had been scheduled for Monday until the following day in order that I might before my departure receive personally and secretly from him further impressions which they were now obtaining from Berlin. I shall consequently sail from Genoa on March 20th instead of from Naples on March 19th. (END MESSAGE).

PHILLIPS

HPD

HE SECRETARY

The attached telegram from

Mr. Welles is in nine sections

and being received only slowly

off thw wire. It is in secret

code requiring slightly longer

for decoding but will be forwarded

as rapidly as possible

CH

AC Rome This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-

fore being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated March 17, 1940 Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State Washington

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

191, March 17, noon.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM WELLES.

Referring to my telephone conversation with the President last night I believe that the urgency of the situation demands that I telegraph this summary of my conversations of last evening with the Duce and with Count Ciano.

In my conversation with the Duce I stated that I had been impressed everywhere during my trip with the confidence expressed that the Duce and his Foreign Minister were sincerely desirous of doing their utmost to bring about a reestablishment of peace on a just and durable basis. I said that it seemed to me that the influence of Italy towards this end might consequently be very great. The Duce replied that if he had not in fact sincerely wished to do everything possible to. avert the present war and, after war had broken out, to limit its spread there would today be engaged in war

more

- 2 - #191, March 17, noon, from Rome.

more than two hundred million additional human beings in the Mediterranean region and in Africa. (END ONE OF NIME SECTIONS).

PHILLIPS

CSB

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated January 17, 1940

Secretary of State
Washington

191, January 17, noon (SECTION TWO). He said that it was impossible for Europe to stand a war at this time and that the course of salvation lay in preparing the foundation for a peace which would give assurance of durability for the next generation. He asked me if I would give him the impressions which I had formed as the result of my recent visits. I said that as he knew I had committed myself to consider the conversations I had as strictly confidential and as solely for the information of the President and the Secretary of State and that consequently he would recognize, I knew, that I could not disclose the statements made to me nor the opinions expressed to me. I said that I had however felt at liberty to say in the visits to the various capitals which I had made after my first visit to Rome that I had been glad to learn from the Duce that he did not believe that the establishment of a just and durable peace at this time was in any sense outside the realm of possibility.

- 2 - #191, January 17, noon (SECTION TWO) from Rome

I had thereby been encouraged in my search for information. (END SECTION TWO).

PHILLIPS

CSB

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated March 17, 1940 Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

191, March 17, noon (SECTION THREE). While for the reasons expressed I could only reply in a general sense, I could state that I had everywhere found that the fundamental demand was for security; not a fictitious nor illusory security but a security which involved a real disarmament including the abolition of offensive types of armaments and in particular areas freed from the present nightmare which today oppressed all peoples, namely, the ever present danger of the utilization of offensive types of airplanes for the bombing of civilian populations and the slaughter of women and children. I said that in my first conversation with the Duce two weeks and he had outlined to me what he believed were essential territorial and political readjustments. I said that I had formed the very definite impression that the readjustments which he had mentioned to me - which included the reconstitution of a free and independent Poland with Economic access to the sea - were by no means insoluble problems

- 2 - #191, March 17, noon (SECTION THREE).

problems. I said that I had formed the equally positive conviction that these problems could only be solved successfully on the basis of real security of the type I had indicated. (END SECTION TEREE).

PHILLIPS

CSB

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 17, 1940 Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

191, March 17, noon (SECTION FOUR) At this stage Mussolini said too that upon the initiative of Hitler he had agreed a few hours before to meet Hitler at the Brenner Pass at ten a.m. on March 18. He said that throughout the course of Ribbentrop's recent visit to Rome the latter had refused to agree to any possible negotiations for peace but had insisted that Gernany would seek peace only through military victory and that after military victory had been gained peace would be determined by German dictation. The Duce said that he believed that the German military offensive was imminent and that in all probability it was only a few hours away. He said that once this offensive was undertaken any hope of peace by negotiation would probably be killed and in any event indefinitely postponed. He said that he would do his utmost to persuade Hitler to postpone the offensive but that if he was to have any chance of doing so he must have some hope to offer. Hitler that the allied powers would not assume a position of complete intransigence. He wished consequently

- 2 - #191, March 17, noon (SECTION POUR) from Rome.

to know whether I would authorize him to communicate to Hitler the impressions I had given him.

(END SECTION FOUR).

PHILLIPS

CSB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (SC) Rome
Dated Harch 17, 1940

AEc'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

191, March 17, noon (SECTION FIVE).

In reply I stated that I could not give him such authorization without consulting the President which I would do by telephone and that I would communicate the President's decision on to him later in the evening through Count Ciano. I said that I felt sure that I need not emphasize to him the fact that I was in no sense acting as an intermediary but solely as a reporter and that I considered it doubtful that the President would feel able to reach any decision in regard to all of the issues involved until I had been afforded the opportunity to report to the President in full and personally. Mussolini said that the minute hand had reached one minute before midnight and that he feared the time would necessarily elapse.

Before the termination of my interview Mussolini said, I think very significantly, that while the German-Italian

-2- #191, Harch 17, noon from Rome

German-Italian pact existed he, Mussolini, retained entire liberty of action. He requested that I defer my departure from Rome until after his return from his meeting with Hitler so that he could communicate to me the results of the interview in order that I might have: them available before leaving Europe to report to the President.

(END SECTION FIVE).

PHILLIPS

PEG

HM
This telegram must be closely piriphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome
Dated Harch 17, 1940
Rec'd 2:30 p. m.

repeated

Sacretary of State,

191, March 17, noon (SECTION SIK)

I then telephoned to the President and obtained his approval of my recommendation that I should send word to the Duce that the President did not feel able to instruct me to authorize Mussolini to communicate any impressions I had formed with regard to territorial readjustments to Mitler.

I then had a further interview with Count Ciano at his house and conveyed to him the President's message. Count Ciano said emphatically that he fully agreed as to the vision of the decision made. I stressed the message which the President had given me on the telephone that the fundamental problem of security involved a real disarmement so that men and women might again undertake constructive work with consequent betterment of living standards and with the consequent possibility that beneficial economic adjustments could be made. I

hsm -2- No.191, March 17, noon, (Section Six) from dome repeated to Count Ciano the President's confident belief that the Allied Governments did not (repeat not) hold as an objective the destruction of Germany nor of the German people but that they did want a real guaranty that war would not be forced upon them every generation. Count Ciano said that he himself completely shared these views.

PHILLIPS

HTM

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome
Dated March 17, 1940
Rec'd 4:10 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

191, March 17, noon. (SECTION SEVEN)

He said that throughout the course of the Ribbentrop conversations Ribbentrip had talked of nothing but war and of the German assurance that Germany could defeat France within three or four months and that subsequently England would crumble soon thereafter. He also spoke of Robbentrop's reiterated insistence that Italy and Russia come to a close and friendly understanding. Ciano stated emphatically that there would be no change in Italy's present policy either with regard to the present war or with regard to Russia. He arranged to meet me confidentially at noon on March 19 with no press publicity in order that I might be fully advised by him of the conversations with Hitler.

As I see the situation there are two possible alternatives: first, that as a result of his conversations with Hitler, Mussolini may convey to the Allied Governments

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hsm -2- No. 191, March 17, noon (Section 7) from Rome Governments peace terms which would prove entirely unacceptable and which might be couched in the nature of a German ultimatum.

PHILLIPS

PEG

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome
Dated March 17, 1940
Rec'd 7:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

191, March 17, noon. (SECTION EIGHT) In the event that this step is taken I would suggest that the Secretary issue a statement saying that while the President greatly appreciates the particularly cordial and friendly reception accorded me by the Duce and by Ciano, as well as the opportunity they have given me of procuring the information which the President sent me to Europe to obtain, nevertheless, neither the President nor I have been consulted in any way with regard to the peace terms nor were the President nor I in any way apprised of their nature before they were made public. In the hypothesis that a peace drive is now put on by Hitler through Mussolini, a statement of that character issued in Washington would immediately kill the impression which would presumably be intentionally created that the President's step in sending me abroad had favored a peace drive of that character.

(END SECTION EIGHT)

PHILLIPS

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome
Dated March 17, 1940
Rec'd 7:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

191, March 17, noon. (SECTION NINE)

A second alternative is that Hitler actually is determined upon a military offensive in the immediate future and will consider no alternative. It may be that Hitler's desire to see Mussolini at this juncture is due to Ribbentrop's inability to persuade the Italian Government to enter into some understanding with Russia and that he feels it imperative if a military offensive is now undertaken by Germany to prevent any discord between Italy and Russia from having prejudicial effects on Germany's source of supplies in the Near East and in particular in the Balkans. In connection with this second alternative Ciano said to me two significant things: first, that when Hitler had requested the meeting with Mussolini the latter had suggested March 19 and Hitler had replied that it could not be later than March 18; second,

36110

hsm -2- No. 191, March 17 (section nine) from Rome second, that Hitler has informed Mussolini that he cannot spare more than one hour for the interview since he must return to Germany with the utmost haste.

(END MESSAGE).

PHILLIPS

HTM

(FROM: ALUSMA LONDON 231230CH980)

DATE: 23 APRIL 1949

TO: OPMAY

PRECEDENCE: CABLE

INFO:

TOR CODE ROOM: 1454

RELEASE:

GODFREY ON THE EVENING OF 22 APRIL EXPRESSED APPRECIABLE LESSENING OF ANXIETY OVER ITALIAN ACTION. HE QUOTES THE

CHANCES NOW TWO TO ONE AGAINST. HE FEELS THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE (ACCORDING TO RECENT RELIABLE INFORMATION) IS SERIOUSLY

UNPREPARED AND THAT THE ARMY IS ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS SO. HOWEVER, HE FEELS THAT THE ITALIAN NAVY IS FULLY READY.

GODFREY SAID AGAIN THAT HIS IDEA WAS THAT THE ITALIAN MOTIVE WAS TO KEEP UP THEIR NUISANCE VALUE UNTIL THE WINNING SIDE

WAS MORE CLEARLY DEFINED WHEN THEY MAY BE EXPECTED TO DRIVE A HARD BARGAIN. HE STATED THAT THIS WAS A DANGEROUS GAME.HE


INTIMATED THAT THEY STILL THINK DIVIDED COUNCILS PREVAIL IN

A SIMILAR VIEW OF THE GENERAL ITALIAN SCENE WAS RECENTLY VOICED BY THE FRENCH NAVAL ATTACHE HERE, BUT HE SAID THEIR OWN

OFFENSIVE POWER COULD SEVERELY DAMAGE IMPORTANT NORTHERN OBJECTIVES. HE SUGGESTED IN CONCLUSION THAT THE EVENTUAL

TALIAN ATTITUDE WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY ITALY'S ABILITY TO GET COAL: - IF FROM THE NAZIS THEN THAT WOULD BE THE WAY THEY WOULD SWING.

HE FRANKLY REPLIED "! DO NOT KNOW BUT FEEL IT IS DOUBTFUL", WHEN I ASKED HIM "DO YOU THINK IT IS PROBABLE THAT SUCH WILL OCCUR?"



NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OF THE "INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C."

Foreign Relations of the United

14 May 1940

THE SECRETARY

General and Europe, Vol. 11

a36 no1

May 14, 1940. Juig mal

Philips Rome A

President desires you to present the following personal message from him to Mussolini:

In final appeal to Your Excellency is the refrain from any course of action that could be constitled



A. UDOCUL

I send you this appeal as the head of a peaceful nation and as a close friend of twenty other American Republics. All of us in the Americas feel in our hearts that tonight the whole world faces a threat which opposes every teaching of Christ, every philosophy of all the great teachers of mankind over thousands of years.

Forces of slaughter, forces which deny God, forces which seek to dominate mankind by fear rather than by reason seem at this moment to be extending their conquist forces which million human beings who have no desire but peace.

You whom the great Italian people call their leader have it in your own hands to stay the spread of this war to another group of 200,000,000 human souls in the Middleman and Alle

I have sent word to Your Excellency before that I am a realist. As a realist you also will, I know, recognize that if war should extend the world of heads of States, would encompass the destruction of millions of lives and the best of what we call the liberty and culture of civilization.

And no man, no matter how omniscient, how powerful, can fortell the result either to himself or his own people.

Therefore, I make the simple plea that you, responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, stay wholly apart from any war and refrain from any threat of attack. So only can you help mankind tonight and tomorrow and in the pages of history.

Frankit m Il procent

I Shapt May 14 10 p.m. Massolmi I smed your thin appoint as the Me head of a praciful the nation the and as a friend of twenty when muciam Republics. All of us in the Americas first in our hearts that longht the whole world faces a threat which opposes ivery tracking of thrist svery philosophy of the Trackers of manking where tole thousands of years. Forces of staughter, forces

THE WHITE HOUSE

which day Sad, forces which Dist Delouinate mentioned by fran rather then by Iravou Dim At This mannet of by extrusting Their Ducy over a hundred million Luma lamps who have no Arsin but peace. You whom the frest otherwine people and their linder have it in your won hands to stry the opercul of the war to mother from of 200 000 aces homen

THE WHITE HOUSE

have some weed A your Exulting before that I am a realist. hs a realist your also will I traw reagnize that a world was should setted to all went ments with of States, would ancoughass the distruction of mellines of lives mel The best of what we coll to bertyand suttine of sivilgation. had no seem, no matter haw impisient how pursuful com forefall the 155 Men 15 himself on his west sigle.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Therefore I make the simple She That you, responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, would of my whichly apart from my now and spring the 2st of attack. No only can you work what he had tumerrows. Prendent

PSF Safe: Dialy

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

Rome

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd 7:23 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

348, May 15, 1 p. m.

My 347, May 15, noon.

Ciano has called me on the telephone to say that Mussolini asked me to convey his thanks to the President and to assure the President that his message would be given most serious consideration but that at the moment he had no further comment to make.

It is clear therefore that the Duce does not desire to receive me today.

RR

PHILLIPS -

PSF Safe: Staly

CK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Rome
Dated May 15, 1940
Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

457, May 15, noon.

Department's No. 116.

Ciano received me this morning at 10 o'clock after he had been made aware that I was bringing message from the President to Mussolini. He read the message carefully and then informed me that he had already advised the Chief of Government of the purpose of my visit and that Mussolini had asked him to tell me that he preferred at this time to receive the message through the Foreign Minister rather than directly from me. Ciano explained that Mussolini wished to avoid at this moment any sensationalism and he assured me that the message would be in Mussolin's hands within a few minutes. I said that I was certain that the President would appreciate the fact that Husselini had received me if only to tell me that he had read the message and to express to me for transmission to the President any comments he might care to make. Ciano did not say that this would be impossible and indicated that he would telephone me a little later in the day.

· ILLIPS

FILE IN THE PRESIDENT'S DESK

safe istaly



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1940

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the attached telegram regarding exports of petroleum and petroleum products from the United States to Italy in the last eight months, and for similar figures of exports to Italy from the principal South American suppliers (Venezuela and the Netherlands West Indies), the following report is submitted:

There is attached hereto a table showing the total dollar value of exports of petroleum products to Italy for each of the eight months September 1939 to April 1940, together with the total for the corresponding eight months of 1938-1939. For this same period there is also shown the leading petroleum products making up this total. The products separately listed account for about 98 percent of the total trade in petroleum products.

It will be observed that total exports of petroleum and petroleum products have been about 9 percent higher in the last eight months than in the corresponding months a year earlier. Exports of crude petroleum and residual fuel oil have been decidedly lower than a year ago, while exports of lubricating oil have risen substantially.

With

With reference to exports of petroleum products from Venezuela and the Netherlands West Indies to Italy, there appear to be no data available in Washington for any recent period. The latest information which the Division of Regional Information of the Department of Commerce has is for 1936 in the case of Venezuela and for the first quarter of 1939 for the Netherlands West Indies. Telegrams are being sent to Caracas and Curação asking for the latest available data on this subject.

CH

U. S. EXPORTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO ITALY, 1938 - 1940

Total	Petroleum Products *	(Thousands of Dollars)
	1939 September	1,128 1,874
	1940 January	970 1,804
×	8 months ending April, 1940	9,996 9,160

Leading Petroleum Expo	8 months ending				
Tourse and a series and a serie		April 1940		April 1939	
Commodity	Unit	Quantity		Quantity (thous	
		(thou	sands)	(chous	eulus /
Crude petroleum	barrels	2,521	3,340	4,032	5,096
Gasoline	barrels	57	112	175	663
Gas Oil & Distillate fuel oil		151	269		
Residual Fuel Oil		373	351	1,333	1,203
Lubricating Oil			4,906	-	1,327
Red and Pale	•	239	1,572	114	546
Cylinder	•	254	2,838	75	528
Paraffin Wax	pounds	16,217	801	20,520	727
Total leading com	modities		9.779	_	9,016

Prepared by:
Division of Foreign Trade Statistics
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce
June 7, 1940

a36 g04

Exports of petroleum products to Italy in May, 1940 totaled \$797,000, for declarations received through May 29.

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

Dated June 5, 1940 Rec'd 8:40 a. m.

REGRADED UNCL & FIED

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1036, June 5, 11 a. m.

PERSONAL AND SECRETARY MORGENTHAU.

Professor Charles Rist has just called on me to state that the Ministry of Blockade has received authoritative and absolute information that the Italian Government has been transshipping to the German Government an average of 175,000 tons of oil products per month during the past few months. The Ministry of Blockade regards the transshipment of lubricating oils as especially serious and states that all the good lubricating oil imported by Italy comes from the United States.

Professor Rist asked me if, at this moment when Mussolini had announced definitely that he was about to make war on France and England although he had not fixed the date, it might not be possible for the Government of the United States to cut off all supplies to Italy of oil and petroleum products.

BULLITT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

February 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your memorandum concerning the cable from Rome about the situation of Italian women and children, there is attached a copy of the reply sent to Ambassador Phillips.

CH

XXX February 7, 1941. AMERICAN ELBASSY. MONE. TRIPLE PRIORITY. Your 167, February 6, noon. For reasons of policy the Department does not repeat not desire you to undertake any arrangements personally or on behalf of this Covernment looking toward the chartering of a vessel or other active participation in the evacuation of Italian nationals in Italian East Africa. However, the Department regarding with humanitarian concern the situation of Italian women and children there, authorizes you informally to discuss their situation with the appropriate Italian authorities and to offer the good offices of this Government in an informal approach to the British authorities for safe conduct and such other facilities as those authorities may be able to extend to the Italian authorities in evacuating Italian women and children and other noncombatants from the area in question. Formal approach to the British authorities in the matter would, of course, have previously to be made through the Brazilian Eubassy at Rome inasmuch as it is understood that the representation of Italian interests in Great Britain have been undertaken by the Brazilian Government.

a36-02

Government. The Department is glad to have had you bring the matter to its attention and in view of its sympathetic interest in it, will appreciate prompt word from you as to further developments.

740.0011 European War 1939/8166

Ruisk SD:GLB:LFS

in Italian East Africa now unable to leave the country. This fear will presumably become acute with advance of British forces and probable native uprisings. circumstances it occurs to me that it would be in line with our tradition and would at the same time be a highly important gesture for us to make at this moment if, acting on my own initiative and yet with your approval, I could discuss the situation at the Foreign Office intimating that we might be able to be of assistance in evacuating the women and children. Already I have heard it said that the Japanese might undertake this task. event that Italian Government should welcome my suggestion we should of course have to explore the possibility of chartering a vessel immediately available in those waters. PHILLIPS GW a36r04

HSM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome Dated February 6, 1941 Rec'd 11:15 a. m.

= Safe: Staly

Secretary of State, Washington.

167, February 6, noon.

There is deep concern apparent in Italian circles with regard to the situation of Italian women and children WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is the autograph copy, with translation, of the letter from Victor Emmanuel dated September 21. You may recall that the substance of the letter was transmitted by radio at that time.

The letter was delivered to me by courier from General Eisenhower with the request that it be transmitted to you.

Chief of Staff

Enc.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

[5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- JAN 18 1972

Signatures RWA

MR PRESIDENT

I deem it opportune to submit to your Excellency in a confidential and personal way certain considerations based on the common interest of our two countries.


In my opinion, it is urgently necessary that all or as much as possible of the territory of Italy be liberated from the Germans in order to prevent the operation of the great industries of Northern Italy, in spite of themselves, for the benefit of the enemy, by supplying him with tanks, airplanes, and motor vehicles; within a few months, it is possible that warships, including two of our battleships, may again plow the waters of the Mediterranean flying the German flag, as the result of the compulsory labor done in our northern shipyards.

In the meantime, it is of vital political importance to Us and to You that we reach Rome as soon as possible.

On July 25, the Italian People decidedly renounced its adherence to the Fascist regime, but I think that a new Fascist Government, even if illegally set up, could, if it were in possession of
the Capital, seriously hinder our military operations and foment
civil war with the support of its armed militia units and of a criminal minority actuated by self-interest.

It is to our common interest that this shall not happen, and this can be prevented all the more quickly the sooner I and my Government can return to Rome and our troops can push toward Northern Italy.

DOD DIN. 5200.9 (9/27/£3)




At present, my Government is exercising civil authority over four provinces of Apulia and over Sardinia; it would bring about a remarkable accession of moral and political strength if my Government were permitted to extend its own jurisdiction over the rest of the occupied territory, including Sicily.

The exercise of civil authority over a considerable part of the National territory would make possible the political reconstruction of the country, to be completed by the return to the parliamentary system, which I have always favored, by giving us. a greater choice between statesmen.

Lastly, I wish to bring to Your Excellency's personal attention the important problem of exchange: a handling of this problem more favorable than that adopted in Sicily would have moral and political repercussions of incalculable benefit to the common cause.

With the best wishes for our two countries, I beg you, Mr. President, to believe in my profound confidence.

(Signed) VICTOR EMMANUEL Sept. 21, 1943.



DDD DIR 0200.9 (9/27/58)

Residence of the second of the

SIGNOR PRESIDENTE

Ritengo opportuno prospettare in via riservata e personale a Vostra Eccellenza alcune considerazioni inspirate all'interesse comune dei Nostri Paesi.

A mio avviso è necessario ed urgente che tutta o la maggior parte possibile del territorio Italia_
no venga liberata dai tedeschi ad evitare che le grandi industrie dell'Italia settentrionale possano, loro malgrado, lavorare in pieno per il nemico for_
nendogli carri, aerei, autocarri: in pochi mesi col lavoro forzato dei nostri cantieri del nord, parec_
chie navi da guerra, comprese due nostre navi da bat_
taglia, potranno nuovamente solcare il Mediterraneo battendo bandiera tedesca.

Nel frattempo è di essenziale importanza politi_ ca per Noi e per Voi raggiungere al più presto Roma.

Il popolo italiano il 25 luglio si è decisamente staccato dal passato regime, però io penso che un nuo vo governo fascista, sia pure illegalmente costituito, ma in possesso della Capitale, potrebbe sempre, appoggiandosi su formazioni armate della milizia e sull'interessato apporto di una minoranza facinorosa, ostacolare seriamente le nostre operazioni militari e fomentare la guerra civile.

E' interesse comune che questo non avvenga e ciò potrà tanto più prontamente evitarsi quanto più pre_ sto il mio Governo ed Io potremo ritornare a Roma e le

nostre truppe spingersi verso l'Italia settentrio_

Attualmente il mio Governo esercita i poteri civili su quattro provincie delle Puglie e sulla Sardegna: esso trarrebbe un notevolissimo rafforza_mento morale e politico nei confronti del Governo illegale del nord, ove gli fosse consentito di esten_dere la propria giurisdizione anche sul rimanente territorio occupato, Sicilia compresa.

L'esercizio del potere civile su di una notevo le parte del territorio nazionale, consentirebbe, for nendo una maggiore scelta di uomini politici, la ricostruzione politica del Paese da completarsi col ritorno al regime parlamentare da me sempre auspicato.

Sottopongo infine alla personale attenzione di Vostra Eccellenza l'importantissimo problema del cambio: un trattamento più favorevole di quello adottato in Sicilia avrebbe ripercussioni morali e politiche in calcolabili per la causa comune.

Vote por nottre lach l'preso, L'mon Prefidente, de crederce alla mia alte confideratione

ASSIFIED (9/27/56)

PSF jula ..

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram from Harold MacMillan to Mr. Churchill concerning the Italian constitutional crisis which indicates that the Prime Minister may request your views. With this in mind I am enclosing copies of Robert Murphy's recent telegrams for your convenient reference, as well as an exchange of telegrams between Mr. Churchill and MacMillan.

General Eisenhower has suggested the following formula which has been approved by the War and State Departments: If the King is successful in forming a liberal government, or if the King is unsuccessful and agrees to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples (which Sforza, Croce, etc., have stated would be acceptable) no problem arises. If, however, the King is unsuccessful in forming a broad-based government and refuses to abdicate, the Allied Military Mission at Brindisi is faced with a first-class constitutional crisis. General Eisenhower has proposed that, in this event, the present arrangement with the King and Badoglio will be permitted to continue until Allied forces have occupied Rome.

In our opinion, General Eisenhower is in the best position to deal with the situation to our military advantage. We feel that his judgment should prevail.

Enclosures:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. 14tter, 1-11-72

Date FEB 8 1972

a36+01

COPY

Text of message sent by the Prime Minister to Resident Minister at Algiers dated November 3rd.

I am sure everything could be settled better in Rome but when are we going to get there? Meanwhile it seems to me dangerous to make changes. King Victor Emmanuel is nothing to us and we certainly do not wish to incur political unpopularity on his account. Nevertheless I incline myself to Eisenhower's view as stated in your paragraph 6.

2. A note by the Foreign Office follows giving more background.

By Authority of State Dept telegram 1-12-72 By Date 1972

a36+02

Text of a telegram dated November 3rd from the British Resident Minister at Algiers to the Prime Minister.

You will see from my telegram of November 3rd the decision which may soon confront us. On the assumption that our intervention becomes necessary I therefore put forward for your consideration following points.

- 2. The arguments in favour of bringing about the King's abdication and forming at once a broadly-based government are obvious and attractive. Such a course would be in harmony with basic war purposes of the Allies and their latest definition at Moscow. British and American public opinion would be gratified.
- 3. The arguments against are, however, not negligible. We are not sure that all Italy will share known views of intellectuals of Naples and alleged views of leaders in Rome. We do not know what will be the effect on Italian army and still more important Italian fleet which is again working well both at sea and on shore, in our interest. We cannot assess results on Italian diplomats all over the world or on merchant seamen in different localities. If we care to we could keep the King in his small enclave round Brindisi and administer the country quite efficiently under Commission and with operational AMGOT. We have quite enough officers for this purpose.
- 4. There is a further argument in favour of delay and encouraging Badoglio and the King to carry on for a limited period. The Allied Commission for Italy is just about to come into being. Is there not a danger that Russians and other governments less extensively involved will feel that we have taken a decision on a vital point without waiting for the Commission to meet and deliberate? As the arguments in favour of one course or the other are very evenly balanced it may be to our ultimate interest to postpone decision until the Commission can meet, this with an eye not only upon Italian questions but upon maintenance of the principle that similar questions in other countries shall be settled by the Allies as a whole, that may be very important for us in future.
- 5. I venture to submit these points for your thought. My main struggle here is to secure that decision shall be taken by British and American Governments at the highest level. It is too serious a matter for anyone except you and the President.

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By Authority of State Oupt

Legran 1-12-12

: Same paret Est & land

a36+04

Date Date

Text of a telegram dated November 3rd sent by the British Resident Minister at Algiers to the Foreign Office.

General Mason Macfarlane reports that Badoglio in conversation on November 2nd showed great depression at the present situation. He stated that he had advised the King not to go to Naples and that he had not known that the King had decided to do so until General Macfarlane had told him.

- 2. In Badoglio's considered opinion there was no solution to the present difficulty without the King's abdication. Neither Sforza or Croce nor probably Rodino would have anything to do with the King. It was unlikely that either Porzio or Nicola would consent to take office under the King and if they did Sforza and his followers would probably make serious trouble.
- 3. Badoglio showed General Macfarlane a copy of a letter dated October 24th in which he told the King definitely that it would be impossible to form a representative government unless the King abdicated. Badoglio agreed with General Macfarlane's view that the King would probably return from Naples having accomplished nothing and that we should then be confronted by a situation which could only be dealt with by the earliest possible abdication of the King.
- 4. Badoglio assured General Macfarlane that he would meanwhile do his best loyally, in accordance with armistice terms, to carry on administration and preserve order, but if things went on as they were he would obviously be in a very difficult position and could only be expected to carry on this way as a very temporary expedient.
- 5. General Macfarlane comments that the only political organization of any consequence now in being in liberated Southern Italy is the group around Croce and Sforza, it is possible but unlikely that the orientation of Roman groups differ substantially from that of Naples group but that in any case unless we get to Rome sooner than appears probable, it is really only the Naples group who can be considered at the moment. Badoglio has tried and failed on account of the King to gain their support. It is unlikely that the King will have any greater success.
- 6. General Macfarlane (words undecypherable) if the King fails with the Naples group that he may not regard this as final test and that it may require considerable pressure to make him abdicate as he will doubtless quote Bonomi's message to Badoglio from Rome stating that he was willing to participate in an administration "under the crown" and will argue that he cannot be stampeded by a small proportion of his people while so many of them are unable to express their opinion.
- 7. General Macfarlane's considered view is that the best interests of the Allies will be served by the removal of the King and the establishment of a regency in favour of his grandson since the present King is not only a great obstacle to the formation of a representative Government but is so old and at times so muddle-headed that he would be better out of the way. General Macfarlane therefore considers that while not intervening we should do nothing to prevent present unsatisfactory situation from coming to a head.

leligram 1-12-72

Pato

a36+05

CAM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated November 1, 1943

Rec'd 2:39 a.m., 2nd

Secretary of State

Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE 1881, November 1, 5 p.m.

CONET FROM MURPHY

In view of the Allied agreement that the transfer of sovereignty need not wait arrival in Rome but will be effected as soon as circumstances permit, the King and Ba doglio resolved to proceed at once to form a broader base for the government. The Brindisi administration has become increasingly cautious of the activities of the political groups in Naples and Rome. They have also established secret radio communication with the six parties in Rome. recent message from the latter signed Bonomi (Democrazia del Lavoro) indicated that the Rome representatives of the parties have not been prepared to serve in a government under a military leader such as Badoglio but would be prepared to assist in the formation of a government under the Crown. It is noteworthy that in reference to the Crown no specific reference is made to the present King. Badoglio DECLASSIFIED fears that

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

-2- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers

fears that the Bonomi group is organizing a shadow government in Rome which might be set up before the arrival of the Allies.

The Naples group under the leadership of
Benedeto Croce and Carlos Forza all refuse to participate in the Badoglio Government as long as the
King remains. They propose the abdication of the
King in favor of the Prince of Naples, who is now
in Switzerland and the appointment of Badoglio as
Regent. It is obvious from our recent coversations
in Naples that bforza is being pushed forward as
Prime Minister.

Sforza and the Naples group agree that there can be no question of establishing a republic in Italy before the entire country is free to participate in general elections even if it should be possible at that time. Your 1988, October 27, 11 p.m.

Leopoldo Piccardi joined the Badoglio Government in Brindisi about ten days ago after a sojourn
in Naples where he was in contact with the Committee
of National Liberation. Badoglio leans on him heavily
in matters concerning economics and industry.
Piccardi is a favorable and useful element.

Brdoglio about October 22 wrote a letter to the King inviting the latter's attention to the position

DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

taken

DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By Date FEB 8 1972

-3- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers

taken by Sforza and Naples group. Acquarone is discussing this matter with our prindisi Mission as well as with Sforza interpreted this letter as an effort on the part of Badoglio to induce the King to abdicate. Acquarone later proceeded to Naples for the purpose of canvassing the political personalities there in the King's behalf. The Naples group includes individuals only of regional importance some of whom might serve as useful technicians in the government. At present they are taking their directives from Sforza and Croce.

In our recent conversations with Badoglio, he was categoric in his statements that he could not be a party to any movement to force out the King even if a Regency is established. He asked MacFarlane if in a communication he proposed to send to Bonomi in Rome he could include a statement that the Allies do not favor any changes in the form of government at this particular junction. He was referred to the public pronouncements made by the American and British Governments and the importance which they attach to the efforts of driving out the Germans. He will show the text of his eventual reply to the mission before its despatch. Badoglio said that he was loyal to the King and would refuse to co-operate with the Naples and Rome groups if they

-4- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers

forced the King's abdication. He said that he would urge the formation of an administration for national unity for the avowed single purpose of expelling the Germans. Failing this, he would resign and leave some politician to assume his duties.

Notwithstanding Badoglio's avowals, I believe that an understanding exists between Badoglio and Sforza looking to the abdication of the King and the establishment of Badoglio as Regent for the Prince of Naples.

Badoglio visited Sforza and Croce at Naples on October 31. He immediately thereafter advised MacFarlane that Sforza refused to take part in the government if the King remained. Sforza urged that the King abdicate in favor of the Prince of Naples and also urged the appointment of Badoglio as Regent. Croce was in entire accord. Badoglio also interviewed Rodino of the Christian Democration Party. The latter maintained that he would not participate in the government unless Croce, Sforza, Orlando or Renauldi were included as Orlando is in Rome and Renauldi in Switzerland. This means Sforza and/or Croce.

Badoglio's conclusion now is that no political government can now be formed without Sforza stating

Data

DECLASSIFIED

that the

-5- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers.

that the latter had become clearly a symbol around which the six parties could rally. According to Badoglio he would be unable to fulfill without them the promise he made to the Allies to form a broad base Government. Therefore, Badoglio proposes to inform the King of this situation and tender his resignation, recommending that the King ask Sforza to form government. Badoglio takes the position that Sforza and the Liberals must persuade the King to abdicate. He as a soldier would not take this step. If this action is taken appropriately, Badoglio now states that he would accept the Regency.

Before returning to brindisi November 1,
Badoglio planned to see De Nicola on the evening of
October 31, but he did not anticipate this interview
would change anything.

It appears therefore that our mission is faced with a fairly important constitutional crisis. In dealing with it our first consideration will be maintenance of order and the armistice. We consider it important for purpose of armistice that Badoglio remain at least as Regent. Both Sforza and Croce admit Badoglio's prestige in the country and with

DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

Pate FEB 8 1972

the army

a36+10

-6- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers.

the army and assert that his retention as Regent will be approved by anti-Fascist elements in northern Italy.

Planning for transfer of AMGOT territory to Italian administration continues. Allied Control Commission for Italy will be established about November 10 under a directive which will be issued shortly.

Sent to Department repeated to London; madrid, Lisbon and Moscow.

WILEY

HTM

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By ______DatEEB 8 1972

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) Algiers

Dated November 2, 1943.

Rec'd 7:24 p.m.

Scoretary of State,

Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

1891, November 2; 2 p.m.

Our military (FROM MURPHY) mission in Brindisi telegraphs as follows November 1,

Badoglio intends to see the King today and inform him that he finds it impossible under present circumstances to form a representative anti-Pascist Government representing existing political parties. He therefore tenders his resignation. Badoglio will recommend that the King summon Sforza who, in Badoglio's opinion, is the only person presently available to whom all the parties will rally.

Our mission has asked Badoglio orally to explain to the King that the Allies don't wish to interfere with constitutional practice provided: (one) that Badoglio remain in office as effective head of the government until the new government is ready to take over and (two) that there be close accord with the Allies in all steps taken to insure the maintenance of order and that the provisions of armistice are:

respected.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) Algiers

Dated November 2, 1943.

Rec'd 7:24 p.m.

Scoretary of State,

Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

1891, November 2; 2 p.m.

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respected.

-2- 1898, November 2, 8 p.m., from Algiers.

requirements of the situation.

Sforza remains in Naples and yesterday with Croce met a group of Allied journalists to whom they repeated freely and frankly their views as already explained to us.

Repeated to London, Madrid and Lisbon for information.

WILEY

RR

IC This tologram must be closely paraphresed before being communicated to anyone. (SC) Algiors
Dated November 4, 1943
Rec'd 6:15 c.m. 5th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1918, November 4, midnight.

FROM MURPLY

AG WAR telegram MAT 77 of Hovember 3 to the Combined Chiefs of Steff in substance stated that King is in Haples today attempting to persuade the Maples group to join his Government. Either he will succeed or he will be met by their refusal to participate in any Government unless he abdicates and the Crown Prince renewnees his right in fever of the Prince of Haples.

Should he succeed in forming a Government no immediate problem for the Allies arises. On the other hand should he fail and accept the proposal for abdication there will also be no occasion for Allied intervention.

However if the Fing refuses to abdicate and appeals to Badoglio to continue notwithstanding the refusal of the Naples group to participate Badoglio undoubtedly will sook Allied advice. This for the reason that he will have failed to obtain the participation of liberal elements

DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

in line with

By Date FED 0 107

-2- #1918, November 4, midnight, from Algiera

in line with stated Allied policy. Therefore unless instructions to the contrary are received it is proposed in the later event to continue the present arrangements until we reach Rome. The alternative would be to stimulate the King's abdication resulting in a coalition Government and the establishment of Badeglio as regent for the Prince of Maples.

Incident to the foregoing MacMillan is telegraphing to the Prime Minister in emplification of the foregoing requesting the Prime Minister's views.

Badoglio is in full accord soon Name a desirable solution which the U.S.A. if necessary might well support. The departure of the King should not caversely affect the military effort and the liberalization of the Italian Government should if anything aid it.

There are of course a number of practical considerations. Principle among these are the command of the Italian armed forces, the operation of the ports and communications, the eventual transfer of Italian territory now under ANC to the Italian administration, the conduct of the civilian Italian administration and the attitude of the personnel of the Italian diplomatic and consular personnel abread.

State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

By Date Bate

Information

-3- #1918, November 4, midnight, from Algiers

Information regarding the signing of the long term crmistice document has been closely held in Italy. If Sforza does form the new government it will be necessary to inform him of the details of the terms and to insist on his acceptance of the obligations of the armistical terms.

WILEY

WFS

SAFE FILE: Kennedy, Joseph P.

Live to

PAP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Safe: Kum, In

LONDON

Dated August 25, 1939

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1254, August 25, 7 p.m.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Turkish Charge d'Affaires Mr. Kadri Rizan has informed the Embassy in confidence that he has received following
circumstantial information regarding secret annexes of the
German-Soviet pact which came from trustworthy sources but
which naturally he states with "complete reserve":

(one) Russia is given a free hand against Japan in the Far East.

(two) Probable partition of Poland and recognition of the special interests of Soviet Russia in the Baltic states: in effect a return to the Russian-German border of 1914.

(three) Territorial advantages to Turkey at the expense of Bulgaria and a kind of subprotectorate: for Turkey over whatever is left of Bulgaria.

(four) Division of the Balkans into spheres of influence between Germany and Russia, the German sphere to
include Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece, the Russian sphere
Rumania and Bulgaria. A 38a 01

PAP -2- 1254, August 25, 7 p.m. from London

Any so-called information regarding secret annexes to the German-Russian agreement is purely speculative.

Neither the Foreign Office nor diplomatic circles however, believe for one minute that Germany did not give Russia something much more substantial than anything that appears in the terms of the public agreement. The supposition above outlined by the Turkish Charge d'Affaires gives a fairly representative consensus of this speculative opinion. A Foreign Office official stated this morning that they had received similar circumstantial information to that set out in points (one) and (two) above.

KENNEDY

CSB

No formation

GRAY

LONDON

Dated August 25, 1939

Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1259, August 25, 8 p.m.

STRICTEN CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

My 1243 August 25, 1 p.m. I have just seen Cadogan who told me he would let me know at home within the next couple of hours what he could of Henderson's report.

He did tell me, however, that they have received a message from Beck by which Beck gives the assurance that even if Danzig should attempt to become part of the Reich, Poland would not attempt military measures until they had discussed the situation with the British Government.

KENNEDY

CSB

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

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NC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated August 25, 1939

Rec'd 8:15 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

1262, August 25, midnight.

I have just been at 10 Downing Street with Prime Minister Halifax, Cadogan, and Horace Wilson. They have discussed with me the Henderson interview.

Hitler seemed calm and earnest. He pointed out that he always wanted a deal with Great Britain but he was not deterred by Great Britain's actions of yesterday. He was indignant with the Poles for their persecutions of his people, firing on airplanes, et cetera, and if they said they did not, it showed they had no control over their subordinates. He was going to have his rights in Poland even if it meant a great war, from which England would suffer much more than Germany. He now had Russia to back him up with supplies and therefore he could go on.

If, however, he could get straightened out in this
Polish business he would make a deal with England that
would guarantee the British Empire forever. He would
limit armaments and then Germany and England could proceed
to economic satisfaction. Henderson kept pointing out that

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England

England could not make any deal that the Poles did not want, and Hitler said he did not want England to break her word and in the next breath said that Poland had no future anyway because Russia and Germany would settle Poland. This last remark was said to Henderson but was left out of report of meeting which Hitler sent to Henderson after the meeting which purported to be the gist of the conversation. Hitler urged Henderson to fly home to persuade Britain to accept his proposition which was:

One. That Poland adjust her differences with Germany at once. Two. England agree and urge this and in return Germany would agree to respect and even fight to preserve the British Empire.

Three. Hitler would limit armaments, go back to peaceful pursuits, and become an artist, which is what he wanted to be. (Aside by Kennedy, he is now but I would not care to say what kind).

Four. If this was not agreed it was going to be a war worse than fourteen-eighteen.

Writing this out it looks like a ridiculous proposition to make Great Britain quit or cut away from the Poles but to hear the text as read it seems much more reasonable.

Chamberlain and others do not know just whether the proposition is (one) throw sand in their eye while he marches

a38c02 in

-3- #1262 from London, August 25, 1939 in or (two) whether he really does not want a fight with England or (three) whether it is a proposition on which semething can be done. They are going to listen to Henderson in the morning and then probably say. We certainly will not agree to permit Poland to be carved up by you and Russia. Nor are we willing to force Poland to make concessions based on these probably ridiculous charges of cruelty but we are willing to help negotiate a fair deal and perhaps with all other powers work out some economic future for the world. Incidentally Hitler asked for a settlement from Britain on the colonies but on a time basis and as he said by fair negotiation. They are not going to give this message to either (?) or French until they have thought it out very carefully and have heard Henderson. During the conversation Wilson asked whether the President had received any answer from Hitler. I said I had not heard of any. Chamberlain held up Henderson's wire and said "This is the answer". KENNEDY NPL 238c03

Promote of

Safe: Kennedy

CA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

LONDON

Dated August 26, 1939

Rec'd 6:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

1263, August 26, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Omitted from my number 1262, August 25, midnight, was the important item that Henderson's message stated Hitler said the only one to benefit from a war between Germany and England would be Japan who might very well become the dominating factor in the world.

KENNEDY

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Safe: Kennedy

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

LONDON .

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1293, August 28, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

My 1292, August 28, 5 p.m.

I have just learned from the Foreign Office that an affirmative reply has been received from Foland, stating that they are ready to enter at once into direct negotiations.

This will be incorporated into the British reply to Hitler.

KENNEDY

HPD

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AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

London

Dated August 28, 1939 Rec'd 11:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1292, August 28, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
My 1288, August 28, 2 p.m.

The Foreign Office informs me confidentially that
the draft reply to Hitler was finally approved by the
Cabinet at noon today with only one change which was
described as "not one of substance" to the effect
that they are asking the Poles to express their
willingness to enter immediately on direct negotiations with Germany on the premises laid down in the
British note. They have no reason to suppose that
the Poles will decline to give this assurance. Ambassador Henderson is flying back to Berlin this afternoon
about 5 o'clock and they hope that he will be able
to deliver the reply to Hitler tonight. The timing
of course depends on Hitler. A slight feeling of
optimism prevails in spite of the Daladier-Hitler
bout.

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KENNEDY

WWC: HTM

NC
This telegram must
be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

LONDON

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

1238, August 28, 2 p.m.
My 1278
August 27, 8 p.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

A responsible official of the Foreign Office this morning in comment on Hitler's reply to the French Prime Minister, the text of which was given out at Berlin during the course of the night, said that in opinion here the text of Hitler's statement itself particularly with reference to his demand that Danzig and the corridor must return to Germany, did not necessarily make the situation any worse but that they do view with great concern the fact that he has made it public. The official also said that in his opinion this publicity would not however effect any material change in the reply that the British are to send to Hitler. The Cabinet is to go over this reply again today and there may of course be changes in drafting. (END SECTION ONE).

KENNEDY

HPD

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LONDON

Dated August 28, 1939 Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1288, August 28, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

According to press messages from Berlin, Hitler decided to release the reply he had made to Daladian through pique at a "unfair" statement made by the French Premier at his press conference yesterday to the effect that Hitler had not given lim a satisfactory reply, the inference being that Hitler took M. Daladier's statement without the publication of the text of his letter as an almost personal and unfriendly act.

(END SECTION TWO).

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GRAY

London

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1288, August 28, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I have also been informed by the Foreign Office that in view of the urgency of keeping all of Great Britain's allies in line, quantities of war materials are being sent to Turkey without reference to the still pending credit agreement. Negotiations on the political agreement (my No. 1192 August 18, 9 p.m. and despatch No. 3238 August 21, 1939) are being pushed as fast as possible, and they are considering sending a ression to Istanbul.

A telegram from the British Ambassador at Warsaw just received by the Foreign Office reports that the "full mobilization" in Poland does not mean "general mobilization". (END MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

CSB

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REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C) Safe: Kennedy

LONDON

Dated August 29, 1939

Rec'd 6:44 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1314, August 29, midnight.

REGRADED UNCL/ E

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 1299, August 29, noon.

Hitler's reply was handed in person to the British
Ambassador at 7:15 this evening. Henderson is forwarding
translation of full text as soon as possible. Following
is a summary:

In reply to the British proposals, namely direct German-Polish negotiations and an international guarantee of any settlement the German Government declares:

(One) That in spite of skepticism as to prospects of success, it accepts direct negotiations with Poland solely out of a desire to insure lasting friendship with Great Britain and (two) in case of any modification of territories the German Government cannot undertake to guarantee them nor to participate in guarantees without consulting the Government of Soviet Russia.

(END SECTION ONE)

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REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated August 29, 1939

Rec'd 7:08 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Wasnington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1314, August 29, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

The note observes that German proposals have never had as their object any diminution of the vital interests of Poland and declares that the Ger in Government accepts the mediation of Great Britain with the view to securing the visit to Berlin of a Polish plenipotentiary. The note adds that the German Government counts on the arrival at Berlin of this plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, August 30th.

Ambassador Henderson remarked that this last stipulation sounded like a ultimatum. After a heated exchange of remarks Hitler and Ribbentrop assured him it was intended only to stress the urgency of the matter, at a moment when two fully mobilized armies were facing each other.

The Ambassador said that he would like to transmit to his Government the assurance, in the event that such a Polish plenipotentiary did go to Berlin, that he would be received and the discussions

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(END SECTION TWO)

KENNEDY

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated August 29, 1939

Rec'd 7:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1314, August 29, midnight. (SECTION THREE)
with him would be conducted on a basis of full equality.
To this Hitler replied "of course".

The German demands are declared to be revision of the Versailles Treaty, that is, the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany and the security of the German national minorities in the rest of Poland.

The note concludes by stating that the German Government is ready immediately to elaborate proposals for an acceptable solution and to inform the British Government if possible before the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

A responsible official of the Foreign Office stated that it is unlikely any action will be taken on this note before tomorrow, when the full text will be here. They will, however, probably inform the Poles at once of the substance of the German reply.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

a38f03

NPL

XX

PSF July

September 11, 1939

4 7.211.

AHURICAN EMBASSY

LCHDON.

905. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR Your 1578, September 11, 2 p.m.

The President desires me to inform you, for your strictly confidential information and so that you may be guided thereby without divulging this message to any one, that this Government, so long as present European conditions continue, sees no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this Covernment that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and of aggression.

Hall.

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PSP gale Kennedy


NC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON **

Dated September 11, 1939

Rec'd 10:45

Secretary of State
Washington



1578, September 11, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND MOST PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

I spent an hour with the King and Queen alone yester-day and three quarters of an hour with Sir Samuel Hoare this morning in my office. From my conversation with the King it became very apparent to me that the one problem he is worried desperately about is that within a comparatively short time, possibly three or four weeks, Hitler will have cleaned up Poland and will then definitely make a proposition to Great Britain and France to call this war off and come to some agreement. I will discuss this problem later in this (*) as a result of my conversation with Sir Samuel Hoare.

As to the Queen, the problem that affects her seems to be the return of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, because it was very apparent to me that the King is worried about his arrival in England. The Queen told me that he

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NC -2- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939

is returning at once but only for a short time. She said it was, of course, frightfully embarrassing to have an "ex-King" around nearby. I should judge also that the situation will not smooth out, at least for the time being, because she will not receive the Duchess. I am citing this not as of great historic importance but rather because subconsciously it is going to have some effect on both the King and Queen in making up their minds as to what answer should be given Hitler.

Sir Samuel Hoare, as I said, called this morning and we had a long talk. He definitely believes that the most serious thing facing the world today will be the proposition he feels will unquestionably come. (END SECTION ONE)

KENNEDY

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PSF Sagle: Kurnean

Dated September 11, 1939
Rec'd 11:48 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1578, September 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO) within a month or six weeks from Germany to England to give up the struggle. He sizes the situation up in this way: Neither the French nor the Germans can make any appreciable headway against each other. He said that the French advance now is almost like the Lancers -- three steps forward and three steps back; that it is extremely unlikely. except at the cost of an incredible massacre, that either side could break through either line. navy, of course, can patrol the seas but the results of this will not be felt acutely for some time to come. the meantime then, there is nothing left but air war. said that at the minute Germany cutnumbers in bombers the British two to one, although he feels the British outnumber the Germans in fighters; that it will be a struggle in the air to see whose morale will break first. The British have despatched practically all their bombers to France but are still keeping them under English command. The problem Hoare feels, will arise from a condition something like this: After the French have had a number

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Safe Konnedy

NC -2- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939 (Section Two)

of casualties they will demand that the British bombers bomb the Ruhr and other places. The minute that starts, women and children are bound to be killed even though British airmen would be under the strictest orders not to do anything of the kind; immediately that would call for reprisals and in spite of all England's defenses, Germany is in a position to make these reprisals most serious. (END SECTION TWO)

KENNEDY

HPD

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NC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to.anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated September 11, 1939 Rec'd 12:06 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Safe Kennedy

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1578, September 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The General Staff feel definitely that the only method of countering German attacks is to keel sending their bombers in to attack the Germans and since their number is very limited it is a question whether they will last very long. In the meantime, the Germans will attack the various factories here and even though direct hits are not made, they will so interfere with production by constant air raid attacks that it is extremely unlikely that a number of bombers can be turned out to fill in the terrific losses. This will be the case if they obey France's suggestion of sending the bombers in. If, believing as they do that the bombers must be saved until they arrive at greater capacity and until they get a greater number, the French become restless and say "why fight any longer to save Great Britain?"

Now, Hoars knows that for any party here to consider any kind of an appointment with Germany would, of necessity

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at the minute result in having the party thrown out of power and I rather got the impression from Hoare this morning that it is not at all inconceivable that this party may make that an issue. It was not what he said; it was the inference I drew. Lord Trenchard, whom they all regard here very highly, feels that if they send English bombers into German territory, the German morale would break quickly and go to pieces much faster than the British. Of course that is a gamble that may have to be taken, but I am of the opinion that the War Cabinet at the moment do not feel justified in taking that risk.

Hoars was responsible for the statement given out on Saturday night that the British regard this as a three year war, in order to keep their morals stiffened up and not let any disquieting criticism of the Government's policy get started too strongly. I could judge from talking with the King on Saturday that this matter is one that is giving the Government an unholy worry. They realize that a continuation of war or the maintenance of a Government on a war basis means complete economic, financial and social collapse and nothing will be saved

after

a38k02

NC -3- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939 (SECTION THREE)

after the war is over. On the other hand, calling the war off would give Hitler such increased prestige that it is a question of how far that would carry him. The King and Hoare recognize the very grave danger that the French may feel the British are not making contribution comparable to theirs and may start to get sick of the war even though their courage and determination at the moment is very strong. He told me in passing that he understood Bonnet was going to be thrown out in France.

I thought this information would be very valuable to you in making up your minds as to your course of action.

It seems to me that this situation may crystalize to a point where the President can be the savior

KENNEDY

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated September 11, 1939

Rec'd 12:32 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

of the world. The British Government as such carbainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the President himself may work out the plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but, as a farily practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world and I have not thought so up to this minute.

If the war continues and air raids between the two countries continue, it is, of course, conceivable that at that time Italy or Russia or other countries may see fit to get in and then the situation might become hopeless.

I am passing this on because I think that beyond all other questions of importance in the world, this is one that the President should be thinking about to work

out

NC -2- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939 (SECTION FOUR)

out in his own mind what might be done at the psychclogical moment not to increase Hitler's prestige
but possibly to bring the whole world on a peace basis.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

HPD

PSP Safe: Kennedy

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made on the telephone just now, I am sending you herewith a copy of Joe Kennedy's telegram of September 11 as well as a copy of the reply made by the Department in accordance with your directions.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

No. 1578, September 11, 2 p.m. from London; No. 905, September 11, 4 p.m., to London.

The President,

The White House.

a38m01

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

1. F. Lafe: Kennedy

LONDOM

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd 10:12 p.m., 14th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1211, Hay 15, 2 a.m. (?)

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

I just left Churchill at one o'clock. He is sending you a message tomorrow morning saying he considers with the entrance of Italy, the chances of the Allies winning is slight. He said the German push is showing great power and although the French are holding tonight they are definitely worried. They are asking for more British troops at once, but Churchill is unwilling to send more from England at this time because he is convinced within a month England will be vigorously attacked. The reason for the message to you is that he needs help badly. I asked him what the United States could do to help that would not leave the United States holding the bag for a war in which the Allies expected to be beaten. It seems to me that if we had to fight to protect our lives we would do better fighting in our own backyard. I said you know our strength what could we do if we wanted to help you all we can.

a38n01

You

-2- #1211, Hay 15, 2 a.m. from London

You do not need money or credit now. The bulk of our navy is in the Pacific and we have not enough airplanes for our own use and our army is not up to requirements. So if this is going to be a quick war all over in a few months what could we do. He said it was his intention to ask for the loan of 30 or 40 of our old destroyers and also whatever airplanes we could spare right now.

(END SECTION ONE)

KENNEDY

NPL

a38n02

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (D)

LONDON
Dated Hay 15, 1940

Rec'd 10:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1211, May 15, 2 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

As said regardless of what Germany does to England and France, England will never give up allong as he remains a power in public life even if England is burnt to the ground. Why, said he, the government will move to Canada and take the fleet and fight on. I think this is something I should follow up. If the Cermans carry on there will be some conversation on what England will eventually do. Churchill called in the First Lord of the Admiralty Sinclair and Eden and although they are tough and mean to fight they are very low tonight.

(END OF HESSAGE)

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HPL

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7 Kenneder

BF Safe: Kennedy

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated June 12, 1940

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

NUCE SILIED BECKADED

RUSH.

1603, June 12, 2 p.m.

AND COMFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My view of the situation this morning. The condition of Britain's preparedness equals her ability to fight the kind of war Hitler wages still appears to be appallingly weak. I am of the opinion that outside of some air defence the real defence of England will be with courage and not with arms. No matter what action the United States takes towards this war it is only fair to say that short of a miracle this country after, and if and when, France stops fighting will hold on in the hope that the United States will come in. Churchill said quite definitely to me he expects the United States will be in right after the election; that when the people in the United States see the towns and cities of England, after which so many American cities and towns have been named, bombed and destroyed they will line up and want war. The people here are kept buoyed up by the inference in the papers and the

a38081

publication

-2- #1603, June 12, 2 p.m., from London.

publication of clippings from the NEW MORK TIMES, HERALD
TRIEUNE and political speeches. This morning an American
correspondent of an English paper mentions that all it needs
is an "incident" to bring the United States in. If that were
all that were needed desperate people will do desperate
things. The point of all this is the fact that the
preparedness for (END SECTION ONE)

KEMIEDY

RR

a 380 02

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.(D)

London
Dated June 12, 1940
Rec'd 11:07 a. m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

(SECTION TWO) 1603, June 12, 2 p. m. carrying on a war here is pitiful, this in spite of the fact that production and war effort are now for the first time going ahead in urgently fashion. We should know this in the light of any action we in America might see fit to take. A course of action that involves us in any respect that presupposes the Allies have much to fight with Except courage is, as far as England goes, I think fallacious. The United States would have nothing to work with with these two countries in their present condition. Unless France and England are dealing or will deal Germany really crippling blows at her industrial production and seriously affect her strength in the air and in tanks as a result of these battles, the United States will have plenty to worry about in their own country. The cry should be prepare for anything right there, right now. (END MESSAGE)

a380 &3

KENNEDY

BF Safe Kennesty

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated June 14, 1940 Rec'd 10:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

REGRADED

TRIPLE PRICRITY

1349, June 14, noon.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I talked with Churchill at 9:20 this morning and made perfectly clear to him your attitude regarding publication of your message to Reynaud. On my arrival at the office this morning I received your personal and confidential message transmitted in the State Department's 1643, June 14, 1 p. m. I immediately called Churchill on the telephone about 11:30 and, Johnson being present while I was talking, repeated to him the sense of your statement and explained again clearly that there was no authority in the United States Government except in Congress to make any commitment regarding war. Churchill was obviously terribly disappointed as he had counted on publication of this message to put a little stiffening into the French backbone. I told him of your desire that any misapprehension which might

a38p01

exist

hsm -2- No. 1649; June 14, noon, from London

exist in the minds of French officials regarding the meaning of the message be cleared up and that they should understand that the matter primarily in mind in sending it was the French fleet and its disposition for future use. He expressed his disappointment and said he was afraid conveying such a message now to the French would merely dampen what fires remained. I replied that I was passing your message on to him as instructed and that the action he would take on it of course was up to him.

he inquired if there had been any reply from you to his last message very early this morning. I told him not yet but that I would get in touch with him immediately if and when anything came.

KENNEDY

HPD

a 38p 02

Lafe: Kennedy

LONDON

Dated June 16, 1940.

REC'd. 4:28 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

UNINCLASSIFIED

RUSH

1680, June 16, 9 p.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I saw Halifax at 7 p.m. He said early this morning they had message here from Reynaud saying that French proposed asking President of the United States to ask Germany for an armistice and Reynaud wanted to know if the British would agree to let the French make a separate peace provided the French agreed not to include the French Fleet as one of the terms of agreement.

British announced then agreement was not with a man or an administrator (this in answer to the statement that Reynaud said that if the British did not agree to the separate peace Reynaud would resign and then a Government might come in that would agree to everything that Hitler wanted). However, the British would agree to let the French make a separate peace provided the French Fleet sailed at once for British ports and then the British would fight on. They also told Campbell in separate agreement to have the Polish, Czechs and Belgium Governments come here. Also have the French air force come here or go

a38901

SAFE FILE:King, Ernest J.

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET DELICATED

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF E.O. 11662, Sec. 8(27) and 5(D) of (E)

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

RHP, NARS Date MAK 28 1973



Merch 5, 1942

Memorandum for the President:

- The delineation of general areas of responsibility for operations in the Pacific is now taking place, in which it appears that we - the U.S. - will take full charge of all operations conducted eastward of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.
- 2. You have expressed the view concurred in by all of your chief military advisers that we should determine on a very few lines of military endeavor and concentrate our efforts on those lines. It is to be recognized that the very few lines of U.S. military effort may require to be shifted in accordance with developments but the total number should be kept at a very few.
- 3. Consideration of what war activities we (U.S.) should undertake in the Pacific requires to be premised on some examination of our (U.S.) relationship with respect to world-wide war activities the Pacific being one part of the larger whole.
- 4. Other than in the Pacific our principal allies Great Britain and Russia are already committed to certain lines of military effort, to which our (U.S.) chief contribution in the case of Russia will continue to be munitions in general.
 - 5. As to Britain's lines of military effort: .
 - (a) it is apparent that we (U.S.) must enable the British to hold the citadel and arsenal of Britain itself by means of the supply of munitions, raw materials and food and to some extent by troops, when they will release British troops to other British military areas.
 - (b) the middle East is a line of British military effort which they and we cannot afford to let go. This effort should continue to receive our (U.S.) munitions.
 - (c) the India-Burma-China line of British military effort is now demanding immediate attention on their part and will absorb its proportion of our (U.S.) munitions in addition to the munitions which we are committed to furnish to China.



Memorandum for the President

Merch 5, 1942

- 6. The chief sources of munitions for the United Nations are Britain, the U.S. and, to some degree, Russia. The chief sources of man-power for the United Nations are China, Russia, the U.S., and to less degree, the British Commonwealth. The only mobile factors are those available to Britain and to the U.S., because of their use of sea power navies and shipping.
- 7. Australia and New Zealand are "white men's countries" which it is essential that we shall not allow to be overrun by Janan because of the repercussion among the non-white races of the world.
- 8. Reverting to the premise of paragraph 2 a very few lines of military endeavor the general area that needs immediate attention and is in our (U.S.) sphere of responsibility is Australasia, which term is intended to include the Australian continent, its approaches from the northwest modified ABDA area and its approaches from the northwest and east ANZAC area. These approaches require to be actively used continuously to hamper the enemy advance and/or consolidation of his advance bases.
- 9. Our primary concern in the Pacific is to hold Hawaii and its approaches (via Nidway) from the westward and to maintain its communications with the West Coast. Our next care in the Pacific is to preserve Australasia (par. 8 above) which requires that its communications be maintained via eastward of Samoa, Fiji and southward of New Caledonia.
- 10. We have now or will soon have "strong points" at Samoa, Suva (Fiji) and New Caledonia (also a defended fueling base at Bora Bora, Society Islands). A naval operating base is shortly to be set up in Tongatabu (Tonga Islands) to service our naval forces operating in the South Pacific. Efate (New Hebrides) and Funafuti (Ellice Islands) are projected additional "strong points".
- ll. When the foregoing 6 "strong points" are made reasonably secure, we shall not only be able to cover the line of communications to Australia (and New Zealand) but given the naval forces, air units, and amphibious troops we can drive northwest from the New Hebrides into the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago after the same fashion of step-by-step advances that the Japanese used in the South China Sea. Such a line of operations will be offensive rather than passive and will draw Japanese forces there to oppose it, thus relieving pressure elsewhere, whether in Hawaii, ABDA area, Alaska, or even India.

a39a02

DEMASSIFED

R.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

NARS Data

RHP, NARS Data



Memorandum for the President

March 5, 1942

12. The foregoing outline (of U.S. participation in the war) points the way to useful lines of U.S. military endeavor in the Pacific, which may be summarized in an integrated, general plan of operations, namely:

Hold Hawaii

Support Austrelasia

Drive northwestward from New Hebrides


E.VJ. KING

a39a03

BO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973



a39a04

F Safe: King

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 12, 1942

Memorandum for the President

Subject:

St. Paul's Rocks.

Enclosure:

H. O. Chert No. 537.

From the chart - and the sailing directions, it appears that:

- (a) St. Paul's Rocks are merely rocks and nothing more.
- (b) Trinidad and Martin Vaz Islands and Rocas are impracticable as aircraft bases.
- (c) Fernando de Noronha has a landing field and limited facilities - not now included in U.S. Army or Navy or Brazilian plans for military uses. It lies some 200 sea-miles from Natal - and may come into the picture later.

P. S. - The Brazilian Army now has I defense battalion of infantry there. They plan to have 2 battalions there eventually, armed with a few 7 m/m machine guns, 1 battery of 105 m/m guns and 1 battery of 75 n/m guns.

a39601

1200.9 (9/27/58)

10-26-66 Call L. Spicer

85F - Safe Adm. King

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

August 24, 1942

CONTRACTOR ADVITAGE CENT

I am receiving almost daily a variety of military variatements for 1943 and 1944. These come from the Army, large, Meritine Commission and our Allies. While the most important of those requirements is the proposed increase of the Army, there are others which affect our production quite as much, if not more.

Purthermore, I believe that our production schedules in certain respects, particularly concerning combat aircraft and escort vessels, are probably too lot and, therefore, used to be revised. I am enclosing a separate memorandum to you on circraft, which indicates my anxiety in regard to this.

that I should like to see is a fresh and realistic look of 1943 over-all requirements from a strategic point of view. This implies that cortain assumptions must be made on which acts anted requirements for United States forces of all types in the various probable theaters of war, by number and general composition, are determined. It naturally follows that those is austione rust include judgments as to the strength of our makes. The stallies in 1943 and the probable strongth of our encuier. The stallies in consecution and supply those forces overcess, of course, is an essential factor in determining our requirements.

This review - and I do not imply a detailed analysis - would be made by you and General Marshall jointly and your respective staffs.

The British are our pertners, hence we must have the Fullest and francest collaboration with them. Lend-Lease and merchant shipping must naturally be integrated in an over-all requirement picture.

I feel that we may have our major in act with the energy in the fall of 1943. Therefore it seems to no that a supreme effort from a production point of view should be given to producing the vespons and military units that we can bring to bear on the energy by that time.

I think our general policy should be to put our munitions to work directly against the enemy as promptly as possible. We agent always remember that the enemy is not going to wait for us to become fully prepared.

Copy to General Marshall.

HILH?lmb

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1970

August 24, 1942

TO THE MENT YOR ADDRESS KING:

I wish you would ask Admiral Tomers to submit to you his project of the number of naval combat aircraft by types which total be reduced for the Navy and the navies of our Allies in this country in 1943 in order to have complete air accendancy over the enemy.

This report should be prepared without consideration for the ing schedules or production possibilities or any other and singuility requirements. I am acking for this because I said like to know that the theoretical requirements are to get condition control and domination of the sir.

I realize fully, however, that there are limiting factors to be creation of air power, such as the availability of pilots, high octane gar, transportation and the competition of ware competition entities amplified amplification of war. Hence, I would like you and General Haraball to submit a second schedule based on these realities and the proper relationship of air power to the lavy and our ground forces.

Copy to General Marshall

IILH/lmb

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COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 6, 1942

Bafe: King

Memorandum for the President

Subject:

Prevailing winds along Russo-German front; May - September.

 This memorandum is a brief summary of prevailing wind conditions along the Russo-German front from May to September, as to be expected at KOLA, LENINGRAD, SMOLENSK, KIEV and SEVASTOPOL.

2.	May	June	July	August		September
-KOLA	Yar. (8)	(a) . M	(e)	N+S.W. (8)		_
LENINGRAD	(9) M - MM	(6) M - MM	W - NW (9)	W (9)		W - NW (9)
SMOLENSK	NE (7)	through	gh so	u t h (6)	t o	NW (6)
KIEV	N - NW	n - na	MK	MA.		MA
	-	_	_	_	•	
SEVASTOPOL	Var. (5)	MW (6)	(6)	NW (7)		NW (7)

Figures in () are average wind velocities.

3. The foregoing data has been extracted from data of record in the Bureau of Aeronautics, supplemented by the records of the Weather Bureau.

a39d01

955 Safe: King

July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL ADMIRAL KING HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR BONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.

- 1. O.K.
- 2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:
 - (A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.
 - (B) Tentative plans for the year 1945 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3.

- (A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.
- (B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.
- (C) Absolute ccordinated use of British and American forces is essential.
- (D) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.
- (E) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

a39e01

- 4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.
- 5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investiage the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that grave reasons are to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russianestianess collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, BLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.
- 6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.
- 7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

- (a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.
- (b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.
- 8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:
 - (1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
 - (2) Loss of Syria.
 - (3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.
 - (4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

a39e02

- (5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.
- (6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunia, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.
- (7) Berious danger of all shipping in the Bouth Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.
- (8) You will the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely:
 - (a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.
 - (b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of Arenon Colonial troops is still in doubt.
- (9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Facific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and African beginning in 1942. It is of the utmist importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the tiher hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1943 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a snot or losing a life.
- (10) Please remember three cardinal principles -speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined
 with defense but not defense alone.
- (11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

SAFE FILE: LEND-LEASE

· Lafa: Tind Lease THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WASHINGTON EF/L11-3(22)(410624) Serial 202823 RESTRICTED BY STORY OF THE STORY OF My dear Mr. President: In accordance with the request contained in your letter of June 24, 1941, there is attached hereto a list setting forth defense aid articles which have been, or will be, transferred to foreign governments under Section 3(a)(2) of the Act of March 11, 1941. Sincerely yours, The President, The White House. Enclosure. a40a01

Listed below are the Defense Aid Articles which have been or are expected to be transferred to Foreign Governments under the provisions of Section 3(a)(2) of the Lease-Lend Act

REQ.	ITFM	QUANTITY	DATE OF AVAIL— ABILITY	ESTIMATED VALUE	COI	UNTRY
<u> </u>	Salvage Pumps	20	Already transferred	\$ 31,326.53	United	Kingdom
321	USS Catlin (Ex-SS George Washington	1	Already transferred	1,761,729.00	п	n
496	Bomb Hoists Mk. III	7	Already transferred	1,400.00		
728	4"/50 LA Guns & Mounts	150	Already transferred	1,624,699.13	. "	n
1465	Ordnance for Grumman F4F4 Aircraft (without guns)	30	Already transferred	48,000.00	n	n
2381	Spare parts - 4" LA Guns Coast Guard Cutters delivered (Ordnance Material)	Misc. 10	Already transferred	20,000.00 1,750,000.00	:	"
2490	Motor Torpedo Boats (Including Ordnance Material)	28	19 trans- ferred; 9 to be transfer- red about 8-1-41	10,100,000.00		
1989	30' Motor Launches	4	Indefinite	30,000.00	п	11
2270	Flexible Bracket Assemblie	s 40	4-1-41	11,846.40	n	
2345	Parachutes	126	4-15-41	12,600.00	u	
884	Fittings for Ruckstell- Burkhart Engines	2	4-18-41	10,700.00	•	
596	Life Rafts	10	4-26-41	4,000.00	н .	*
1465	F4F-3A Aircraft	30	4-29-41	1,574,974.82	#	
595	Navigational Octants	50	5-10-41	12,000.00		"

REQ.	ITEM	QUANTITY	DATE OF AVAIL— ABILITY	ESTIMATED VALUE	COUNTRY
597	Navigational Watches	50	5-10-41	\$ 2,000.00	United Kingdom
2224	26' Motor Launch	1	6-12-41	5,600.00	п п
287	Float lights, MK. IV U.S.N. Type	1,548	2nd Quarter	3,150.00	н п
612	3"/50 Rds. LA Practice ammunition	600	2nd Quarter	8,400.00	n n
	3"/50 Rds. HA Practice ammunition	700	2nd Quarter	14,000.00	т п
1430	Propelling Charges for "Y" Guns	3,000	2nd Quarter	6,500.00	
2340	Hydrostatic Depth Bombs Mk. IV	12	2nd Quarter	2,400.00	п
56	Radio Buoys and Receiver	6	7-1-41	10,000.00	и п
1222	Pump	1	7-1-41	250.00	u n
1205	Roebling Amphibian Tractor	. 1	8-1-41	16,200.00	n n
459	Packard Engines	3	8-41	34,000.00	'n n
223	3"/50 Rds. LA ammunition	6,300	2nd & 3rd Quarters	245,700.00	п п
369	3"/23 Rds. HA ammunition Practice Shell	1,200	3rd Quarter	25,200.00	
460	3"/50 LA Guns & Mounts (Reconditioned under #95)	300	2nd & 3rd Quarters	1,500,000.00	" " .
539	4"/50 Rds. Mk. IX ammuniti				
1	4"/50 Practice Shell	5,000 7,500	2nd & 3rd Quarters	220,000.00	11 11
540	4"/50 Rds. Common Shell	16,100	2nd & 3rd Quarters	708,400.00	н . н
	4"/50 Rds. Practice Shell	9,000	3rd Quarter	270,000.00	и и
	4"/50 Cartridge Cases	3,000	2nd Quarter	81,000.00	
	Primed with Propellant	,,,,,,,	rue feet eet.	51,000.00	- 170

REQ.	ITEM	QUANTITY	DATE OF AVAIL- ABILITY	ESTIMATED VALUE	COI	untr y
652	3"/50 Rds. LA for Mk. III Guns-Ammunition	18,000	2nd & 3rd \$ Quarters	702,000.00	United	Kingdom
666	Pyrotechnics for Grummen G2l Aircraft	50	3rd Quarter	1,250.00	e.	"
796	5"/38 Rd. H.E. Ammunition	2,525	3rd Quarter	154,025.00	"	π
815	Microphones & Telephones	140	3rd Quarter	2,500.00	Ħ	"
853	5"/38 Guns, Mounts & Fire Control	5	3rd Quarter	1,500,000.00	"	"
878	Reserve Ammunition, Spare Parts, etc. to maintain 50 ex U.S.	Misc. Fire Control	3rd Quarter	38,000.00	п	" .
	destroyers Ordnance Material for Coast Guard Cutters	Misc.	3rd Quarter	100,000.00	"	"
899	3"/23 H.E. fuzed Ammun. Target	1,200	3rd Quarter	26,400.00	,	•
1058	Radio Parts	10	3rd Quarter	6,400.00	Ħ	п
1381	18" Mk. VII USN Torpedoes (6 ordered - 4 to BuShip	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	3rd Quarter	36,000.00		"
1482	4"/50 Ras. Com. Ammun.	8,000	3rd Quarter	352,000.00	n	u
2086	Darex Balloons	12,500	2nd Quarter 2500 3rd Quarter 10,000	50,000.00	"	•
2195	Arbors for Thornycraft Depth Charge Guns	605	3rd Quarter	25,400.00	п	•
2274	[150	2nd & 3rd	3,000.00	π.	n
	Cal. LA. Equipments Sets of tools for 3"/50 Cal. LA Equipments similar to those required for 4"/50	300	Quarters 2nd & 3rd Quarters	6,000.00	п	•

REQ.	ITEM	QUANTITY	DATE OF AVAIL- ABILITY	ESTIMATED VALUE	COUNTRY
NW-4	3" AA Guns	50	3rd Quarter	\$ 200,000.00	Norway
			TOTAL \$	23.574.550.88	

There are no other requisitions on hand or in prospect for assistance to Foreign Governments under Section 3(a)(2) of Public Law 11. It is possible and probable that some requisitions for material in this category will be received in the future but it is anticipated that they will be minor in nature and amount. There is very little material left in stock which can be so transferred since practically all surplus Navy material has been, or is in process of being, disposed of.

For purpose of accounting, it is recommended that the total tentative aid program contemplated by the Navy Department for future transfer to Foreign Governments under the provisions of Section 3(a)(2) Public Law 11 be estimated at \$750,000.00.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

July 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPALNS:

For your information and return.

F.D.R.




Safe: Tend Zease

UNCLASSIFIED GBG3: 03.4

STATUS OF FRENCH AND BRITISH ORDERS WITH AMERICAN AMERICAN INDUSTRY

Company	Type of Equipment	Total No.	Delivery Schedule	Number undelivered	Number ready for delivery but held up by embarge
		AUSTRA	LIA		
Lockheed Aircraft Co., Burbank, Calif.	Bombardment-RB14 w/2 eng. (Wright 1820)	100	To be completed by June, 1940	100	None
		GANAD	Δ		
North American Aviation, Inglewood, Calif.	Basic Training, BT9 w/l eng. (P&W-1340)	15	To be completed by Oct., 1939	15.	15
Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif.	Bombardment, 518A, w/2 eng. (Wright 1820)	20	To be completed by Jan., 1940	20	None
		GREAT	BRITAIN		
North American Aviation, Inglewood, Calif.	Basic Training, BT9, w/1 eng. (Wright R975)	400	To be completed by Oct., 1939	76	76
Lockheed Aircraft Co., Burbank, Calif.	Bombardment, EB14, w/2 eng. (wright 1820)	250	To be completed by Jan., 1940	90	65
Wright Aeronautical Corp., Patterson, N. J.	Engines (R 1820)	50	To be completed by Oct., 1939	50	50
	Engines (R 1820)	56	To be completed by March, 1940	56b	None



Сопралу		Total No.	Delivery Schedule	Number Undelivered	Number ready for delivery but held up by embarge
		2	RANCE		
Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif.	Bombardment, DB7 \(\pi/2\) eng. (P&W 1830)	100	To be completed by March, 1940	100	11
Henn L. Martin Co., Baltimore, Maryland.	Bombardment, 167F w/2 eng. (P&W 1830)	215	To be completed by Jan., 1940	215	45
North American Aviation, Inglewood, Calif.	Basic Training w/l eng. (Wright R975)	230	To be completed by	90	
Yought-Sikoraky Stratford, Gonn.	Scout Bombers, Model 156 w/l eng. (PAW 1830)	40		20	None
Gurtis-Gright Buffalo, N. Y.	Fursuit (Hawk 75) w/1 eng. (PAW 1830)	250	Completed . July, 1939	None	None
Pratt & Whitney, martford, Conn.	Engines (SB4G)	500		500	None
	Engines (SC3G)	1,288	To be completed by March, 1940	1,128	240

NOTE: Data received from Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce. There may be inaccuracies in some of these figures. A more accurate report based on Government information will be compiled as of November 1 (about Nov. 15).

UNCL/SS 3



Chate Dept. Letters, 1417/2

DEPARTMENT OF SPATE

By J. Schariote Cate FEB 4 1972

PARAPRASE

TO SHARE THE PARTY OF THE PARTY

Telephone po. 220

Dated: 4/21/42 midnight

From: Callegram

Rec'd: 4/23/42 6:17 A.m.

WEIGHT PRICRITY.

TO CHIETINIUS AND MCCARD FROM WASSERMAN.

The special boring machine, universal boring machine, and deplet provision and boring machine that were to be delivered to the Cliver form Equipment Company for making good books and final drives for Australian tanks have been diversal, according to information which Barnes receives from backgrouper. Austrolian tank production, which is about to be approved by the American Army and is ready to a fit and output of ten tanks per week, (eventually 20 m. a core machine tools arrive) when goar boxes and army the delivered here will be orippied by this diversal.

I indepoted this tenk production in the company of Unit to the and australian ordnance officers, and as such the vetion is absolutely essential to the general plan of the Australian Army, I feel that holding this at which be a serious mistake. The details of the machine fords needed to increase tank output will soon be for read to you. I expect, carrying the formal approval of the High Command.

JOHNEON.

ax**/**a:UCO:MB**J** a/fa/co.

Contact Co:

Er. Hopkins (2)

Mr. McJaba (1) via Stattinius

Mr. Stettinius (1)

SF Somilians

Ry J. Scheriche Late FEB

DUPARTICULT OF STATE

PARAPHHASE

1 1 1

COMPTONICTAL

Telegram no. 2032

Dated: 4/22/42 11 p.m.

From: LONDON

Rec'd: 4/22/42 11:16 p.m.

FROM HARRIMAN FOR STETTINIUS.

One. In the artillery group there are certain antitank data. Do they apply to complete equipments or to guns only?

Two. In the data for the M1918A 20 automatic rifle and for the M1919A4 and A5 machine guns, are modernized at tell ac new weapons included?

Three. It is noted that there are not included in your list four items of which the production is about in the ordernoe production report. These are: Eran 305 median gun, two-inch bomb thrower, two-inch smoke bead, and three-inch morter bomb. I should like to know (1.) whether these items are produced in Canada and (b) whether you regard the production data for these items given in the ordnance report as authoritative.

Four. Please refer to the first paragraph of your 1894 of April 20. Are both gun and mount also included in the 81 MM mortar carrier without duplication of mortars classified as small arms?

Five. Will you please repeat the fourth item in the armored car subgroup, reference your Navy cable 080000 of April 8. It is not clear. The last sentence of the second paragraph of your 1707 of April 21 reads: "Item 681 150,000; item 682 71,000". Rather than group six, should this be group 57

MATTHEWS.

SA/E: DCB: MBJ 4/23/42.

Copies to: Mr. Hopkins (2) Mr. Stettinius (1) SAFE FILE: LOTHIAN, LORD

Lage : Lord Jothian.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

October 5, 1939.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached hereto a self-emplanatory nemorandum which the British Ambassador left at the Department when he called this morning.

Co H

If the existing list of "arms, ammunition and implements of war", the export of which to belligerent countries is now prohibited by the President's Proclamation of September 5th, were to be amended and any articles were to be omitted, the articles which His Majesty's Government would be most interested in seeing excluded would be the following: -

CATEGORY I.

- (S) Gun liners.
- (4) Small arms ammunition. Shell bodies. Cartriago cases.

CATEGORY II.

Articles used for naval purposes, more particularly mines.

CATEGORY III and CATERCRY V

Aircraft of all kinds including engines, individual component parts of aircraft engines, aeronautical equipment and instrument, normally supplied with complete aeroplanes.

CATEGORY VII.

(1) and (2). Chemicals not made up finally into explosives and charges.

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON D.C.

October 2nd 1939.

Lefe: To Lothian

THE SECRETARY

November 13, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram received by the British Embassy from its Government dated November tenth which contains secret information on the European situation which may be of interest to you.

C.H.

Lefe: To Lothian

THE SECRETARY

November 13, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram received by the British Embassy from its Government dated November tenth which contains secret information on the European situation which may be of interest to you.

C.H.

JEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter just received from the British Ambassador relative to the telegram of November tenth, which the British Embassy received from its Government and which I sent over to you this morning.

CH :

Se Seem

REGRADED .

DRITHER MED. DEF, WESHINGTON, D.C. November 13th, 1939.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In the last paragraph of the telegram of which Mr. Mallet sent you a copy in his letter of November 11th it was stated that the Foreign Office had heard from our Ambassador in Paris that the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was appealing for military conversations with the French authorities and that a French general was to be sent at once to Brussels. It would seem however from a further telegram which has now reached us from London that the earlier message was not altogether accurate. Our Ambassador at Brussels states that it is exaggerated to say that M. Spaak is appealing for conversations and that it is not the case that a French general is being sent to Erussels.

Believe me, My dear Mr. Secretary,
Yours very sincerely,

LOTHIAN

The Honourable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of
the United States,
Washington, D. C.

Safe File
Lord Lothaun
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 17th, 1940

ident,
we just been informed by the
se that, as you are no doubt aware,
the Government asked through the
enment for the cessation of

Dear Mr. President,

I have just been informed by the

Foreign Office that, as you are no doubt aware,
the new French Government asked through the

Spanish Government for the cessation of
hostilities and to be informed of the
conditions on which an armistice would be
granted.

has now been instructed to make to the new
French Government the communications regarding
the question of an armistice which were
contained in paragraph 2 of the telegram sent
to me yesterday by Lord Halifax (copy of which
marked (1) I gave you last night) and in the
telegram/

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

telegram addressed yesterday by Lord Halifax to Bordeaux (copy of which marked (2) I also handed to you last night.)

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Lolevan

SAFE FILE: LUBIN, ISADOR

Safe: Lubin
THE WHITE HOUSE

April 13, 1942

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT:

MERCHANT VESSEL LOSSES


The attached table shows that during the week ending April 5, the United States and British governments received notification of the loss of 19 ships aggregating 186,244 deadweight tons. Of this total, 100,103 tons were tankers and 86,141 tons were cargo ships.

During the same week 12 new ships of 130,041 deadweight tons were put into operation. Two of these were tankers, of 32,250 tons.

The net loss of merchant vessels under United States and British control for the week ending April 5 was 56,203 deadweight tons.

You will note from the table that there was a net gain in cargo ships of 11,650 tons. The net loss of tankers (new construction minus sinkings) was 67,853 tons.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972



GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS UNDER AMERICAN AND BRITISH CONTROL MULBER AND DEADWEIGHT TORMAGE WEEK ENDING APRIL 5, 1942

On	CARGO		TARKER		TOTAL	
No.	DUT	No.	DWT	No.	DEVT	
11						
5	54,691	2	32,250	7	86 , 941	
5	13,100	-	-	5	13,100	
1	10,600	-	-	1	10,600	
. 11	32,500	-	-	4	32,500	
-	-	-	-	-		
10	97,791	2	32,250	12	130,011	
<u>s</u> 7	52, ld.1	2	18,003	9	70 , kkl	
-	52,441 33,700	2	18,003 82,100	9		
7	10.00			34000	70,644 115,800 186,244	
7 s 3	33,700	7	82,100	10	115,800	
	<u>11</u> 5 5	5 5h,691 5 43,100 1 10,600 4 32,500	5 5h,691 2 5 h3,100 - 1 10,600 - 1 32,500 -	5 5h,691 2 32,250 5 h3,100 1 10,600 h 32,500	5 5h,691 2 32,250 7 5 h3,100 5 1 10,600 1 h 32,500 4	

BASIS: Date of notification

SOURCES: U. S. controlled - U. S. Maritime Commission


British Controlled vessels - Linistry of War Transport

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board April 11, 1942

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the BB. 8.1972

By W. J. Stewart Date__



Safe: Lubin

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

April 13, 1942

MEMADRANDUM

Tố:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT:

MERCHANT VESSEL LOSSES

The attached chart shows the merchant vessel situation from March 1 to April 5.

It should be noted that the losses reported for the week ending April 5 were smaller than for any week in the 5-week period. On the other hand, new construction was higher than for any week in the period.

The total losses for the five weeks, as shown on the chart, amounted to 1,195,000 deadweight tons. This is an average loss of approximately 239,000 tons per week.

The total new construction in the United States, Great Britain and Canada for the five weeks was 456,000 tons, or an average of 91,000 tons per week.

The total net loss for the five weeks was 739,000 tons, or an average of approximately 148,000 tons per week.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972

VEEK ENDING --- 8 VRCES: { U.S. - WINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT THOUSAND 200 LOSS NET MARCH, 1942 139 GAINS MERCHANT VESSELS 273 BASIS: DATE OF NOTIFICATION LOSSES U.S. AND THOUSAND DEADWEIGHT TONS MARCH I TO APRIL 5, 1942 APRIL, 1942 GAINS AND U.K. CONTROLLED LOSSES ō MAY, 1942 <u></u> 200 300 a42602

Safe: Lubin

Del

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

April 17, 1942

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: SHIPPING LOSSES

March, 1942

Losses of British and United States merchant vessels, on which notification was received during the month of March, reached an all-time monthly high record of 1,023,000 DWT tons. This figure exceeds February losses by almost 300,000 tons.

Of the ships lost, 564,000 tons were cargo and 458,000 tons were tankers.

During the month, U.S., U.K., and Canadian construction of new ships aggregated 350,200 tons. Of this total, only 28,000 DWT tons were tankers. This is equal to about 5 per cent of the total tanker tonnage lost during the month.

The <u>net</u> loss (losses minus new construction) for the month of March were 672,400 DWT tons. At the end of the month, the combined merchant fleets of both countries had declined by 242,000 tons of cargo ships and 430,000 tons of tankers. Table No. 1 attached shows the breakdown of the construction and losses by type of ship.

Losses for the Quarter Ending March 31

Gross losses of merchant shipping under U.S. and U.K. control for the first quarter aggregated 2,366,000 tons. If this rate were continued throughout the year, the gross loss for 1942 would amount to close to 10 million DWT tons.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

FEB 8 1972

New construction for the first quarter amounted to 1,020,000 tons, leaving a net loss of 1,345,000 tons.

The loss figures refer to losses by sinking and capture, of which notification was received by the United States and British governments during the quarter. They do not refer precisely to the date on which the actual sinking or loss occurred.

The picture for the quarter is presented in the table below:

GAINS AND LOSSES
NEW CONSTRUCTION - SINKINGS & CAPTURES
U. S., U. K., CANADA
JANUARY 1, 1942 - MARCH 31, 1942

	January	February	March	Total
Sinkings & Captures	612,092	731,075	1,022,678	2,365,845
New Construction	308,378	361,449	350,232	1,020,059
NET DECREASE	303,714	369,626	672,446	1,345,786

A more detailed breakdown of the shipping situation for the first quarter of 1942 is shown in Table No. 2. The bottom of this table shows that 83 tankers of 921,800 DWT tons were lost in the quarter as compared with 15 new tankers of 222,195 tons which were put into operation during the period. For cargo ships, the losses for the quarter were 212, of 1,444,000 DWT tons. New construction of cargo ships for the quarter was 82 ships, of 797,864 tons.

In addition to these losses, it is estimated that the sinkings and captures of neutral vessels, not under the control of either the United States or the United Kingdom, aggregated 310,000 DWT tons during the quarter. This brings the total U.S., U.K., and neutral vessel gross losses up to 2,675,000 tons.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972



Estimated Losses for the Week Ending April 12

According to preliminary estimates received from London, the combined losses for the week ending April 12 were 70 vessels, aggregating approximately 565,000 DWT tons. Twenty-two vessels of 229,000 tons were tankers.


The losses for the week exceeded the losses for the entire month of December and were only 50,000 tons under the total losses for the month of January. The losses during the week exceeded the previous weekly peak (March 15 - March 22) by more than 200,000 tons.

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GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS*

UNDER AMERICAN OR BRITISH CONTROL

NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE

MARCH, 1942

	CAI	CARGO		TANKER		TAL
	No.	DWT	No.	DWT	No.	DWT
GAINS						
New Construction				-		
U. S.	17	179,332	2	28,000	19	207,332
British	15	142,900	-		15	142,900
In U.S. In U.K. In Canada	5 9 1	53,000 79,400 10,500		=	5 9 1	53,000 79,400 10,500
TCTAL	32	322,232	2	28,000	34	350,232
LOSSES Sinkings & Captures						
U. S.	20	157,140	14	169,038	34	326,178
British	60	407,000	28	289,500	88	696,500
TOTAL	80	564,140	42	458,538	122	1,022,678
NET DECREASE	48	241,908	1,0	430,538	88	672,446


*British figures on four week basis ending March 29, 1942


BASIS: Date of Notification

SOURCE: U.S. - U.S. Maritime Commission

British - Ministry of War Transport

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GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS UNDER AMERICAN OR BRITISH CONTROL NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE

	C	CARGO		TANKER		TATOT
	No.	DWT	No.	DWT	No,	DWT
	J	ANUARY, 1942				
New Construction	20	191,793	8	116,585	28	308,378
Losses	70	463,712	12	148,380	82	612,092
Net Decrease	50	271,919	4	31,795	54	303,71
	F	EERUARY, 1942	,			
New Construction	30	283,839	5	77,610	35	361,449
Losses	62	416,193	29	314,882	91	731,07
Net Decrease	32	132,354	24	237,272	56	369,62
		MARCH, 1942				
New Construction	32	322,232	2	28,000	34	350,23
Losses	80	564,140	42	458,538	122	1,022,678
Net Decrease	48	241,908	40	430,538	88	672,440
	JANU	ARY 1 to MAI	RCH 31,	1942		
New Construction	82	797,864	15	222,195	97	1,020,059
Losses	212	1,444,045	83	921,800	295	2,365,845
Net Decrease	130	646,181	68	699,605	198	1,345,786

BASIS:

Date of Notification


SOURCE: U.S. - U.S. Maritime Commission British - Ministry of War Transport

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB

MERCHANT VESSELS-U.S. AND U.K. CONTROLLED



Luis in the trans of and of the standed of the shipping man. a.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

April 28, 1942

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: MERCHANT SHIPPING GAINS AND LOSSES Week Ending April 19, 1942

Tankers

- During the week ending April 19, United States and British controlled tanker losses continued at an exceedingly high rate. Total U. S. and U. K. losses were 150,000 DW tons.
- New construction of tankers in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada for the month aggregated 28,000 tons.
- Taking the first three weeks of April as a whole, 38 tankers of 441,000 tons were lost.
- 4. During the first three weeks of April, only five new tankers of 73,000 tons were put into operation.
- 5. From January 1 to April 19, 1942, total U.S. and U.K. tanker tonnage lost was 1,363,000 tons. During the same period 295,000 tons of new construction were put into commission, leaving a net decrease in available tonnage of 1,068,000 tons. This is about 10 per cent of the total tanker tonnage available to the United States and Great Britain on January 1.

Cargo Vessels

- 6. Losses of cargo vessels under American and British control during the week ending April 19 were 175,000 tons.
- 7. This loss was partially offset by new U.S., U.K., and Canadian construction during the week when 128,800 DW tons were put into commission.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

I I

By W. J. Stewart DatoFEB 8 1972



Combined Cargo and Tanker Losses

- 8. The combined cargo and tanker losses for the week ending April 19 were 325,000 tons. This is 159,000 tons less than during the previous week.
- 9. The net losses (sinkings minus new construction) for the week aggregated 169,700 tons. This is 221,000 tons less than during the week ending April 12.
- 10. The reported shipping losses for the three weeks ending April 19 aggregated 996,000 tons. This exceeded the losses for the month of December by 630,000 tons. It was 384,000 tons greater than the losses for the whole month of January, and 265,000 tons greater than the losses in February.

Location of Sinkings

ll. Preliminary reports as to actual location of sinkings received by April 23 show that between April 1 and April 23, 307,000 tons of United States, British, Allied and Neutral shipping were lost in the Atlantic north of 30° N. and west of 45° W. Losses in the Atlantic Ocean south of 30° N. and west of 45° W. were 85,000 tons. Indian Ocean losses were 186,000 tons.


The attached table shows new construction and losses for cargo vessels and tankers under United States and British control for the week ending April 19.


The chart attached shows the changes in the shipping situation from March 1 to date.

A table and map showing sinkings by geographical areas from April 1-23 are also attached.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972










GAINS AND LOSSES OF CCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS UNDER AMERICAN OR BRITISH CONTROL NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE WEEK ENDING APRIL 19, 1942


	CAF	CARGO		TANKER		TAL
	No.	DWT	NO.	DWT	NO.	D.TT
GAINS						
New Construction						
U.S.	6	64,700	-		6	64,700
British	6	64,100	2	26,500	8	90,600
In U.S. In U.K. In Canada	2 3 1	21,200 32,400 10,500	2	26,500	2 5 1	21,200 58,900 10,500
TOTAL GAINS	12	128,800	2	26,500	14	155,300
LOSSES						
Sinkings & Captures						
U.S.	6	53,000	6	87,700	12	140,700
British	16	122,400	5	61,900	21	184,300
	_				-	
TOTAL LOSSES	22	175,400	11	149,600	33	325,000
NET DECREASE FOR WEEK	10	46,600	9	123,100	19	169,700

BASIS: Date of Notification

SCURCE: U.S. - U.S. Haritime Commission British - Ministry of War Transport

April 25, 1942





U.S., BRITISH, ALLIED and NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSELS SINKINGS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

APRIL 1-23, 1942

(Preliminary)

AREA	DWT
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, West of 45°W.	307,000
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, East of 45°W.	56,000
British Coastal Waters	57,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, West of 45°W:	85,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, East of 45°W.	56,000
Lediterranean Sea	16,000
Pacific Ocean	2,000
Indian Ocean	186,000
Elsewhere or Area Unknown	64,000
TOTAL	829,000

BASIS: Date of Occurrence


SOURCE: Office of Naval Intelligence

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FFB 8 1972





STORE?

Lafe: Luli

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

May 5, 1942

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT:

MERCHANT SHIPPING FOR THE WEEK ENDING APRIL 26, 1942

Tankers

- 1. The immobilization of tankers was reflected in the shipping figures for the week. No United States tankers were reported as sunk during the week. It is interesting to note that no British tanker losses were reported.
- 2. During the week previous, tanker losses aggregated 150,000 DW tons.
- 3. One new tanker was added to the merchant fleet during the week.

Cargo Vessels

- 4. Although there was a reduction of 35,000 tons in cargo vessels lost during the week ending April 26 as compared with the week before, the total was 140,400 DW tons. This is at a rate of 7 million tons a year, despite the fact that some cargo vessels were immobilized in port.
- 5. The cargo vessel losses for the week were in large part offset by the new construction of 104,000 tons in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. This means that the net reduction in cargo vessels was approximately 35,000 tons.


Tanker and Cargo Vessels Combined

6. The combined net losses for tankers and cargo vessels (sinkings minus new construction) aggregated 26,200 tons for the

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972



THE PRESIDENT

--2--

May 5, 1942

week. This is the smallest net decrease for any week since March 1st. (See attached chart). During the week of April 19, net losses were 170,000 tons.

Summary for the Four Weeks Ending April 26

- 7. Total shipping losses for which notification was received during the four weeks ending April 26 aggregated 1,136,000 tons. This is at an annual rate of almost 14 million tons. The losses during the first four weeks in April were 113,000 tons greater than in March.
- 8. New construction during the four weeks ending April 26 (tankers and cargo vessels) was 142,000 tons greater than in March. The total for the four weeks was 492,000 tons.
- 9. The decline in tonnage available to the United States and the United Kingdom during the four weeks was 644,000 tons (losses minus new construction).

Tankers

During this 4-week period, tanker sinkings were 441,000 tons. Only 83,000 tons of new tankers were put into operation.

Cargo Vessels

Cargo sinkings for the four weeks were 695,000 tons. New construction amounted to 409,500 tons.

Location of Losses

10. Preliminary figures now on hand, based upon the actual date of sinking, account for 941,000 DW tons lost between April 1 and April 30. Of this total, 476,000 tons, or more than one-half of the total, were lost in the Atlantic Ocean west of 45°W. In the Indian Ocean losses were 186,000 tons. (See Table I and map).

Table II attached shows new construction and losses of cargo vessels and tankers for the week ending April 26.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972





GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE WEEK ENDING APRIL 26, 1942

	CARGO		TANKER		TOTAL	
	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT
GAINS - New Construction						
U.S.	5	54,300	1	10,000	6	64,300
British	5	49,900	-		5	149,900
In U.S. In U.K. In Canada	1 3 1	10,600 28,800 10,500	- -		1 3 1	10,600 28,800 10,500
TOTAL GAINS	10	104,200	1	10,000	11	114,200
LOSSES - Sinkings, Captures & Marine Casualties						
U.S.	8	61,600	-		8	61,600
British	11	78,800	_		11	78,800
TOTAL LOSSES	19	140,400	-		19	140,400
NET DECREASE FOR WEEK	9	36,200	-		8	26,200
NET INCREASE FOR WEEK	-		1	10,000	-	
LOSSES - Other vessels available to United Nations	_2	15,300	_		_2	15,300
TOTAL LOSSES OF UNITED NATIONS	21	155,700	-		21	155,700
TOTAL NET GAIN	-		1	10,000	-	
TOTAL NET LOSS	11	51,500	_		10	41,500


BASIS: Date of Notification

SOURCE: U.S. - U.S. Maritime Commission; British - Ministry of War Transport

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U.S., BRITISH, ALLIED and NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSELS

SINKINGS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

APRIL 1-30, 1942

(Preliminary)

AREA	DWT
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, West of 45°W.	355,000
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, East of 45°W.	56,000
British Coastal Waters	57,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, West of 45°W.	121,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, East of 45°W.	56,000
Mediterranean Sea	34,000
Pacific Ocean	2,000
Indian Ocean	186,000
Elsewhere or Area Unknown	74,000
TOTAL	941,000

BASIS: Date of Occurrence


SOURCE: Office of Naval Intelligence

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

May 4, 1942

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972







Life / Lubin

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

May 11, 1942

MENORANDUM

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT:

SHIPPING SETUATION - WEEK ENDING MAY 3, 1942

For the first time since the U. S.-U.M. shipping statistics were combined (Merch 8, 1942), the figures show an actual increase in the amount of shipping available.

This is due to the fact that total losses for the week ending May 3 were 108,900 DWT. New construction for the period reached a new peak of 196,600 tons. The net increase in shipping available thus became 87,700 DWT. (See Chart I).

TANKERS

- 1. Despite the immobilization of tankers, three United States ships were lost, aggregating 37,300 tons during the week.
- 2. This loss was offset by the delivery of three new tankers totalling 44,800 DNT. This tanker production was 12,500 tons greater than that of the peak week of April 5.
- 3. The net tanker gain (new construction minus losses) was 7,500 tons. This is the second consecutive week showing a net gain in tanker tonnage.

CARGO VESSELS

- For the first time since the week ending April 5, cargo ship construction exceeded losses. The net increase for the week was 80,200 tons.
- 2. New cargo ship construction reached a newweekly peak. There were 14 vessels of 152,000 tons delivered. This is 23,000

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W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1977

tons more than the last peak, which was reached during the week ending April 19.

3. Losses during the week ending May 3 are the lowest recorded since early in March. Losses of U. S. and U. K. cargo vessels were 71,600 tons.


Table II shows new construction and losses for cargo vessels and tankers under U. S. and U. K. control for the week ending May 3.

LOCATION OF SINKINGS BY DATE OF OCCURRENCE

May 1 - 9, 1942

- 1. According to preliminary reports, 141,000 DWT were lost during the first nine days of May.
- 2. There was only one vessel (10,000 DWT) lost in the Atlantic Ocean, North of 30° North, and West of 645° West. In the South Atlantic (South of 30° North and West of 45° West) losses were 96,000 tons or 68% of the total reported.
- 3. Three vessels, aggregating 24,000 tons were lost off of Murmansk. One Russian vessel of 7,000 tons was sunk in the Pacific Ocean (See Table I).

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GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE WEEK ENDING MAY 3, 1942

-	CARGO		TANKER		TOTAL	
	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT
GAINS - New Construction						
U.S.	10	110,000	2	32,800	12	142,800
British	4	41,800	1	12,000	5	53,800
In U.S.	1	10,600	-		1	10,600
In U.K.	1	10,200	1	12,000	2	22,200
In Canada	1 2	21,000	_=		_2	21,000
TOTAL GAINS	114	151,800	3	44,800	17	196,600
LOSSES - Sinkings, Captures & Marine Casualties						
U.S.	3	21,100	3	37,300	6	58,400
British	_7	50,500	_=		_7	50,500
TOTAL LOSSES	10	71,600	3	37,300	13	108,900
NET INCREASE FOR WEEK	4	80,200	-	7,500	4	87,700
LOSSES - Other vessels	10	335				
available to United Nations	_3	19,300	_=		_3	19,300
TOTAL LOSSES OF UNITED NATIONS	13	90,900	3	37,300	16	128,200
TOTAL NET GAIN	1	60,900	-	7,500	1	68,400

BASIS: Date of Notification


SOURCE: U.S. War Shipping Administration British - Ministry of War Transport

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972

May 9, 1942







U.S., BRITISH, ALLIED and NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSELS SINKINGS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

MAY 1-9, 1942


(Preliminary)

AREA	DWT
Atlantic Ocean North of 30° N, West of 45° W.	10,000
Atlantic Ocean North of 30° N, East of 45° W.	24,000
British Coastel Waters	
Atlantic Ocean South of 30° N, West of 45° W.	96,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30° N, East of 45° W.	
Mediterranean and Red Sea	4,000
Pacific Ocean	7,000
Indian Ocean	
Elsewhere or Area Unknown	
TOTAL	141,000

BASIS: Date of Occurrence

SOURCE: Office of Naval Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By W. J. Stewart Date FFB 8 1972



May 11, 1942

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

May 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT:

SHIPPING GAINS AND LOSSES FOR THE WEEK ENDING

MAY 10

LOSSES

- 1. United States and United Kingdom merchant shipping losses for the week ending May 10 were higher than those for any week with but three exceptions since March 1.
- 2. The total U. S. and U. K. losses amounted to 260,000 tons. In addition, 26,000 tons of neutral vessels were lost, making total losses of the United Nations 286,000 tons. (See Table I)
- 3. If this rate of sinkings should continue, the annual loss would be close to 14,000,000 tons.
- 4. Tanker losses aggregated 62,000 tons. Cargo losses were 198,000 tons.

MET CONSTRUCTION

- 5. New construction during the week was 145,500 tons. Of this amount, 116,500 tons were built in American yards. (See Table I.)
 - 6. No new tankers were put into commission during the week.

NET CHANGE IN SHIPPING POSITION

7. The net loss for the week (sinkings minus new construction) was 140,700 tons. (See attached chart.)

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972

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8. Since December 1, the net shipping under U.S.-U.K. control has declined by 2,136,000 tons, despite the fact that 2,100,000 tons of new ships have been put into commission during the period.

LOCATION OF SINKINGS

9. The bulk of the ships lost during the first thirteen days of May were sunk in the Atlantic Ocean South of 30 N, West of 45 West. (See attached map.) This area accounted for 68% of the losses for which definite information is available in the Office of Naval Intelligence. During this period, 28,000 tons were sunk in the Murmansk area.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972



SECRET

GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS
AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE
WEEK ENDING MAY 10, 1942

	CARGO		TANKER		TOTAL	
	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT
GAINS - New Construction						
U.S.	9	95,300	2		9	95,300
British	5	50,200	-		5	50,200
In U.S. In U.K. In Canada	3	21,200 29,000	Ī	=	2 3 -	21,200 29,000
TOTAL GAINS	14	145,500	_		<u></u>	145,500
LOSSES - Sinkings, Captures & Marine Casualties					202	
U.S.	9	63,500	2	25,100	11	88,600
British	17	134,600	_3	36,900	20	171,500
TOTAL LOSSES	26	198,100	5	_62,000	31	260,100
NET DECREASE FOR WEEK	12	52,600	5	62,000	17	114,600
LOSSES - Other vessels available to United Nations	4	26 100				26 300
	_6	26,100	-		_6	26,100
TOTAL LOSSES OF UNITED NATIONS	32	224,200	5	62,000	37	286,200
TOTAL NET LOSS	18	78,700	5	62,000	23	140,700

BASIS: Date of Notification.

SOURCE: U.S. - War Shipping Administration British - Ministry of War Transport


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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972

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May 18, 1942



SECRET

U.S., BRITISH, ALLIED and NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSELS

SINKINGS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

MAY 1-13, 1942

(Preliminary)

AREA	DWT
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, West of 45°W.	30,000
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, East of 45°W.	28,000
British Coastal Waters	1,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, West of 45°W.	218,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, East of 45°W.	
Mediterranean and Red Sea	4,000
Pacific Ocean	25,000
Indian Ocean	
Elsewhere and Area Unknown	
TOTAL	306,000

BASIS: Date of Occurrence

SOURCE: Office of Naval Intelligence

May 18, 1942

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972





THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM May 25, 1942 TO: THE PRESIDENT FROM: MR. LUBIN SUBJECT: SHIPPING SITUATION - WEEK ENDING MAY 17 Shipping losses totalled 36 vessels of 305,000 DWT tons during the week ending May 17. 2. There were 14 new U.S. and U.K. vessels, aggregating 152,600 DWT tons, put into commission. 3. The ratio of new vessels put into commission to the number of vessels lost was one to two-and-a-half. The ratio in tonnage was about one to two. 4. Sinkings during the week were at the annual rate of about 16 million tons, whereas U.S., U.K., and Canadian construction was at the annual rate of approximately 8 million tons. 5. In addition to the losses sustained by the U.S. and U.K. controlled merchant fleets, 14 vessels of 72,000 tons under Allied and Neutral control were lost, bringing the total losses for the week up to 50 vessels of 377,600 tons. 6. The net loss of U.S.-U.K. ships (sinkings minus new construction) was 153,000 tons. This is the highest net weekly loss since the week ending April 19. (See Chart No. 1.) Tankers 7. Thirteen tankers, aggregating 148,000 tons were lost. 8. Only one new tanker was put into commission.

. . .

Cargo Ships

9. Twenty-three cargo vessels of 157,000 tons were lost. Offsetting this U.S.-U.K. loss were 13 new ships, aggregating 139,000 tons. (See Table No. 1.)





GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE WEEK ENDING MAY 17, 1942

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	CARGO		TANKER		TOTAL	
	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT
GAINS- New Construction						
U. S.	9	98,400	1	13,000	10	111,400
British	14	41,200	-	-	4	41,200
In U.S.	2	21,200	_	-	2	21,200
In U.K.	1	9,500	-	-	1	9,500
In Canada	1	10,500	-	-	-	10,000
TOTAL GAINS	13	139,600	1	13,000	과	152,600
LOSSES - Sinkings, Captures & Marine Casualties						
v. s.	6	31,300	7	83,800	13	115,100
British	17	126,200	6	64,200	23	190,400
TOTAL LOSSES	23	157,500	13	148,000	36	305,500
NET DECREASE FOR WEEK	10	17,900	12	135,000	22	152,900
LOSSES - Other vessels available to United Nations	13	62,100	1	10,000	14	72,100
	landarios.			A total months		-
TOTAL LOSSES OF UNITED NATIONS	36	219,600	114	158,000	50	377,600
TOTAL NET LOSS	23	80,000	13	145,000	36	225,000

BASIS: Date of Notification.

SOURCE: U.S. - War Shipping Administration British - Ministry of War Transport



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

May 25, 1942

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: SHIPPING GAINS AND LOSSES -

FINAL FIGURES FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL

- 1. An all-time high of 56 ships, aggregating 619,000 DWT tons, were put into commission in April by the United States and the United Kingdom.
- 2. Losses of U.S. and U.K. controlled vessels also reached an all-time high; the total loss for the month was 131 vessels aggregating 1,158,000 tons.
- 3. For every new vessel put into commission during April, 2-1/2 were lost. Tonnage losses were twice as high as new construction.
- 4. Losses in April were 13 per cent higher than in the previous peak month (March). (See Chart No. 2.)
- 5. In addition to losses of U.S. and U.K. controlled ships, the Allied and Neutral losses in April were 28 vessels of 158,000 tons.
- 6. The total U.S., U.K., Allied and Neutral loss in April was 159 ships of 1,316,000 tons.
- 7. New construction for the month was equal to about 46 per cent of these total losses.

(See attached Table No. 2.)



GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE APRIL, 1942

	CAR	ugo	TAN	KER	TOTAL		
	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT	
GAINS New Construction							
U. S.	27	293,000	3	49,000	30	342,000	
British	22	224,400	4	53,000	26	277,400	
In U.S. In U.K. In Canada	6 12 4	63,600 118,700 42,100	<u>.</u>	53,000	6 16 4	63,600 171,700 42,100	
TOTAL	49	517,400	7	102,000	56	619,40	
LOSSES Sinkings & Captures							
U. S.	29	215,000	17	207,000	46	422,00	
British	65	518,000	20	218,000	85	736,00	
TOTAL	94	733,000	37	425,000	131	1,158,00	
NET DECREASE	45	215,600	30	323,000	75	538,60	
LOSSES - other vessels					-	ST.	
available to United Nations	25	122,000	_3	36,000	28	158,00	
TOTAL LOSSES OF UNITED NATIONS	119	855,000	40	461,000	159	1,316,00	
TOTAL NET DECREASE	70	337,600	33	359,000	103	696,60	

^{*}British figures on five week basis ending May 3, 1942

BASIS: Date of Notification

SOURCE: U.S. - War Shipping Administration; British - Ministry of War Transport

May 20, 1942




By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 8 1972

Chart No. 2.

GAINS AND LOSSES

MERCHANT VESSELS-U.S. AND U.K. CONTROLLED



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

May 25, 1942

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:


MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: SHIPPING LOSSES -

December, 1941 through April, 1942

- 1. During the five months since the United States entered the war, 3,890,000 DWT tons of United States and United Kingdom shipping have been lost.
- 2. Less than half of this loss has been offset by new construction.
- 3. Whereas the tonnage available to the United States and Great Britain on December 1 was 40,001,000 DWT tons, the net available on May 1, after new construction had been taken into consideration, had fallen to 37,997,000 DWT tons, making a net loss of 2,004,000 tons for the period.

(See table No. 3 and bottom of chart No. 2.)




GAINS AND LOSSES OF OCEAN GOING MERCHANT VESSELS UNDER AMERICAN OR BRITISH CONTROL NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE DECEMBER, 1941 - MAY, 1942

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				By W. J. St		ate 1972
	CA	CARGO		TANKER		TAL
	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT	NO.	DWT
Total Merchant Vessels as of December 1, 1941	3,843	27,968,906	1,099	12,032,101	4,942	40,001,007
Total Gains, New Construction Losses, Sinkings & Captures	19 37	182,575 281,138	5	64,700 85,498	24 45	247,275 366,636
Net Decrease for December	18	98,563	3	20,798	21	119,361
Total Merchant Vessels as of January 1, 1942	3,825	27,870,343	1,096	12,011,303	4,921	39,881,646
Total Gains, New Construction Losses, Sinkings & Captures	20 70	191,793 463,712	8 12	116,585 148,380	28 82	308,378 612,092
Net Decrease for January	50	271,919	4	31,795	54	303,714
Total Merchant Vessels as of February 1, 1942	3,775	27,598,424	1,092	11,979,508	4,867	39,577,932
Total Gains, New Construction Losses, Sinkings & Captures	30 <u>62</u>	283,839 416,193	5 29	77,610 314,882	35 <u>91</u>	361,449 731,075
Net Decrease for February	32	132,354	24	237,272	56	369,626
Total Merchant Vessels as of March 1, 1942	3,743	27,466,070	1,068	11,742,236	4,811	39,208,306
Total Gains, New Construction Losses, Sinkings & Captures	32 80 48	322,232 564,140	2 42	28,000 458,538	34 122	350,232 1,022,678
Net Decrease for March	48	241,908	40	430,538	88	672,446
Total Merchant Vessels as of April 1, 1942	3,695	27,224,162	1,028	11,311,698	4,723	38,535,860
Total Gains, New Construction Losses, Sinkings & Captures	49 <u>94</u> 45	517,400 733,000	<u>37</u>	102,000 425,000	131	619,400 1,158,000
Net Decrease for April	45	215,600	30	323,000	75	538,600
Total Merchant Vessels as of May 1, 1942	3,650	27,008,562	998	10,988,698	4,648	37,997,260

U.S. - War Shipping Administration BASIS: Date of Notification SOURCE: British - Ministry of War Transport



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

May 25, 1942

TO:

THE PRESIDENT


FROM:

MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: LOCATION OF SINKINGS BY DATE

OF OCCURRENCE

- 1. According to preliminary reports for the period May 1 - May 21st, 403,000 tons or 68 per cent of the tonnage sunk has been lost in the Atlantic Ocean, south of 30° North and west of 45° West.
- 2. Losses in the Atlantic Ocean, north of 300 North, west of 45° West, were 49,000 tons.
- 3. Locations for sinkings for which information by date of occurrence is available are shown on the attached map.



U.S., BRITISH, ALLIED and NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSELS SINKINGS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

MAY 1-21, 1942

(Preliminary)

AREA	DWT
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, West of 45°W.	49,000
Atlantic Ocean North of 30°N, East of 45°W.	53,000
British Coastal Waters	1,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, West of 45 W.	403,000
Atlantic Ocean South of 30°N, East of 45°W.	
Mediterranean and Red Sea	14,000
Pacific Ocean	25,000
Indian Ocean	11,000
Elsewhere or Area Unknown	30,000
TOTAL	586,000

BASIS:

Date of Occurrence


SOURCE:

Office of Naval Intelligence

By Deputy Archivist of the FEB' 8 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date

May 23, 1942





THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Sofe: Lubin

MEMORANDUM

July 15, 1942

TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MR. LUBIN

We have just received some preliminary figures from London on shipping losses for the week ending last Sunday (July 12). These figures show a loss for the week of something in excess of half a million tons of shipping. Final figures for the week will not be available for three or four days. This is the highest loss for any week on record.

Twenty-two of the ships lost during the week were on the Murmansk-Archangel run. Seventeen were proceeding eastward and were loaded, and five were sailing west without cargo.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date

FEB 8 1972